NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ARAD ARTICULATES ISRAELI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000281

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ARAD ARTICULATES ISRAELI
FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),
(d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 5 article in the Israeli
newspaper Yisrael Ha-yom, National Security Advisor Uzi Arad
articulated the Netanyahu Government's foreign policy
successes over the past year, including helping prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon and promoting negotiations to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arad's foreign policy
article may in part represent a response to critics who
panned PM Netanhayu's February 3 speech at the Herzliya
Conference for its lack of foreign policy focus. End summary.


2. (SBU) In an unusual article in the February 5 edition of
the Israeli newspaper Yisrael Ha-yom, National Security
Advisor Uzi Arad laid out the Netanyahu Government's foreign
policy successes over the last year. Arad noted that in the
political sphere, if something is "not publicized, the
likelihood that it will happen increases." In this respect,
he argued that the GOI has made progress in two main efforts:
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and
promoting negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.


3. (SBU) On Iran, Arad noted GOI efforts to apply pressure to
change Tehran's bid to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the
same time deferring to U.S. diplomatic efforts. He
referenced a "very high level of compatibility between Israel
and the international community led by the United States" in
"tightening the noose around Iran in terms of economic
pressure and its global isolation."


4. (SBU) On the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arad acknowledged
those who might view 2009 as a failure due to the lack of
high-level Israeli-Palestinian political contacts. However,
Arad said he advised caution during the past summer regarding
expectations of a breakthrough in negotiations, primarily
because of what he described as a Palestinian "rejectionist
position" that manifested during the Olmert administration.
Nevertheless, Arad pointed to U.S. efforts to resume talks,
and restated GOI interest in this regard without
preconditions, as indicated by "gestures" and "various
measures."


5. (SBU) Arad described a difficult international environment
facing Israel, including a "tough anti-Israel campaign"
consisting of four planes: the public information-media
campaign, the legal front, the political front, and the
economic arena. Nevertheless, he highlighted improved
relations with Egypt, Russia, and China, and continued
contacts with European leaders. Arad noted that many
analysts predicted a "head-on collision" with the United
States last year, which has not transpired due to the
U.S.-Israeli mutual understanding. He pointed to the
creation of the "Septet" -- or the seven-member inner
security cabinet -- which brings experience to the national
security and foreign policy arena, while affording legitimacy
to consensus decisions reached by this forum. Finally, he
noted the Israeli National Security Council's new role as the
focal point in a strengthened decision-making process.


6. (C) Comment: Arad's foreign policy op-ed is
uncharacteristic of his usual behind-the-scenes style, and
would for the most part seem out of place. However, many
critics panned PM Netanyahu's Feburary 3 speech at the annual
Herzliya Conference for its lack of foreign policy focus.
Some critics charged that the speech resulted from
Netanyahu's lack of a political vision and/or uncertainty how
to proceed in a largely hostile international environment.
Arad's articulation of the Netanyahu administration's foreign
policy accomplishments over the past year may be in part in
response to such criticism.


7. (U) The below includes an unofficial translation of the
February 5 Yisrael Ha-yom article.

Begin Text:

Every Israeli Government's main effort channels involve the
attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability and
weapons, and the promotion of negotiations to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict. In both these channels, far greater
progress than meets the superficial eye has been made.

As a prelude to a discussion of these subjects, it would be
worthwhile to paraphrase the statement from bureaucratic life
that goes like this: "if you reported on something but did
not actually do anything - you have in fact done something;
but if you have done something but failed to take credit for
it - you are as good as not having done anything." In the
political sphere, if something is publicized, it will not
happen; and if it is not publicized, the likelihood that it
will happen increases. Quite often, what does not make

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headlines and is not accounted for is exactly what actually
happens.

The effort on the Iranian path is directed toward persuading
Tehran pleasantly -- this is, after all, the U.S. dialogue
policy -- but at the same time while applying pressure to
change the course it is treading in a bid to accumulate a
military nuclear potential and shift instead to a peaceful
course.

In this path, progress has been made with a very high level
of compatibility between Israel and the international
community lead by the United States. In this quarter, a
quantum leap is expected in tightening the noose around Iran
in terms of economic pressure and its global isolation. Iran
will face the following dilemma: it will have to decide
whether it wants to continue to flout the world, or if it
understands that if it continues this way, the price might be
high.

