DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/10

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 000229 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/10 INDEX: (1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue (Sankei) (2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new alliance (Asahi) (3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S. alliance (Nikkei) (4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of female mayors (Hokkaido Shimbun) (5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 (Nikkei) (6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi) ARTICLES: (1) U.S. assistant secretary of state meets with Ozawa to search for breakthrough in Futenma relocation issue SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) February 3, 2010 As if to coincide with the release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by the U.S. Department of Defense, the governments of Japan and the U.S. have shifted into full gear in their effort to deepen the bilateral alliance. On Feb. 2, they held a Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC) meeting of bureau director-level foreign affairs and defense officials. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell had a personal talk with Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa and tried to find ways to mend the strains caused by the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture) relocation issue. However, with the Hatoyama administration continuing to drift over its security policy, a breakthrough in the situation is nowhere in sight. On the afternoon of the 2nd after attending the SSC talks, Campbell told Ozawa in the DPJ secretary general's office in the Diet building, "We have reaffirmed our intentions to further strengthen the bilateral alliance. This alliance serves as the linchpin of the U.S. policy toward Asia." It is unusual for senior U.S. officials to visit the Diet. By doing so, Campbell, a leading Japan hand in the Obama administration, is apparently determined to save the face of Ozawa, the most influential figure in the Hatoyama administration. The meeting, which was held behind closed doors apart from the opening statements, lasted for an hour. A briefing after the talks was also cancelled at the request of Ozawa. Ozawa politely saw Campbell off at the Lower House entrance. Campbell told the press corps with a smile, "Nice talks." There is no doubt that the Futenma issue was brought up in the talks. The U.S. side is apparently unhappy about the inconsistency of Japanese ministers' views on the issue and believes that Ozawa is the only one who will be able to find a way out of the current situation. Campbell probably made the courtesy call on Ozawa with the aim of figuring out what he is up to. TOKYO 00000229 002 OF 009 The QDR specifically mentions the need to implement the Japan-U.S. agreement, including the agreement on the relocation of the Futenma facilities to an area near the coast of Camp Schwab (in Henoko, Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture),calling on the Japanese government to steadily implement the existing plan. Campbell during the SSC conveyed the U.S. government's stance to the Japanese side and stressed to the press corps: "We have clearly conveyed our view that the existing plan is the best option. We would like to work closely so as to move forward on this issue." However, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has entirely relegated the effort to find a relocation site to the ruling parties' Okinawa base issue review committee to work out. The committee is also going astray with the three ruling parties failing to reach an agreement. The panel held a meeting on the evening of Feb. 2. Participants agreed to dispatch an inspection team consisting of government and ruling party officials to Guam, which the SDP insists is a candidate relocation site, in mid-February. However, the U.S. side is reluctant to allow the inspection team to make the visit. It is now certain that the submission of a proposal for a relocation site by each party slated for January will be delayed until late February or later. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada mentioned the possibility of continuing to use Futenma Air Station, provoking a backlash from the SDP. This has also halted the talks on the issue. Following the SDP's opposition to the idea of continuing to use the current site, the prime minister on the evening of the 2nd told the press corps: "This whole issue originated from the idea of Futenma relocation. It will not be a solution if we go back to the beginning. The foreign minister understands that." However, the foreign minister at a press conference on the evening of the 2nd once again said, "If worst comes to the worst, Futenma Air Station will remain at the same site." The fire continues to smolder. The perceptions of cabinet ministers not only on the relocation issue but also on security issues are diverse. A senior Defense Ministry official said with a sigh: "In the present administration, there are no politicians who can map out a strategy that Japan should adopt based on the QDR." (2) "Japan@the World" column: How to draw up a blueprint for a new alliance ASAHI (Pages 1, 15) (Slightly abridged) February 4, 2010 Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in 1960, the Japanese and U.S. governments have declared that they will "deepen" the Japan-U.S. alliance. They would like to come up with a blueprint for a new alliance by the time U.S. President Barack Obama visits Japan in November. However, the Hatoyama administration has scrapped the Futenma Air Station relocation plan agreed