AMBASSADOR DEMARCHES LIBYANS ON PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000046



SIPDIS



STATE FOR NEA/IO, ISN/MNSA. STATE PASS TO USUN.



E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/19/2020

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, KNNP, PREL, NPT, LY, RF, UK

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DEMARCHES LIBYANS ON PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY



REF: State 4457



CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,

Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (U) This is an action request message. See para 6.



2. (C) On January 18, per instruction reftel, the Ambassador,

accompanied by UK Ambassador Fean and Russian Ambassador Chamov

presented a joint demarche on the Libyan proposal to amend the

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to Libyan MFA Under

Secretary Abdulathi Obeidi, MFA/IO Chief Mehdi al-Mjribi and Dr.

Ali Gashut, Head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment. The

Libyans led off by explaining that the genesis of their proposal

was the special UN Security Council session on nonproliferation

that had been chaired this past fall by President Obama. POTUS'

statements and passion on the subject, in conjunction with

Libyan (and other Non-Aligned Movement members') long-held

sentiment that the NPT had been a discriminatory document

monopolized by the nuclear powers, and that there had been a

lack of seriousness by those powers to move toward a

de-nuclearized world, had compelled the Libyans to act. There

was also a continuing concern, said Obeidi, that countries like

Pakistan, India, Israel, and Iran, located in volatile regions,

were increasingly threatening international security with their

nuclear arsenals. Libya, he argued, was best-placed to take

this initiative given that it served as a model for those

countries that wanted to give up their WMD capability.



3. (C) By agreement with his colleagues, the Ambassador read

the demarche and clarified the meaning of several points for the

Libyans. Our trio reiterated several times that the joint

position was not necessarily a rejection of the Libyan ideas;

rather, our opposition was to Libya's request to circulate the

proposals, which would inevitably open up the NPT to other

potentially unhelpful amendments by others. The NPT had

withstood any amendment process for 40 years, and its integrity

needed to be upheld. We also argued that the upcoming Review

Conference would be focusing on difficult issues and the work

needed to deal with those issues could be placed in jeopardy if

the participants had to be diverted to deal with the issue of

amendments. The Libyans asked several times if, despite their

opposition, the NPT Depositary States were still willing to

circulate the proposal if that is what the Libyans decided. We

replied that that was indeed the case.



4. (C) After some further discussion, it was clear that the

Libyans were intrigued by the point that we would deal seriously

with their concerns at the May conference if they agreed to not

circulate the current amendment proposal. They were concerned,

however, that the agenda had already been set. They could

consider withdrawing their proposal if they could receive some

ironclad guarantees that the U.S., Russia, and UK could find a

mechanism to ensure that their concerns were discussed and take

the lead in encouraging such a discussion. The Libyans did not

want to be put in a position of yielding on their current

initiative and then having their concerns dismissed by

technicalities at the conference. If the Depositary States

could assure them on this count, they would take the proposal to

their leadership.



5. (C) We agreed to bring this option to our capitals and to

get back to the Libyans when we had a definitive answer.



6. (C) Action request: That Department, working with USUN,

Moscow and London, prepare a response to the Libyans that would

enable them to cease current efforts to circulate proposals to

amend the NPT.



CRETZ