DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER

S E C R E T TOKYO 000011

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI, EAP/J, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2035
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, KZ, JA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL
IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER

REF: A. ASTANA 02273
B. ASTANA 02257
C. STATE 131723

Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S) Acting EMIN delivered the demarche and non-paper
contained in ref C to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Deputy Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation,
and Science Akihito Nakajima January 4. (Note: The
Government of Japan had been officially closed since December
29 for New Years holidays, delaying our delivery of this
demarche. End note.) Without getting into details of
Astana's discussions with the government of Kazakhstan,
A/EMIN also made him aware of Kazakhstan's strong denials on
this issue by sharing a copy of the December 30 public
statement from the GOK.

2. (S) Nakajima expressed appreciation for the information
and said MOFA would look into the transaction, including by
consulting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry's
(METI) colleagues. He requested any additional information
the USG could provide, especially that which relates to the
status of the transaction and the dates of the shipment.
Nakajima said the GOJ understands that Iran will soon run out
of yellowcake, and has expected Iran to search for another
source. He suggested there will be a continued need to keep
a look out for this type of transfer in the future.

3. (S) Econoff also delivered separately the demarche and
nonpaper to METI's Security Export Control and Trade Control
Policy Divisions. These offices are typically responsible
for investigations into Japanese companies on security and
export control issues, and likely will coordinate the GOJ
investigation with MOFA. Since press articles about the
uranium transfer have not included any details on East Asia
Limited or Baiken-U's involvement, METI officials were
unfamiliar with the issue and initially confused by our
request to discuss a uranium transfer involving Iran.
However, once made aware of the potential role of a
Japan-owned firm, Security Export Control Division Director
of International Affairs Masaaki Takabatake said that his
office would begin an immediate investigation. He noted his
office was unfamiliar with the companies involved, but would
work with METI's nuclear energy division, which should
already have the required corporate contacts.

4. (SBU) Post will provide updates on the results of GOJ
investigations as soon they are received. We would welcome
any additional information that can be shared with the GOJ on
this issue.
ROOS