upon between the two governments in 2006 and begun to consider an alternative plan. As a result, the Japan-U.S. relationship is in disarray. TOKYO 00000229 003 OF 009 Opinion in the U.S. of the Hatoyama administration is harsh. An editorial in The New York Times on Jan. 28 expressed concern that "there are signs that many of the leaders of Japan's new administration and its postwar generation do not understand the irreplaceable value of the Japan-U.S. security partnership." However, on the other hand, there is a growing opinion that the U.S. should avoid forcing the Hatoyama administration into a corner. The same editorial counseled the Obama administration to be "patient," asserting that, "The Obama administration should look for a solution to the Futenma relocation and encourage the Hatoyama administration, so that it can declare with confidence that it is capable of conducting equal diplomacy with the U.S." It is important to deal with the base issues in the context of developing a blueprint for a new alliance. How, then, should the new alliance blueprint be drawn up? Stabilizing relations with a rapidly rising China will be the main issue. While China is not a threat right now, there is no guarantee that it will not be one in the future. China's peaceful rise so far owes much to its leaders' prudence and "patience." However, if China becomes more powerful economically and militarily, such "patience" may be weakened. The Western countries have begun to express their uneasiness and even alarm with China's recent "conceited" attitude in the areas of economics and finance, human rights, and global warming. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, who played a major role in the "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. security alliance in the 1990s, argues strongly for "buying insurance by engaging China" when dealing with this country. The functions of the Japan-U.S. alliance will be most important in such a situation. Nye asserts that a real alliance consists of deterrence in peacetime and preparedness for contingencies. The main source of tension is China's naval buildup and the projection of such military power in Asia and the Pacific. Japan and the U.S. should consider creating a multilateral framework with the Asian neighbors, including China, for maritime stability in the South China Sea and East China Sea. This can start with cooperation among Japan, the U.S., Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries in dealing with the threat posed by pirates in the South China Sea. The "redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the 21st Century will consist of the "transformation" from an alliance "against" to an alliance "for." Japan should aim at consolidating its relations with China; realizing policy dialogues among Japan, the U.S., and China; and building "maritime peace" with the Japan-U.S.-China relationship as the axis. It is only through such "transformation" of the Japan-U.S. alliance that stability in China and Asia can be achieved. Along with the role of the alliance, the management of the alliance also needs to be "redefined." I would like to discuss here the following principles: mutual benefit, complementarity, and cooperation. The principle of mutual benefit means the "sharing of obligations" TOKYO 00000229 004 OF 009 in responding to "common threats and issues." Here, the important thing is that the obligation and cost should be more or less proportionate on both sides. So far, the Japan-U.S. alliance has consisted mainly of the U.S.'s defense of Japan and Japan's provision of military bases. This structure can be sustained into the future by reducing the excessive burden on Okinawa. The principle of complementarity means that the two sides will combine their strengths in order for the alliance as a whole to realize its full potential. Japan is good at civilian power, while military power is the U.S.'s forte. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief, building and maintenance of peace, development for nation building, prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament, breaking away from dependence on oil, and environmental conservation and working toward a low carbon society are promising areas in which Japan can make contributions. To be sure, complementarity does not denote a complete division of labor. The alliance will remain a military alliance. Here, it will be important for Japan to maintain and develop its economic and technological power and its international competitiveness, which form the basis of its civilian power. The principle of cooperation means enhancing the reliability of the common tasks and operations of the two countries in support of the alliance and building broader-based human resources for the alliance. Intelligence sharing, joint flight exercises, and joint administration of military bases by the two countries should be considered. The Japan-U.S. alliance was built on the pledge by a victorious and a vanquished country in World War II not to go to war ever again and on "trust and reconciliation." The fact that these two countries with different languages and culture have been able to develop such a profound relationship of trust following the war is almost a miracle in contemporary history. It seems that the desire to be free from dependence on the U.S. and to seek moral solidarity with Asia is a latent force in the sentiments of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Japanese people. However, security policy should not be affected by sentimentalism. The essence of security policymaking lies in conducting rational and strategic policy debate based on national interests while skillfully