AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SHARES IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S CLAIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000040 SIPDIS NEA FOR LIMBERT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2025 TAGS: PREL AORC IR AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SHARES IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S CLAIM THAT IRAN WILL ACCEPT TRR PROPOSAL REF: A. VIENNA 138 ¶B. UNVIE 553 Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 5, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) debriefed Tri-Mission officers on a meeting he had earlier in the week with Iranian President Ahmadinejad's chief of cabinet, Mashaie, at Mashaie's request. On the nuclear issue, Mashaie told Postl that Iran is now ready to accept the Tehran Research Reactor proposal as put forward by the IAEA because it has enough LEU that losing the 1200 kg is less of a worry than it was previously and because if successful, the agreement would be tantamount to international acceptance of the Iranian right to enrich. (Note: Mashaie did not address the very apparent inconsistency of this message with other Iranian statements, including by President Ahmadinejad, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh in Vienna, and Iran's recent counterproposal to the IAEA. End Note.) ¶2. (C) Comment: Although Mission cannot discount, given Postl's good contacts in Tehran, that Mashaie may have summoned Postl to convey a policy change on the TRR proposal to the USG, we have no other indications of Iranian acceptance of the original terms. Nevertheless, it is possible that Iran or, more specifically, Ahmadinejad is trying to use this channel to confuse the issue sufficiently to delay sanctions or other actions against Iran or to gain some traction in internal struggles in Tehran. In addition, neither Postl nor others at the Austrian MFA are well-versed in the nuances of the TRR proposal or the differences between that proposal and the Iranian counterproposals conveyed publicly and to the IAEA, thus it is possible that Mashaie used positive language to convey Iranian willingness to accept terms not congruent with the IAEA proposal. Mashaie also noted that the U.S. was disproportionately focused on the newly-outed Qom enrichment facility declaring ominously that there are other, more important, nuclear sites. ¶3. (C) Mashaie also told Postl that Iran is not worried about sanctions, which it believes would be watered down by Russia and China, or that Israel would strike Iran. He portrayed opposition as being buttressed by foreign support, and Postl suggested that Iranian officials may have convinced themselves that this is true. Overall, Postl described Mashaie as Ahmadinejad's "right hand" and, thus, his comments should be taken as having the explicit backing of or being directed by the President. Discussion of the U.S. hikers detained in Iran and Iranian participation in Afghanistan-related talks has been reported in Ref A. End Summary. -------------- Iran Ready to Accept the TRR Proposal -------------- ¶4. (C) On February 5, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) gave UNVIE MsnOff and Embassy PolOff a readout of a 90-minute, one-on-one meeting he had on February 1 in Geneva with President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's chief of cabinet, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, at Mashaie's request. They began the meeting with a discussion of the nuclear issue. Postl referred to Mashaie's promise in September that Iran would come to Geneva with a constructive attitude (reported in Ref B),acknowledging that Iran had done so, and asked what had happened since; why had that spirit of compromise not lasted beyond the October 1 discussions? Mashaie explained that there were two reasons that Iran's attitude had changed in the wake of the Geneva talks. First was the domestic political friction in Iran over the nuclear issue. Second was that Iran perceived that the parties changed the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal in between the October 1 meeting and the Vienna talks starting on October 19. Mashaie claimed that in Geneva there was no explicit discussion of where the exchange would take place or that the Iranian LEU needed to be transferred out of Iran in one tranche. It was a surprise to Iran that these elements were added prior to the Vienna meetings and the change in tone caused Iranian officials to question the motives of the other parties. ¶5. (C) Despite initial rejection of the terms of the IAEA TRR proposal, Mashaie claimed to Postl that Ahmadinejad recently had been able to convince the "spoilers" in the Iranian government that now is a good time to go forward with the proposal as put forward by the IAEA. (Note: Mashaie did not reference the recent Iranian counterproposal to the IAEA which essentially rejects the offer as proposed by the IAEA in October. End