GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000148 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV OTRA OVIP RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S VISIT Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Georgia is calmer and more stable than it was when you visited last summer, but those improvements are far from durable and a palpable sense of insecurity still permeates society and politics. Miscalculations and provocations - domestically, in the territories or north across the mountains - could easily spark renewed crisis. With a stabilized economy and no viable rival, President Saakashvili is stronger politically but paradoxically more insecure, burdened by the fear history will judge him to have lost irrevocably the occupied territories and concerned our measured approach to defense cooperation and engagement with Moscow presage a deeper reorientation of U.S. interests. These concerns are reinforced by a steady drumbeat of Russian accusations about the legitimacy and behavior of his government and comparative silence from the West about Moscow's consolidation of its position in the territories. In this hothouse environment, your visit is an important, visible manifestation of our enduring commitment to support Georgia's aspirations to move west - and an opportunity to remind the president that realization of those aspirations ultimately depends on a renewed commitment to deeper democratic and economic reforms. ¶2. (S) Large swathes of the government, and society more broadly, are still motivated by the lure of Euro-Atlantic integration. Fears that Georgia will remain in the West's waiting room in perpetuity have sparked a minority to begin discussing the viability of a deal with Moscow in order to reintegrate the territories. These trial balloons, and Moscow's efforts to de-legitimize the government and create more palatable alternatives, further polarize a political environment that encourages zero-sum thinking and retards deeper democratic and economic reforms. Saakashvili continues to cast about for the 'one big thing' that will secure Georgia's place in the west, adding an offer to provide a logistics hub for Afghanistan to his substantial troop commitment over the next two years. Our challenge is to convince President Saakashvili that the 'one big thing' is a recommitment to Georgia's democratic development, symbolized by a competitive presidential succession in 2013, even while we work to prevent a slide back into conflict and instability. CONFLICT AND INSECURITY ¶3. (C) It's hard to overestimate the extent to which an intense climate of insecurity permeates Georgian society and political culture. Russian forces, located as close as 25 miles from Tbilisi, are building permanent bases and Georgians confront a steady drip of Russian statements alleging Georgian aggression or announcing the latest step in incorporating Abkhazia into Russia's economy. Moscow's statements suggesting that Georgia is planning provocations in the North Caucasus have raised fears among Georgian officials that Russia is looking for another pretext. Tbilisi, in turn, is overly focused on weapons acquisition as an antidote to its jitters. It fears our approach to defense cooperation (heavily focused on developing the structures and processes to assess threats, develop appropriate responses and make informed decisions about use of force before moving to acquisition) is a trade-off to secure Russian cooperation on other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our Qon other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our broader efforts with Moscow will help reinforce with Saakashvili that we do not see this as a zero-sum equation - and that Georgia also benefits from Moscow's cooperation on the wider agenda. ¶4. (C) The immediate security environment has stabilized, with fewer incidents along the administrative boundaries. Shootings and explosions still occur, but much less frequently; in the age-old tradition of the Caucasus, detentions have become the major source of tension, especially around South Ossetia. The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) established by the Geneva talks have helped increase communication and decrease the volatility of individual incidents, especially in Abkhazia; the South Ossetian de facto authorities have refused to participate in their IPRM since October 2009, pending the resolution of three missing persons cases. Overall the Abkhaz de facto authorities are more interested in engaging with partners other than Russia and are therefore more constructive in the IPRM and in Geneva; they continue to allow international partners to operate inside Abkhazia. The South Ossetians are steadfastly uncooperative, even when proposals would benefit their own residents. Local residents still face limitations on movements and other human rights TBILISI 00000148 002 OF 004 concerns in both regions. ¶5. (C) A more mature Georgian policy on the territories reflects growing recognition that there is no short-term - or military - way to reintegrate them into Georgia, but implementation may founder on Abkhaz, or Russian, insistence on first discussing the region's status. A key question is the extent to which the de factos control their own fate versus Russia orchestrating the immediate security ups and downs; the Georgians are convinced the Abkhaz/South Ossetian good cop-bad cop routine is played at the behest of the Russians. No one expects much constructive reaction to the strategy from South Ossetia, but a positive response from Abkhazia, even on relatively modest activities, could indicate sincere interest in moving away from Moscow's orbit and finding some accommodation with Tbilisi. We are currently developing ways the United States will support the strategy's objectives through its own activities. ¶6. (SBU) Even in Abkhazia, however, the underlying situation remains fundamentally unstable. Georgia and Russia disagree profoundly over the source of the instability and the direction the parties must take toward resolution of the conflict. Georgia insists Russia has not yet complied with its ceasefire commitments; Russia claims Georgia is preparing further aggression against the regions. The EUMM, with its extensive access to Georgian military and law enforcement installations, has found no evidence to support Russian claims. ¶7. (C) This impasse has become more and more apparent in Geneva, where Georgia sees Russia as a party to the conflict and an existential threat, while Russia sees itself as a keeper of the peace analogous to the EUMM. The Geneva co-chairs have tried to square this circle by combining Russia's demand for a non-use of force agreement (between Georgia and the regions) with Georgia's demand for new international security arrangements, but Russia refuses to contemplate any new international presence. The Geneva process is having trouble addressing even practical issues; at the most recent round on January 28, the participants could not even agree to reconvene the South Ossetia IPRM. Even the Georgians agree the talks provide a useful forum for engagement among the parties, but if we continue to see no progress on what should be simple issues, we will have to reconsider the usefulness of Geneva. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES ¶8. (SBU) The Saakashvili-led United National Movement (UNM) continues to hold a constitutional majority in Parliament, and its current poll numbers reflect broad popular support. The government's restrained handling of the months-long opposition protests in 2009 reinforced Saakashvili's and his party's popularity throughout the country and reduced support for opposition leaders. A rapidly shrinking economy, Saakashvili's sharpest challenge in 2009, seems to have stabilized in late 2009. Although consumer indicators are improving, the economy remains a concern, as unemployment is up and investments and government revenues have fallen. International assistance, particularly the U.S. provision of 1 billion USD in aid following the August 2008 conflict, helped insulate Georgia from the worst of the global financial crisis and has provided a significant base for recovery. The EU, other donors and international financial institutions are providing an additional 3.5 billion USD in Qinstitutions are providing an additional 3.5 billion USD in assistance to Georgia. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS ¶9. (SBU) The government has made some tangible democratic progress in a number of areas, including passing a new electoral code on December 28, 2009, that will set rules for upcoming May 2010 municipal elections. The divergent positions and motives of the opposition (which ranges from "responsible" parties who sit in parliament to "irreconcilable" ones who insist on Saakashvili's early departure or removal) precluded the kind of grand bargain which could have turned the electoral code into an engine for new democratic reforms. In the current zero-sum environment, the government did not stretch itself, either. The revised election code has been sent to the Venice Commission for comment, which the Georgians expect to receive by March. President Saakashvili agreed to allow for the direct election of the Tbilisi mayor, giving the opposition a chance to control this politically important post. Substantial government influence, if not outright control, over broadcast and other media steepen the slope the opposition needs to TBILISI 00000148 003 OF 004 climb. In addition, the government has formed a constitutional commission to review ideas for constitutional change to lessen the power of the president. OPPOSITION CONCERNS ¶10. (SBU) Your meeting with opposition leaders, representing parties both inside and outside of Parliament, will provide an opportunity to hear about the current state of democracy and reform in Georgia, and the leaders will likely urge the United States and international community to do more to level the electoral playing field in Georgia by emphasizing the importance of U.S. support to strengthen civil society, establish a more free media environment, and foster increased political pluralism. Much of the public is still looking for the government to make good on its promises of a new wave of democratic reform as articulated by Saakashvili after the August 2008 conflict. The opposition argues that Saakashvili has consolidated power over the past seven years and is increasingly moving in an authoritarian direction. However, there is little agreement among opposition forces as to what needs to be done or what a good alternative political program would be. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT ¶11. (SBU) Georgian media at present reflect the polarized Political environment in the country, largely divided into pro-government and pro-opposition operations. Nationwide television channels remain the main source of information for most people. Television content is limited, resulting in a majority of the population that is poorly informed about a variety of issues and everyday concerns. Limited news programming by the Georgian Public Broadcaster in Azeri, Armenian and Russian leaves members of ethnic minorities Poorly informed about developments in Georgia; many receive news via satellite from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. Rustavi-2, to whom you will give an interview, is the most popular and widely-watched of the three national broadcasters, all of which are perceived to be pro-government. There are no hard walls separating the editorial and management sides of media organizations. The media market is small, creating financial challenges. Journalists are low-paid and practice self-censorship. STILL SEEKING NATO INTEGRATION ¶12. (SBU) Support for NATO remains high in Georgia. At the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO Allies decided that Ukraine and Georgia's bid for membership action plans would have to be addressed later, yet at the same time declared that the two countries would become members of NATO. Since the fall of 2008, NATO has been working with Georgia under the aegis of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC),and through the NGC, Georgia and the Alliance have work closely on an Annual National Program (ANP) which is designed to help Georgia advance reforms in areas key for membership, including political, economic, and defense reforms. Georgia continues to be a strong supporter of NATO operations and is a contributor to international security missions. Georgia currently has troops deployed with the French and Turks in Afghanistan, and is scheduled to deploy this spring a battalion to participate in the ISAF operations, alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand Province. U.S. Marines have been on the ground in Georgia since September 2009 training about 700 Georgian land force troops for their deployment alongside U.S. troops in March 2010. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA QRELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ¶13. (SBU) While official relations between Russia and Georgia remain contentious, the two governments reached a preliminary agreement in December to reopen a border crossing for transit traffic to Armenia and limited access for Georgians, and the government has indicated that it is willing to sign a protocol as early as March. Georgian Airways ran a few charter flights to Moscow and St. Petersburg in January -- the first direct commercial flights since a brief period in 2008 -- and is negotiating for permission for more regular flights. A TOUGH NEIGHBORHOOD ¶14. (C) Georgia is also concerned by a significant increase in military supplies from Russia to Armenia planned for 2010 primarily via overflights between Russia and Armenia. Although Georgia has continued to allow the flights to maintain a good relationship with Armenia, it does not TBILISI 00000148 004 OF 004 believe Armenia has the capacity to use these shipments itself and fears that such armaments as large-caliber ammunition for aircraft could be intended for Russian forces in Armenia, instead of the Armenian military. Not only could such shipments disrupt the balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but they could potentially be used to squeeze Georgia from the south as well. ¶15. (S) Georgia is also trying to manage its relationship with Iran. Georgia agrees with many of our concerns about Iran's policies, and has been willing to raise those concerns directly with the Iranians. Georgia still faces lingering anger from Tehran for extraditing an Iranian arms smuggler to the United States several years ago. At the same time, it cannot afford to alienate a powerful regional neighbor and major commercial partner -- especially as it seeks to prevent any further recognitions of the breakaway regions. Although the government has assured us that a proposed hydro project does not involve Iranian banks, we continue to monitor the deal. BASS