controlling nationalist sentiments in the process. The exercise of self-restraint on both sides to suppress nationalism is also a hidden function of an alliance. The Obama administration has proposed a security strategy for multilateral defense of the global commons, including navigation in international waters and cyber space. There are moves in the U.S. Department of Defense toward setting up a Pacific command for humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Prime Minister Hatoyama's "yuai boat" concept has elements in common with the multilateral medical assistance network promoted by the Obama administration. Now is the time for the DPJ to open up new frontiers in the Japan-U.S. alliance in a different way from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). If the DPJ and LDP are able to build consensus across party borders on Japan-U.S. security policy, the 50th year of the security treaty will indeed be of great historic significance. (3) Editorial: U.S. defense strategy calls for deepening Japan-U.S. TOKYO 00000229 005 OF 009 alliance NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) February 4, 2010 The Department of Defense (DOD) has released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 2010, which sets the guidelines for DOD security policy for the next four years. The 2010 QDR focuses on the variety of new threats the nation faces and calls for its allies in the Asia Pacific region, including Japan and South Korea, to play an expanded role. The allies should study the contents of the threats and jointly address the threats as a matter of course. The hard battle in Afghanistan probably can be cited as the most influential factor that has caused the U.S. to alter its strategy over the past four years. Emerging countries have gathered strength, non-state forces have gained influence, and weapons of mass destruction have spread further throughout the world. There is also the danger of military action in cyberspace. It is necessary to deal effectively with such diversified threats; otherwise, security will be undermined on a global scale. Therefore, it is quite natural for the DOD to spotlight new threats in the QDR. Previous QDRs envisioned a strategy to deal with two large-scale conflicts in the Middle East and Asia simultaneously, but this two-front strategy was removed from the 2010 QDR. The U.S. probably judged that it would be appropriate to eliminate this strategy from a realistic point of view. However, this strategy had some deterrent effect on North Korea's moves, so its elimination is not desirable from the standpoint of Japan. Probably with the aim of making up for the removal of the two-front strategy, the QDR promised to enhance its deterrence capability with nuclear and conventional weapons for Japan, South Korea, and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of this is to strengthen relations with its allies. In the case of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the U.S. should have proposed in the QDR that defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. should be strengthened by means of Japan taking measures to enable the Self-Defense Force to exercise the right to collective self-defense. But this idea is not practical in the current Japan-U.S. relationship under the Hatoyama administration. Almost at the same time as the release of the QDR, Japan and the U.S. held a high-level meeting of the Security Subcommittee composed of their senior foreign and defense officials in Tokyo. As a result of the Hatoyama administration's decision to put off making a decision on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station until the end of May, Japan and the U.S. remain unable to arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and President Barack Obama. Given this, strategic dialogue has been carried out by working-level officials of the two countries. Between Japan and the U.S., deliberations were carried out between working-level officials until 10 years ago. Although the Hatoyama administration has advocated shifting the decision-making responsibility to politicians, the Japan-U.S. alliance has returned to the so-called "working-level alliance" of 10 years ago. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has emphasized the importance of his talks TOKYO 00000229 006 OF 009 with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Hawaii, but the two sides have yet to establish a deep relationship of trust. If the U.S. proposal for an expanded role to be played by its allies is translated into action, it will inevitably become a major challenge for the Hatoyama administration. (4) U.S. Ambassador Roos, Hokkaido governor participate in summit of female mayors HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN ONLINE (Full) 09:11, February 4, 2010 The "national summit of female mayors" that opened in the town of Higashikagura in Kamikawa Subprefecture moved its venue to Sapporo City on Feb. 3. Seven female mayors, including Mayor Keiko Kawano of Higashikagura exchanged views with Governor Harumi Takahashi (of Hokkaido),Sapporo Mayor Fumio Ueda, and other officials. U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, who was on an inspection tour to see the Sapporo Snow Festival and other sites, made an unscheduled appearance and livened up the atmosphere at the summit. In a speech, Governor Takahashi said: "There are only three female governors and seven female mayors in the country. This number is very small, but let us work together." During the informal meeting, Roos asked: "How is the female mayors' summit going?" He talked to each of the mayors, and the mayors all advertised their towns