IRANIAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

S E C R E T TOKYO 000030 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/J, NEA/IR, ISN/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PINR KNNP IR JA SUBJECT: IRANIAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY GENERAL SECRETARY JALILI VISIT TO TOKYO Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Robert S. Luke per reason 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: During Iranian Supreme Council for National Security Secretary General Saeed Jalili's December 21-24 visit to Japan, the GOJ stressed that Iran must address international concerns about its nuclear program, according to MOFA Iran Desk Chief Junichi Sumi. Jalili proposed that Japan host a possible next round of discussions between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. Seeking to break the current stalemate in Iran's discussions with the P5 plus 1 on the plan to export Iran's Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU),the GOJ suggested to Jalili that Iran could ship its LEU to Japan, which would store it and safeguard it. Jalili also visited a nuclear power station, asking numerous detailed questions. Sumi said he believes that elements within the Iranian government were genuinely interested in dealing constructively with the P5 plus 1 as well as exploring the President Obama's overtures to Iran. However, since Iran's June 2009 Presidential election, the Japanese Embassy in Tehran has seen a deterioration of the situation within the Iranian government, with distrust growing among government officials at various levels. During his meeting with GOJ officials, Jalili also discussed Afghanistan and North Korea, appearing poorly-briefed on Afghanistan and denying any cooperation between Iran and North Korea. A Iranian Foreign Minister visit to Japan remains in play although whether the current international climate surrounding Iran would be conducive to a visit from the GOJ perspective remains unclear. End Summary. Cooperation Contingent on Resolution of International Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Embassy Poloff met January 5 with MOFA Second Middle East Division Assistant Director and Iran Desk Chief Junichi Sumi to review Iranian Supreme Council for National Security Secretary General Saeed Jalili's December 21-24 visit to Japan. Both Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Okada stressed to Jalili that greater Japan-Iranian energy cooperation remained contingent on resolving international concerns about Iran's nuclear program, Sumi said. In its press statements, MOFA also noted that greater regional cooperation would also depend on "trust in the international arena." Some press reports had stressed Iranian-Japan cooperation without adequately noting the caveats, Sumi noted. Iran Proposes Japan Host Discussions -------------- ¶3. (S) In his meetings with GOJ officials, Jalili proposed Japan host a possible next round of discussions between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. Sumi noted that this was an idea that had been raised in previous discussions between the GOJ and Iran, but that Jalili had revived the concept during his December visit to Japan. Sumi said that the impetus for the proposal came from Iranian Ambassador to Japan Seyed Araguchi, who is personally close to Jalili. The GOJ responded to the proposal cautiously, saying it would only be willing to host such discussions if they would be likely to move the nuclear issue in a positive direction. Moreover, the GOJ noted that whether or not Japan should host P5 plus 1/Iran discussions was not a decision for Japan and Iran alone but for the other six countries as well, Sumi said. At this point, the GOJ does not plan to raise the proposal officially with the P5 plus 1 given that another P5 plus 1 session with Iran is not imminent. ¶4. (S) Sumi believed that Iran's motive in suggesting Japan host meetings was to draw Japan into the P5 plus 1 process and potentially split the international community by seeking to have more Iranian-perceived "friends" of Iran involved in the P5 plus 1 process. Sumi said that if that had been the Iranian motive, then the GOJ's noncommittal response appeared to have been unexpected and disappointing to the Iranians. Japan Makes LEU Proposal -------------- ¶5. (S) Seeking to break the current stalemate in Iran's discussions with the P5 plus 1 on the plan to ship Iran's Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment and then to France for reprocessing into fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),the GOJ suggested to Jalili that Iran could ship its LEU to Japan, which would store and safeguard it. Once the LEU was in Japan, then third countries could provide fuel for the TRR at the request of the GOJ. In response, Jalili raised