GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000148

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV OTRA OVIP RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY
STEINBERG'S VISIT

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Georgia is calmer and more stable than it was when
you visited last summer, but those improvements are far from
durable and a palpable sense of insecurity still permeates
society and politics. Miscalculations and provocations -
domestically, in the territories or north across the
mountains - could easily spark renewed crisis. With a
stabilized economy and no viable rival, President Saakashvili
is stronger politically but paradoxically more insecure,
burdened by the fear history will judge him to have lost
irrevocably the occupied territories and concerned our
measured approach to defense cooperation and engagement with
Moscow presage a deeper reorientation of U.S. interests.
These concerns are reinforced by a steady drumbeat of Russian
accusations about the legitimacy and behavior of his
government and comparative silence from the West about
Moscow's consolidation of its position in the territories.
In this hothouse environment, your visit is an important,
visible manifestation of our enduring commitment to support
Georgia's aspirations to move west - and an opportunity to
remind the president that realization of those aspirations
ultimately depends on a renewed commitment to deeper
democratic and economic reforms.


2. (S) Large swathes of the government, and society more
broadly, are still motivated by the lure of Euro-Atlantic
integration. Fears that Georgia will remain in the West's
waiting room in perpetuity have sparked a minority to begin
discussing the viability of a deal with Moscow in order to
reintegrate the territories. These trial balloons, and
Moscow's efforts to de-legitimize the government and create
more palatable alternatives, further polarize a political
environment that encourages zero-sum thinking and retards
deeper democratic and economic reforms. Saakashvili
continues to cast about for the 'one big thing' that will
secure Georgia's place in the west, adding an offer to
provide a logistics hub for Afghanistan to his substantial
troop commitment over the next two years. Our challenge is
to convince President Saakashvili that the 'one big thing' is
a recommitment to Georgia's democratic development,
symbolized by a competitive presidential succession in 2013,
even while we work to prevent a slide back into conflict and
instability.

CONFLICT AND INSECURITY


3. (C) It's hard to overestimate the extent to which an
intense climate of insecurity permeates Georgian society and
political culture. Russian forces, located as close as 25
miles from Tbilisi, are building permanent bases and
Georgians confront a steady drip of Russian statements
alleging Georgian aggression or announcing the latest step in
incorporating Abkhazia into Russia's economy. Moscow's
statements suggesting that Georgia is planning provocations
in the North Caucasus have raised fears among Georgian
officials that Russia is looking for another pretext.
Tbilisi, in turn, is overly focused on weapons acquisition as
an antidote to its jitters. It fears our approach to defense
cooperation (heavily focused on developing the structures and
processes to assess threats, develop appropriate responses
and make informed decisions about use of force before moving
to acquisition) is a trade-off to secure Russian cooperation
on other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our
Qon other issues, such as Iran. Your discussion of our
broader efforts with Moscow will help reinforce with
Saakashvili that we do not see this as a zero-sum equation -
and that Georgia also benefits from Moscow's cooperation on
the wider agenda.


4. (C) The immediate security environment has stabilized,
with fewer incidents along the administrative boundaries.
Shootings and explosions still occur, but much less
frequently; in the age-old tradition of the Caucasus,
detentions have become the major source of tension,
especially around South Ossetia. The Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) established by the Geneva talks
have helped increase communication and decrease the
volatility of individual incidents, especially in Abkhazia;
the South Ossetian de facto authorities have refused to
participate in their IPRM since October 2009, pending the
resolution of three missing persons cases. Overall the
Abkhaz de facto authorities are more interested in engaging
with partners other than Russia and are therefore more
constructive in the IPRM and in Geneva; they continue to
allow international partners to operate inside Abkhazia. The
South Ossetians are steadfastly uncooperative, even when
proposals would benefit their own residents. Local residents
still face limitations on movements and other human rights

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concerns in both regions.


5. (C) A more mature Georgian policy on the territories
reflects growing recognition that there is no short-term - or
military - way to reintegrate them into Georgia, but
implementation may founder on Abkhaz, or Russian, insistence
on first discussing the region's status. A key question is
the extent to which the de factos control their own fate
versus Russia orchestrating the immediate security ups and
downs; the Georgians are convinced the Abkhaz/South Ossetian
good cop-bad cop routine is played at the behest of the
Russians. No one expects much constructive reaction to the
strategy from South Ossetia, but a positive response from
Abkhazia, even on relatively modest activities, could
indicate sincere interest in moving away from Moscow's orbit
and finding some accommodation with Tbilisi. We are
currently developing ways the United States will support the
strategy's objectives through its own activities.


6. (SBU) Even in Abkhazia, however, the underlying situation
remains fundamentally unstable. Georgia and Russia disagree
profoundly over the source of the instability and the
direction the parties must take toward resolution of the
conflict. Georgia insists Russia has not yet complied with
its ceasefire commitments; Russia claims Georgia is preparing
further aggression against the regions. The EUMM, with its
extensive access to Georgian military and law enforcement
installations, has found no evidence to support Russian
claims.