enthusiastically. The summit will close on Feb. 4 after adopting an appeal at a hotel in the town of Toyako in Iburi Subprefecture, which was the venue for the G-8 Hokkaido-Toyako Summit. (5) Foreign Minister Okada to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) February 4, 2010 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada yesterday started making arrangements to visit Australia on Feb. 20-21 with an eye to holding talks with his Australian counterpart Stephen Smith. The purpose of his trip to Australia is to lay the groundwork for a meeting of the two countries' foreign and defense ministers (2-plus-2),which will be held as early as this summer. Okada and Smith are expected to confirm that the two countries will accelerate talks for the conclusion of an economic partnership agreement (EPA). They are also expected to exchange views on Japan's research whaling. (6) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) February 1, 2010 Questions & Answers (T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet? T P M F Yes 50 (55) 53 48 No 38 (34) 37 39 Not interested 12 (12) 10 14 TOKYO 00000229 007 OF 009 Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 7 (6) 6 8 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 2 (2) 2 3 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policies 13 (9) 12 13 Because the nature of politics is likely to change 78 (82) 80 76 Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3 (5) 4 3 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 41 (42) 37 45 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policies 32 (32) 35 29 Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23 (20) 24 23 Q: Which political party do you support? T P M F Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30 (35) 33 28 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 16 (16) 17 14 New Komeito (NK) 4 (4) 2 6 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (2) 3 3 Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1 (2) 2 0 People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 1 (1) 1 0 Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 4 (4) 4 4 Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) -- (0) -- -- New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) 0 0 Other political parties 1 (1) 1 0 None 39 (33) 35 43 Q: What do you think DPJ Secretary General Ozawa should do if Tomohiro Ishikawa, one of his former secretaries and currently a DPJ lawmaker seated in the House of Representatives, is prosecuted over his fund management organization's unreported land purchase? Do you think he should resign from his party post to take responsibility? T P M F Yes 76 75 78 No 18 22 15 Q: Some lawmakers in the DPJ are criticizing the prosecutors' investigation over the case. Do you think the prosecutors' investigation is appropriate? T P M F Yes 71 71 71 No 21 23 19 Q: Concerning this case, Prime Minister Hatoyama told DPJ Secretary General Ozawa to "please fight" and also said he hoped Mr. Ishikawa would not be indicted. Do you think these Hatoyama remarks are problematic? T P M F TOKYO 00000229 008 OF 009 Yes 65 62 67 No 29 35 25 Q: Prime Minister Hatoyama's fund management organization is alleged to have falsified reports on political donations. In this case, a former state-funded secretary of Prime Minister Hatoyama has been prosecuted on the charge of violating the Political Funds Control Law. Do you think Prime Minister Hatoyama should resign to take responsibility for this case? T P M F Yes 33 (40) 34 33 No 60 (54) 63 57 Q: In this case, it is clear that a total of more than 1.2 billion yen was provided to Prime Minister Hatoyama by his mother for eight years. Prime Minister Hatoyama explained, "My former secretary handled that, and I didn't know anything about it." Do you believe this explanation? T P M F Yes 25 27 23 No 68 69 68 Q: The government's budget for next fiscal year incorporates its policy-based plans to provide child allowances and make high school education free of charge. Meanwhile, the government will issue deficit-covering bonds at a record-high level of 44 trillion yen. Do you approve of this budget? T P M F Yes 31 34 29 No 61 61 60 Q: The recent mayoral election in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, ended in the victory of a candidate opposed to relocating the U.S. military's Futenma airfield facility to the Henoko area of the city, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano indicated that there is no need for the government to ask for local consent for its decision concerning where to relocate Futenma airfield. What do you think about this? T P M F This is a problem 73 71 74 This is not a problem 19 25 14 Q: What do you think the Hatoyama government should do about the Futenma relocation issue. Pick the response that is closest to your opinion. T P M F Relocate Futenma airfield out of Okinawa Prefecture or Japan 48 (51) 47 50 Look for another site in Okinawa Prefecture for Futenma relocation 26 (15) 27 25 Relocate Futenma airfield to Henoko 16 (25) 20 12 Q: If an election for the House of Councillors were to be held now, which political party or which political party's candidate would you vote for in your proportional representation bloc? T P M F TOKYO 00000229 009 OF 009 DPJ 35 40 32 LDP 20 21 19 NK 5 3 7 JCP 4 4 4 SDP 2 3 2 PNP 1 2 0 YP 6 7 5 RC 0 0 1 Other political parties 15 14 15 (Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Dec. 19-20. Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Jan. 30-31 over the telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,662 households with one or more eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,050 persons (63 PERCENT ). ROOS