IAEA: ARSHAD LIMBO SHADOWS IAEA BOARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000032 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, P, IO, ISN, EAP, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA MY SUBJECT: IAEA: ARSHAD LIMBO SHADOWS IAEA BOARD Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) His status in Vienna uncertain and his reputation in Kuala Lumpur in tatters, Malaysian Ambassador Arshad continues to implore the IAEA and sympathetic diplomatic colleagues to pressure the U.S. to "quietly" seek his reinstatement by the GOM as Chairman of the Board of Governors. In the run-up to the March 1-5 Board, IAEA Director General Amano advised Ambassador Davies privately February 2 that he has asked the GOM for early clarification of the situation. The same day an informal group of G-77 ambassadors led by former Board Chair and current G-77 Chair Feroukhi (Algeria) appealed for U.S. intervention on Arshad's behalf, arguing essentially that the U.S. should "save" Arshad. They cautioned that the situation was inauspicious for Amano's March Board debut and would undermine Board unity, potentially becoming a political issue affecting the NPT RevCon. Ambassador expressed personal empathy for Arshad but reported the U.S. is not disposed to intervene in a Malaysian domestic decision. He agreed to relay the informal appeal of the G-77 ambassadors to Washington but did not hold out hopes for a change in our position. ¶2. (C) The IAEA and its Member States clearly need a face-saving way out of the Board Chair impasse. Failing that, Arshad will continue to look for ways to finger the U.S. for his downfall. If Malaysia is not prepared to send a new Ambassador (rumors are swirling in Vienna that the Malaysian Ambassadors in London and Brussels are being considered),the interim appointment of a new Malaysian IAEA Governor, who can then be appointed Board Chairman, would be one way out. This individual could be a capital-based technocrat who is above the political fray, such as retired DDG for Technical Cooperation Normaly Bin Muslim who was a Malaysian candidate for DG. Bin Muslim contacted the IAEA to advertise his availability for BOG duty soon after Arshad's removal was announced. End summary and comment. Amano on the Case -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador raised the Arshad situation privately with DG Amano February 2 following up several previous conversations. Amano confirmed that he had sent a letter to Malaysian FM Anifah January 28 saying that "some uncertainty" 
had been brought to his attention about the status of Malaysia's IAEA Governor and "clarification is needed" for the "smooth functioning" of the Agency. It closed by asking for "early clarification." (Note: The Secretariat sent a letter to regional groups on behalf of an unnamed Board Chair to begin pre-March Board consultations February 15. If the situation is unresolved, the plan is to substitute one of the two Vice Chairs, Germany or Romania. End Note.) External Affairs (EXPO) Director Vilmos Cserveny followed up with a call to the Director General of the Malaysian MFA who indicated that his government was "fully aware" of the problem, leaving the impression that the GOM intends eventually to act. Amano further reported that while Australia had refused to intervene with Kuala Lumpur, Japanese Ambassador Nakane had raised the issue with a Malaysian DG-level interlocutor on the margins of a preparatory meeting for the NPT RevCon in Manila. G-77 Appeal for U.S. to Save Arshad -------------- ¶4. (C) An informal group of G-77 Ambassadors (Algeria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Namibia) appealed February 2 to Ambassador Davies for U.S. intervention with Malaysia to retain Arshad as Chairman of the Board of Governors. Current G-77 Chairwoman and 2008-2009 Board Chair Feroukhi (Algeria) spoke for the group, seconded by Pakistani Ambassador Anwar, who is expected to be selected by the Middle East/South Asia (MESA) group as the next Board Chairman, following Malaysia in September. While Feroukhi stressed that they all came in a personal capacity and that this was a collegial discussion, she indicated that a larger group of G-77 Ambassadors could have joined. She argued that this was a peculiar and almost unprecedented case to remove a Board Chairman and that it would be an inauspicious start to DG Amano's debut at the March Board as well as for Board debate on Iran, cautioning that this could take on a "political aspect" just before the NPT RevCon. The G-77 Ambassadors appealed to U.S. good offices to throw our weight behind Arshad in light of good relations between the current Malaysian government and the Obama Administration. Most of this appeal was couched in personal terms so as to avoid the impression that Arshad was removed for incompetence, which was not the case. However, the political undercurrent was clear that the U.S. would be blamed for his removal. The G-77 Ambassadors also did not want the Board Chair position to go to one of the other Board members from the South East Asia Pacific (SEAP) regional group, Australia or New Zealand, at the expense of a G-77 member. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Davies recounted Arshad's direct appeal to him on January 14, noting that Arshad's personal circumstances had improved considerably from the dire uncertainty that preceded his December 25 return to Vienna. While the Ambassador expressed personal empathy for Arshad's predicament, he advised that Washington's response had been categorically against interference in what was a Malaysian domestic political decision. He further questioned whether Arshad's personal stake in being retained coincided with Malaysia's best interest, i.e. if the U.S. is seen to have "saved him." He noted the need for Malaysia to clarify the situation so as to not disrupt the Board, but underlined that the decision would have to reside with Kuala Lumpur. Pakistani Ambassador Anwar sought to cast U.S. intervention as potentially positive in that it would "look good" for us if Arshad were reinstated (the implication being that it would look bad if we did not intervene). He suggested an approach to the Malaysian Ambassador in Washington. Ferouki rounded out the G-77 appeal with a pitch for Board unity in support of the new Director General. She noted that the group's next stop would be DG Amano (Ambassador immediately advised the DG of the G-77 appeal). Ambassador Davies agreed to report the G-77 appeal to Washington but did not indicate to his counterparts any expectation of a change in our position. DAVIES