Note.) These naysayers were persuaded given that Iran now has more LEU, so although it would be bad if they lost the 1200 kg they would send out under the proposal, it was still worth seeing if the other parties would follow through with their side of the agreement. More importantly, if the exchange was successful, it was tantamount to international acceptance of Iran's right to enrich. Postl said that he pressed Mashaie on who these spoilers were, noting that the West needs to know who it needs to reach on these issues. Mashaie said that although Ali Akbar Velayati previously held the most influence on foreign policy in the Supreme Leader's office, he had been surpassed by former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, who was responsible for convincing the Supreme Leader to reject the TRR proposal. Other influential opponents to the deal were former Supreme Council for National Security Secretaries and former nuclear negotiators Ali Larijani and Hasan Ruhani who still are advisors to the Supreme Leader on the nuclear file. ¶6. (C) In response to a MsnOff question, Postl said Mashaie did not note any Iranian plans to inform the IAEA of their decision to move forward with the proposal, and Postl was unaware of whether Iran planned to convey this message through any other channels. Postl had not read the text of Ahmadinejad's statements on Iranian TV on February 2, but did not believe, given the timing and venue, that comments were meant to signal a change in the Iranian position. Postl added that Iran was no more interested in arranging a LEU transfer in Austria or Switzerland, rather than Turkey, since Tehran "trusts" the governments in Vienna and Bern more. ¶7. (C) Comment. Postl served as Austrian Ambassador to Tehran until fall 2009. Possibly because of his proficient Farsi and familiarity with Iranian culture, Postl enjoyed better Iranian government contacts than many Western diplomats, especially in the wake of the Iranian elections, thus Mission cannot discount that Mashaie may have summoned Postl to convey a policy change on the TRR proposal to the USG. Nevertheless, it is possible that Iran or, more specifically, Ahmadinejad is trying to use this channel to confuse the issue sufficiently to delay sanctions or other actions against Iran or to gain some traction in internal struggles in Tehran. In addition, neither Postl nor others at the Austrian MFA are well-versed in the nuances of the TRR proposal or the differences between that proposal and the Iranian counterproposals conveyed publicly and to the IAEA, thus it is possible that Mashaie used positive language to convey Iranian acceptance of terms not congruent with the IAEA proposal. Postl is much more familiar, however, with Iranian domestic issues and his insight into domestic machinations have often proven well-founded and been later borne out. End Comment. ¶8. (C) Postl said he told Mashaie that Iran should not expect that acceptance of the TRR proposal now would head off UN sanctions since that train was already underway. Rather, he noted, cooperation now might prevent a new round of sanctions beyond the set currently under consideration. (Note: Postl expressed his opinion that Iran only responds to pressure, so the dual-track approach is the right one and should be continued. End Note.) (Comment: Postl appears more supportive of the dual-track approach than some of his colleagues in the Austrian MFA, which has reluctantly accepted the idea of UNSC sanctions but is resisting calls for the preparation of additional, EU sanctions. Friedrich Stift, MFA Middle East Director, argued during the meeting that Iran would lose face if it carried out a TRR agreement and still faced sanctions. End Comment.) Mashaie said that Iran was not afraid of new UN sanctions and was confident that Russia and China would water down any sanctions in that forum. Postl queried whether Iranian conservatives, in fact, welcomed the sanctions, to which Mashaie made clear that the sanctions are not in Iran's interest, but it has learned to live with them. Mashaie laughed when Postl brought up the possibility of Israel bombing Iran if it does not cooperate on the nuclear file, saying that Israel will not dare attack Iran given the "risk" of doing so. ¶9. (C) Mashaie claimed that Iran is still interested in engagement with the U.S. and Iran had come to the October 1 talks showing its interest in engagement with the U.S. and specifically mentioned the bilateral meeting with the U.S. in this respect. However, Mashaie also said that it was frustrated by working with the French and the Russians in the TRR deal and would prefer to deal directly with the U.S. and noted several times that the UK was the "spoiler" of the P5 plus one and in engagement more generally. Ahmadinejad had shown his personal interest in engagement by sending a letter to President Obama to congratulate him on winning the U.S. presidency, but was depressed, according to Mashaie, to