TURKISH AMBASSADOR INDICATES IRAN STAGNANT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000024 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2024 TAGS: PREL IR TU PARM SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR INDICATES IRAN STAGNANT ON NUCLEAR ISSUE Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) ¶1. (C) In a January 12 conversation with DCM and poloff, Turkish Ambassador Bayer gave a readout of the Iran discussion at the recent Turkish Ambassador's conference in Ankara and his take on the Iranian issue more generally. Bayer noted that he took part in a four-hour working group on Iran at the Ambassador's conference that "barely scratched the surface." At that event, the ambassadors were debriefed on the close contact the Turkish government currently has with Iran and said that their Foreign Minister had recently spoken to President Ahmadinejad. Bayer reported the Turkish Prime Minister had been to Iran twice of late (once being the high-profile meeting in Tabriz). He also said that SCNS Secretary Jalili was in Ankara in December, but the meeting produced no new "openings." ¶2. (C) Bayer shared that the Turks have talked to Ahmadinejad twice and that he continues to try to find an opening on the TRR proposal, but he remains in a difficult position because of opposition from hardliners in the government. Bayer did not further push the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal or Turkey's potential role in the deal with the DCM, but the DCM reiterated U.S. points on the TRR proposal and noted that the IAEA proposal on the table is "as good as it gets." Bayer thought that Iran had moved on the issue given that its proposal in early January offered to send its LEU out of Iran for the first time and was the first time Iran had advocated a position itself rather than reacting to the IAEA's proposal. Nevertheless, Bayer said he realizes that Iran's counter-offer is still unacceptable to the U.S. and others and seemed to understand why and accept that position. ¶3. (C) Bayer repeated familiar Turkish points on Iran's lack of confidence in the P5 1 (to match the lack of confidence the six have in Iran) and argued that Iran wants to keep its options open. Iran has never invaded another country, he noted, professing an understanding for Iran's need to keep options open. Nevertheless, Turkey does not want to see Iran get nuclear weapons, which would tilt the balance in the region even if Iran has no intention to actually use the weapon. Bayer also argued that Iran wants to deal directly with the U.S. and that the more that the UK and France are involved, the more Iran is dissatisfied. ¶4. (C) Bayer noted Turkey's impression that Jalili is not fully authorized to "solve" the nuclear issue. He is probably empowered to make a deal, but he is not sure how any deal he reached would go over in Tehran, so he is inclined to drag his feet. Turkey believes Jalili is afraid any deal would go over poorly, affecting his standing internally. When former IAEA Director General ElBaradei called Bayer in to discuss his suggestion for storing Iranian LEU in Turkey, the DG asked that Turkey pass this suggestion to Tehran. ElBaradei also called Jalili to ask for the same message to be passed. (Note: IAEA contacts suggest that he may have contacted Salehi, not Jalili, so this may be a garble.) According to Bayer, Jalili told ElBaradei he would not take the message to Ahmadinejad himself, but encouraged the Turks to do so. DAVIES