CWC: MEETING WITH ALGERIAN DELEGATION AND OPCW TO

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000087 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AL PARM PREL PTER CWC SUBJECT: CWC: MEETING WITH ALGERIAN DELEGATION AND OPCW TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED CHEMICAL TERRORISM CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS REF: A. THE HAGUE 00048 ¶B. ALGIERS 00084 ¶C. STATE 01954 This is CWC-11-10 ¶1. (U) On February 11, Delrep Landsman met at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with Algerian DCM Sid Al Branci and OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) officials to discuss the proposed chemical terrorism conference in Algiers (refs A-C). TS officials present were Office of Special Projects (OSP) Director Krzysztof Paturej, OSP Officer Irakli Beridze, and Head of the Assistance and Protection Branch (APB) Gennadi Lutay; no officials from the International Cooperation Branch (ICB) were available to attend. ¶2. (SBU) After Delrep briefed the TS on the concept of the conference and shared a draft agenda, the TS officials expressed enthusiasm for working with Algeria, the U.S. and the EU in ensuring a successful event. Paturej said that the OPCW Director-General (DG) had already indicated his support for the conference but was unable to commit OPCW funding. Paturej requested that the Office of Special Projects serve as the OPCW's lead office on this conference since the subject matter most closely reflects OSP's mission, but he recognized that OSP, with only one officer (Beridze),lacked the administrative capacity to organize the conference on its own. APB and ICB are best placed to play a role in this regard. (Del comment: Paturej wants to ensure political credit for the conference falls to OSP, thus further justifying the work of OSP in the field of counter-terrorism.) ¶3. (U) TS officials advised that the three sponsoring parties must decide how involved they want the OPCW to be in the organization of the event. If the OPCW is to serve as an official "sponsor," either the TS would need to allocate fumds for such an event in the 2011 budget under the International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) Division which Paturej noted could be politically difficult or the U.S., EU, and Algeria would need to transfer funds to the TS in separate sub-trust funds established specifically for the conference. In a sponsorship capacity, the TS would need to devote significant internal resources to the organization of the event, including arranging the travel for the participants and speakers. Organizing such an event with over 50 participants from across Africa would be a substantial undertaking and would be impossible to do by May 3- 4, as initially proposed by the African Center for the Study and Research Against Terrorism (CAERT). ¶4. (U) Instead, the TS recommended that the three parties simply seek OPCW "support" for the conference which would allow the TS to get involved substantively, i.e. providing assistance in developing the program and identifying speakers, and logistically, i.e. the issuance of invitations, with minimal internal cost to the TS. Funds for the conference would remain with the three parties, and the TS would need not have to account for the Qand the TS would need not have to account for the event in that year's program and budget. Any administrative costs to the OPCW for helping with the event would come out of regular OSP/APB/ICB funds. The TS officials said that in previous conferences funded by States Parties, money had always been set aside to cover the cost of TS participation, and the TS officials asked that consideration be given in this regard, if not from the U.S., side then perhaps from the EU. ¶5. (U) The TS recommended that the three parties look as an exemplar to the June 2009 international seminar on national implementation of nonproliferation obligations which was hosted by the Bosnian government and supported by the OPCW. This conference was funded by the EU and administratively organized by Bosnia, but the TS issued the invitations and helped devise the program. Participants corresponded directly with the Bosnian MFA on registration, travel, and sponsorship availability. The TS officials advised that the next step would be for the three parties to submit a letter to the DG formally requesting the specific type of OPCW involvement sought in the conference; without such a letter, the TS cannot proceed with any further specifics on the conference. ¶6. (U) Regarding the substance of the conference, the TS fully agreed with Algeria that while the focus should be on Africa, the event should be international in scope and include other organizations in this field. The TS offered to use its network of contacts to ensure participation from key players in the chemical safety and security field. Delrep indicated that the U.S. would not object to having participants/speakers come from outside Africa but said that U.S. funding would be targeted at Africa, a point both the TS and Algeria appreciated. TS officials also thought the draft U.S. agenda seemed to focus too much in its current form on the "safety" side of the debate and not enough on the "security" aspects of preventing chemical terrorism. The TS also encouraged the three parties to look at the 2011 time frame, as invitations would need to be sent out at least five months in advance and the OPCW would not want the event to compete with other programs, such as the Assistex 3 exercise in Tunisia in October. There is also already an OPCW event scheduled for May 5 in Chile which the DG will participate in. ¶7. (SBU) Del Comment: Del recommends that consideration of the "Bosnian model" as a good exemplar to follow, and that the USG provide the Algerian MFA with draft language to insert into a formal letter to the DG, but that the letter come from Algeria vice the United States. We believe the letter should be delivered well before July when the current DG departs, as the next DG could not choose to support this conference. Del also agrees that a 2011 timeframe appears far more realistic. It seemed that Branci grasped this reality as well. Finally, Del suggests that U.S. Embassy Algiers, the Algerian MFA, and the CAERT convene a meeting in Algiers, if that has not taken place already. Even with extensive assistance from OPCW, the organizational and logistical burden lies in Algeria. ¶8. (U) BEIK SENDS. NOLAN