NEW CONSTELLATION POSES CHALLENGES FOR ADVANCING ANTI-CRIME

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000035 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV UN AU KCRM KCOR RS CH PK EG AG SZ SUBJECT: NEW CONSTELLATION POSES CHALLENGES FOR ADVANCING ANTI-CRIME AND ANTI-DRUG GOALS IN VIENNA ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Our partial success in negotiating a U.S.- backed review mechanism for an anticorruption convention last year has inspired a group of countries -- Russia, Iran, Algeria, China and Pakistan -- to coordinate more closely in Vienna at UN-related meetings on anti-crime and anti-drug issues. Following the departure of their sophisticated Egyptian leader last year, the group has taken on a more blunt and obstructionist character as they pursue their common negative agenda. In turn, this has charged the atmosphere with delegations such as Argentina, Mexico and several European Union members that do not share their goals. Post will monitor the progress of the alliance and determine if it can be broken through outreach to select individual members, to G-77 "bridge" delegations such as Indonesia and South Africa, or whether it will self destruct under the weight of its polarizing tactics. END SUMMARY -------------- Russia Takes on an Egypt's Mantle -------------- ¶2. (U) On January 25-26, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) hosted an expert group meeting to discuss the development of a review mechanism for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)(Note. Septel provides a readout of the substantive results of the meeting. End Note). At this meeting, U.S. delegation members were struck by a negative multilateral dynamic spearheaded by Russia, with assistance from Pakistan, Iran, Algeria, and China, that could possibly affect our work in key UNODC-related gatherings scheduled over the next several months, including the March UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the April UN Crime Congress, the May UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the ongoing Financial and Governance Working Group for UNODC. Throughout the two-day meeting, Russia produced a series of delay tactics aimed at halting discussions regarding a review mechanism. These tactics were a pale imitation of previous efforts by a recently-departed Egyptian delegation member, who was able to argue the hardliner point of view more persuasively. With the departure of the sophisticated Egyptian diplomat, Russia and its partners are now resorting to rough procedural objections to promote their negative multilateral objectives. ¶3. (SBU) The current hardline alliance appears to be an offshoot of a group assembled during last year's negotiations to create a new review mechanism for the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). That group, which also included Egypt and Cuba (which also lost one of its most able diplomats this past fall),was partially effective in limiting the scope of the U.S.-led UNCAC mechanism. In hindsight, however, these countries are unhappy with agreeing to any peer review process in Doha, and want to ensure that the UNTOC does not follow the same path. The result is that the group (minus Egypt and Cuba) began coordinating more closely on UNTOC and is now transplanting its negative agenda to other Vienna meetings and issues. -------------- Blunt but Effective Obstructionism -------------- ¶4. (U) Led primarily by the Russians, a coordinated hardline alliance of Russia, Algeria, Iran and China, with occasional help from Pakistan, delayed and blocked progress throughout the two-day UNTOC meeting. Their actions moved Member States backwards in their efforts to create a mechanism to review implementation of UNTOC. The alliance refused to accept any reference in the final conclusions to a "review mechanism," despite the fact that the convention authorizes the States Parties to create any such "mechanisms" needed to review implementation, and the COP had specifically tasked the expert group to provide options for "review mechanisms." ¶5. (U) A local Russian delegate led the charge with lengthy and numerous interventions during the two-day meeting, many timed to overturn extended efforts to reach compromise language on key issues. For example, the Russians intervened at 8:00 PM on the final day to reopen compromise language that had already been approved by the delegates and gaveled as accepted by the Chair. The reason for reopening the language was to further water down reference to the possibility of the October COP charging a new working group with developing terms of reference for a review mechanism. The language had been the subject of extensive negotiations and was already riddled with conditional caveats aimed at mollifying the nay sayers. Iran then further extended the late hour of the meeting by demanding that the report of the meeting be issued as a "report of the chair," notwithstanding the fact that the chair had made perfectly clear during the day, without objection, that the report would not be a chair's report. -------------- Raising Hackles among Constructive Delegations -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Generally, multilateral negotiations on crime and drug issues in Vienna have benefited from considerable collaboration among delegations. Faced with the very unhelpful slow-rolling tactics of this small group of hardliners, a number of active delegations, including Argentina, Mexico, and several European Union countries, reacted quite strongly and openly expressed frustration. Other G-77 delegations, from which the hardliners would traditionally look for allies, took no steps to encourage these countries in their obstructionist pursuits. Such G-77 "bridge" countries, for example, Indonesia and South Africa, could play a role in pressuring the hardliners to desist with their bullying tactics. We will work closely with these countries to try to moderate the negative influence of Russia and its cohorts in the weeks ahead. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The rough procedural tactics have already been noticed elsewhere; for example, they were evident during a subsequent expert meeting on trafficking in persons last week. The UNCAC experience has clearly galvanized Russia, Algeria, Iran, China and Pakistan. However, with the loss of their capable Egyptian ring leader, their tactics have become more blunt and obstructionist. Although Russia is notorious in other multilateral venues for using such tactics, in the drugs and crime context, Russia has generally played a more moderate role emphasizing shared interests with the U.S. Therefore, the frustration with Russia in the room among the more constructive delegations was palpable. As the former Egyptian leader originally provided the substantive glue for the hardliners, we believe that the current alliance may be more vulnerable to efforts to pick apart the group. We will work with likeminded countries and bridge G-77 countries to assist in deflating the hardliners before their bullying tactics reach other drugs and crime fora. END COMMENT DAVIES