As for the second plane -- promoting agreements and the peace
process -- no doubt this entails great disappointment since
2009 was marked by the absence of high-level political
contacts. Only few educated commentators and members of the
intelligence community correctly predicted the current
situation. When I dared, back in July, to calm down those
who thought we were on the brink of intensive talks, someone
immediately jumped up and called me to order for being such a
skeptic and furthermore explained that I do not understand
the great potential.

The potential is indeed great, except that even though this
is the case, the Palestinians have assumed a rejectionist
position. This stance did not begin when the incumbent
Israeli Government was established. Some 18 months ago, the
former prime minister made an extremely generous offer to Abu
Mazen in an effort to move forward toward arrangements. The
latter, however, turned him down. Six months later, Abu
Mazen explained that the gaps were still too wide.

So whatever the reason for this rejectionist Palestinian
stand may be -- once Abu Mazen is too strong, another time he
is too weak; once he is going to elections, or he is in a bad
mood, or is awaiting the Arab League summit -- the reasons
may vary, but the rejectionist policy continues, and this is
disappointing.

Despite the disappointment, the U.S. has been making efforts
to bring about Israeli-Palestinian talks. The Israeli
Government has already announced that it was interested in
this, without preconditions, and has made gestures and taken
various measures to prove this.

Combined Effort

Meanwhile, a tough anti-Israel campaign is underway. It
consists of four planes with reciprocal links to one another:
the public information-media campaign; the legal effort; the
political front; and, finally, the economic arena. More and
more boycotts are imposed on Israeli products, to the point
where they are burned. I do not know of anyone who is
familiar with Jewish history whose guts would not churn upon
watching such a bonfire.

Here Israel is required to adopt an educated and carefully
thought-out strategy: create obstructive blocs when the
phenomenon is negative, and support blocs when the initiative
is positive, or apply the brakes.

In the past year, Israel put an emphasis on several anchors.
In the region nearest to us, one cannot avoid noticing the
tighter cooperation with Egypt. As far as the United States
-- the superpower without which nothing can be done -- is
concerned, a year ago, people prophesied that we were heading
toward a head-on collision. Well, one year later, we are not
at this point. Sometimes, our views differ, but this is part
of a mutual understanding, as among friendly countries. In
Europe, one most note the upgrading of relations with several
countries: Germany, Poland, and Italy -- whose prime minister
arrived here last week at the head of a group of ministers.
Note the frequency of visits to such key countries as
Britain, France, Spain or such traditionally friendly
countries as the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. Where
Brazil is concerned -- President Lula will arrive soon and
his defense minister visited Israel a week ago; and with
respect to Russia -- Netanyahu will travel to that country in
two weeks, this time openly; and there are also China and
India. In terms of relations with China, everyone, including
the United States, feels it wants more.

In addition to external support, it is also necessary to have
support at home. A change has taken place that not many have

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noticed, but as an eyewitness, I can attest to the fact that
it is far-reaching in its importance. This government has
established a de facto council of ministers -- the "Septet."
This is the assembly of people who hold consultations in the
most intensive way and it is also the most significant. The
rate at which it holds deliberations is frequent, although
this not done publicly, and this is where the key issues are
discussed.

Who is in that group: the four heads of the coalition's major
factions, two former prime ministers, and two former chiefs
of staff, and all of them have held ministerial positions
more than just once or twice. The "Septet" represents a
broad range of views and grants decisions consensus and
legitimacy.

There is further bolstering and it has to do with the staff
work. It was Netanyahu, who, during his first term as prime
minister, established the National Security Council. Now he
has transferred the Council from a side position in the
decision-making process to the focal point of the process.
This strengthens the decision-making process, as required by
the National Security Council Law and as demanded by various
commissions of inquiry.

Faced with such phenomena as Goldstone, we encounter a
comment that is a typical show of Israeli defiance: what
would we rather be -- right or smart? No Israeli would ever
agree to be "not smart," even if we may be able to live with
the "not right." Yet when someone employs this statement to
attack us bluntly, this dilemma sometimes pushes us into
something that may be portrayed as smart, but which meanwhile
sacrifices the element of justness.

I would like to propose two principles by which to conduct
our policy. One principle is not to offer solutions that
balance off being smart versus being right -- marry the two.
This is the prudent way. The second principle is to exercise
caution. Let us engage in less swashbuckling, avoid
incitement or threats, and engage more in doing, in modesty,
and in earnestness. Let us work quietly because where
politics are concerned, being quiet does not mean filth but
quality. All these could help us reinforce Israel because in
our region, there is no alternative to strength.

End text.
Cunningham