questions about possible time lags between the export of the LEU and the delivery of TRR fuel and suggested that the LEU might be shipped in several phases. The GOJ conceded that time lags were likely owing to the need to manufacture TRR fuel but stressed that the LEU should be exported from Iran in a single shipment. ¶6. (S) Sumi stressed that the GOJ had made no specific proposal to Iran and that the idea amounted to a vague "what if we tried this?" sort of conjecture. He added that the GOJ sought to help the P5 plus 1 and in that spirit, it had made a vague proposal, hoping to encourage Iran to think of ways to resolve the issue. Sumi noted that Jalili and the Iranians suggested that they were under the impression that fuel for the TRR was not something that needed to be custom manufactured, and that usable stocks existed. According to Sumi, Jalili said that Iran had sought to procure TRR fuel as a simple commercial transaction and that the issue had become politicized. Such protestations and apparent naivet regarding the supposedly unforeseen politicization seemed disingenuous, Sumi added. Nuclear Power Plant Visit -------------- ¶7. (S) On December 23, Jalili visited Kashiwazaki Kariba Nuclear Power Station in Niigata Prefecture. The event was closed to the media. Sumi said that Jalili was very impressed by the facility and asked numerous detailed technical questions. While reiterating that the power plant visit had been at Iran's request, Sumi noted that along with the visit to Hiroshima's Peace Park, the GOJ had hoped to impress on the Iranians the contrast between peaceful and non-peaceful uses of nuclear power. This approach was consistent with Japan's approach of trying to offer positive incentives to Iran to resolve the nuclear issue. That said, Sumi conceded that while Iran appeared to be listening to Japan, it had not yet been persuaded to act to resolve international concerns. Sumi added that Jalili and the Iranians seemed much more relaxed and engaging outside of Tokyo. Iranian Domestic Situation -------------- ¶8. (S) Sumi said he believed that elements within the Iranian government were genuinely interested in dealing constructively with the P5 plus 1 as well as exploring President Obama's overtures to Iran. However, since Iran's June 2009 Presidential election, the Japanese Embassy in Tehran has seen a deterioration of the situation within the Iranian government, with distrust growing among government officials at various levels. In the current climate, any ambitious efforts to deal with the nuclear issue or to decrease Iran's international isolation likely engender a backlash, he said. However, in light of the recent opposition demonstrations in Iran, Sumi cautioned that one should be careful not to underestimate the government's support among large segments of the population. The hard-line response to demonstrations reflects the extent to which "radicals" within the government have gained strength since June 2009, making the Iranian regime more unpredictable and intransigent, he said. Afghanistan -------------- ¶9. (S) Although mentioned in press releases, Sumi downplayed the significance of discussion of Afghanistan in Jalili's meetings with the GOJ. He said that it appeared that Iran had sought to discuss a broader agenda and that therefore Afghanistan had been included in Jalili's briefing materials. Sumi noted that Jalili did not seem particularly engaged on his Afghanistan points, nor "did he appear well-briefed." North Korea -------------- ¶10. (S) Foreign Minister Okada raised with Jalili the GOJ's concerns regarding Iranian nuclear and missile development cooperation with North Korea. Sumi said the issue had also been included in Hatoyama's briefing paper but that Hatoyama did not have time to raise it. Jalili denied that that there was any nuclear or missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea and condemned North Korea's nuclear program. Accordingly, Jalili asserted that no "Iran-North Korea" issue existed. Mottaki Visit Still A Possibility -------------- 11, (S) Noting that a tentative November 2009 visit to Japan by Iranian Foreign Mottaki had not come to pass, Sumi felt that such a visit remained probable, although there was no specific time-frame. A ministerial visit would need to be positive and reflect the full scope of Japan's relationship with Iran, including culture and other exchanges. Sumi therefore wondered whether the international atmosphere regarding Iran in the coming months would permit such a "positive" visit, given increased international pressure on Iran and possible new sanctions. Biographic Note -------------- ¶12. (S) Junichi Sumi has been MOFA Iran Desk Director since ¶2006. He served at the Japanese Embassy in Tehran from 2000-2004, followed by a two-year assignment in Kabul. He speaks Farsi. ROOS