DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER

S E C R E T TOKYO 000011



SIPDIS



STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI, EAP/J, SCA/CEN



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2035

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, KZ, JA

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL

IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER



REF: A. ASTANA 02273

B. ASTANA 02257

C. STATE 131723



Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (S) Acting EMIN delivered the demarche and non-paper

contained in ref C to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

Deputy Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation,

and Science Akihito Nakajima January 4. (Note: The

Government of Japan had been officially closed since December

29 for New Years holidays, delaying our delivery of this

demarche. End note.) Without getting into details of

Astana's discussions with the government of Kazakhstan,

A/EMIN also made him aware of Kazakhstan's strong denials on

this issue by sharing a copy of the December 30 public

statement from the GOK.



2. (S) Nakajima expressed appreciation for the information

and said MOFA would look into the transaction, including by

consulting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry's

(METI) colleagues. He requested any additional information

the USG could provide, especially that which relates to the

status of the transaction and the dates of the shipment.

Nakajima said the GOJ understands that Iran will soon run out

of yellowcake, and has expected Iran to search for another

source. He suggested there will be a continued need to keep

a look out for this type of transfer in the future.



3. (S) Econoff also delivered separately the demarche and

nonpaper to METI's Security Export Control and Trade Control

Policy Divisions. These offices are typically responsible

for investigations into Japanese companies on security and

export control issues, and likely will coordinate the GOJ

investigation with MOFA. Since press articles about the

uranium transfer have not included any details on East Asia

Limited or Baiken-U's involvement, METI officials were

unfamiliar with the issue and initially confused by our

request to discuss a uranium transfer involving Iran.

However, once made aware of the potential role of a

Japan-owned firm, Security Export Control Division Director

of International Affairs Masaaki Takabatake said that his

office would begin an immediate investigation. He noted his

office was unfamiliar with the companies involved, but would

work with METI's nuclear energy division, which should

already have the required corporate contacts.



4. (SBU) Post will provide updates on the results of GOJ

investigations as soon they are received. We would welcome

any additional information that can be shared with the GOJ on

this issue.

ROOS