get no response. He was "embarrassed" that when Obama decided to correspond with the Iranian leadership, he sent a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei instead of returning Ahmadinejad's correspondence. Mashaie said this had a very negative effect on Ahmadinejad because he is a "very proud man." Despite Ahmadinejad's unhappiness with sanctions, Mashaie argued that he is in a strong position now after his "heavy majority" in the June elections. In contrast, Iranian officials believe President Obama is in a weaker position since he has been unable to produce a victory on the Iran portfolio, thus the U.S. Administration needs to take the next step. ¶10. (C) Closing out the discussion on the nuclear file, Mashaie referred to the nuclear issue as a game and noted that the recently-exposed Qom facility "is nothing." Mashaie said the importance of this site was overblown by the U.S. and there are other, more important, sites related to Iran's nuclear program. ¶11. (C) As a side note on the changing influences in Tehran, Postl also noted that Foreign Minister Manucher Motaki is in a stronger position than he was prior to the June elections. He had been widely understood to be essentially outside of Iranian decisionmaking circles and had even given a "farewell" reception after Ahmadinejad's reelection, expecting that he would be dismissed under the second Ahmadinejad administration. To the contrary, however, Postl said that he is gaining influence under the protection of the Supreme Leader. -------------- Mashaie Says Foreigners Behind Opposition -------------- ¶12. (C) Postl also brought up with Mashaie the subject of the lingering aftermath of the June elections, noting that Austria is "appalled" at the human rights situation in Iran and implored Mashaie to allow free demonstrations in Iran. Avoiding the human rights issue, Mashaie responded that Ahmadinejad's election was a strong success and the population in the countryside "loves" the president. He then noted that there are clear indications of foreign intervention in the demonstrations, specifically in those that took place on Ashura. In response to a MsnOff question about whether Iran really believes foreigners are behind the protests, Postl noted that Iranian officials may have convinced themselves that this is true even if they originally knew this was just bluster. He recalled Iran's recent frustration with and distrust of the Germans, which Postl believes may originate with the presence of a German diplomat at one of the protests, and noted that Iran is now used to the French hard line. However, I ran is most struggling with the penetration of BBC Persian, and Postl noted that Mashaie specifically addressed this issue as Western malfeasance. ¶13. (C) After the meeting, the Iranians provided a driver to take Postl to the airport. Much to Postl's surprise given the driver's link to Iranian officials and Postl's own position, the driver told him that the opposition movement in Iran is strong and will continue. ¶14. (C) Some of Postl's Iranian contacts have said that the opposition misused Ashura to start unrest. They noted that it may have angered the clerics to use a religious holiday for political protests and that the opposition should use other occasions to protest the leadership. -------------- Who Does Mashaie Speak For? -------------- ¶15. (C) Given the unique insights Mashaie provided during the meeting, MsnOff asked Postl his perception of Mashaie's influence and the degree to which what he said should be taken as the words of Ahmadinejad. Postl replied that Mashaie clearly and confidently was speaking for Ahmadinejad and, when conveying something not previously discussed with the President, he would add, "I think the President would see it the same way." ¶16. (C) One of the issues that reportedly had prevented Mashaie from becoming an Iranian vice president was opposition to his remarks - such as those in which he appeared to speak too positively about Israel - by the clergy. Other contacts had told Postl that Mashaie met a few weeks ago with clerics that had been opposed to his candidacy for that post in an attempt to seek accommodation with the clerics. Postl cautioned that it was not clear whether this story was true or was intended to show Mashaie and Ahmadinejad as stronger through reduction of opposition against them. Postl also took it, if true, to show that Mashaie still seeks the vice presidential post. In any case, Mashaie was being more cautious about his remarks on Israel and was unwilling to discuss it other than to note that Iran was not worried about an Israeli strike. Postl described him as Ahmadinejad's right hand and noted that Mashaie is leading the Council of Ministers, which Ahmadinejad rarely attends, showing the trust he puts in Mashaie. Postl noted that Mashaie is more moderate than many of the Iranian interlocutors he has dealt with, and Postl finds him relaxed in conversation. DAVIES