7. (C) This impasse has become more and more apparent in
Geneva, where Georgia sees Russia as a party to the conflict
and an existential threat, while Russia sees itself as a
keeper of the peace analogous to the EUMM. The Geneva
co-chairs have tried to square this circle by combining
Russia's demand for a non-use of force agreement (between
Georgia and the regions) with Georgia's demand for new
international security arrangements, but Russia refuses to
contemplate any new international presence. The Geneva
process is having trouble addressing even practical issues;
at the most recent round on January 28, the participants
could not even agree to reconvene the South Ossetia IPRM.
Even the Georgians agree the talks provide a useful forum for
engagement among the parties, but if we continue to see no
progress on what should be simple issues, we will have to
reconsider the usefulness of Geneva.

DOMESTIC CHALLENGES


8. (SBU) The Saakashvili-led United National Movement (UNM)
continues to hold a constitutional majority in Parliament,
and its current poll numbers reflect broad popular support.
The government's restrained handling of the months-long
opposition protests in 2009 reinforced Saakashvili's and his
party's popularity throughout the country and reduced support
for opposition leaders. A rapidly shrinking economy,
Saakashvili's sharpest challenge in 2009, seems to have
stabilized in late 2009. Although consumer indicators are
improving, the economy remains a concern, as unemployment is
up and investments and government revenues have fallen.
International assistance, particularly the U.S. provision of
1 billion USD in aid following the August 2008 conflict,
helped insulate Georgia from the worst of the global
financial crisis and has provided a significant base for
recovery. The EU, other donors and international financial
institutions are providing an additional 3.5 billion USD in
Qinstitutions are providing an additional 3.5 billion USD in
assistance to Georgia.

DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS


9. (SBU) The government has made some tangible democratic
progress in a number of areas, including passing a new
electoral code on December 28, 2009, that will set rules for
upcoming May 2010 municipal elections. The divergent
positions and motives of the opposition (which ranges from
"responsible" parties who sit in parliament to
"irreconcilable" ones who insist on Saakashvili's early
departure or removal) precluded the kind of grand bargain
which could have turned the electoral code into an engine for
new democratic reforms. In the current zero-sum environment,
the government did not stretch itself, either. The revised
election code has been sent to the Venice Commission for
comment, which the Georgians expect to receive by March.
President Saakashvili agreed to allow for the direct election
of the Tbilisi mayor, giving the opposition a chance to
control this politically important post. Substantial
government influence, if not outright control, over broadcast
and other media steepen the slope the opposition needs to

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climb. In addition, the government has formed a
constitutional commission to review ideas for constitutional
change to lessen the power of the president.

OPPOSITION CONCERNS


10. (SBU) Your meeting with opposition leaders, representing
parties both inside and outside of Parliament, will provide
an opportunity to hear about the current state of democracy
and reform in Georgia, and the leaders will likely urge the
United States and international community to do more to level
the electoral playing field in Georgia by emphasizing the
importance of U.S. support to strengthen civil society,
establish a more free media environment, and foster increased
political pluralism. Much of the public is still looking for
the government to make good on its promises of a new wave of
democratic reform as articulated by Saakashvili after the
August 2008 conflict. The opposition argues that Saakashvili
has consolidated power over the past seven years and is
increasingly moving in an authoritarian direction. However,
there is little agreement among opposition forces as to what
needs to be done or what a good alternative political program
would be.

MEDIA ENVIRONMENT


11. (SBU) Georgian media at present reflect the polarized
Political environment in the country, largely divided into
pro-government and pro-opposition operations. Nationwide
television channels remain the main source of information for
most people. Television content is limited, resulting in a
majority of the population that is poorly informed about a
variety of issues and everyday concerns. Limited news
programming by the Georgian Public Broadcaster in Azeri,
Armenian and Russian leaves members of ethnic minorities
Poorly informed about developments in Georgia; many receive
news via satellite from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.
Rustavi-2, to whom you will give an interview, is the most
popular and widely-watched of the three national
broadcasters, all of which are perceived to be
pro-government. There are no hard walls separating the
editorial and management sides of media organizations. The
media market is small, creating financial challenges.
Journalists are low-paid and practice self-censorship.

STILL SEEKING NATO INTEGRATION


12. (SBU) Support for NATO remains high in Georgia. At the
NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO Allies decided that
Ukraine and Georgia's bid for membership action plans would
have to be addressed later, yet at the same time declared
that the two countries would become members of NATO. Since
the fall of 2008, NATO has been working with Georgia under
the aegis of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC),and through
the NGC, Georgia and the Alliance have work closely on an
Annual National Program (ANP) which is designed to help
Georgia advance reforms in areas key for membership,
including political, economic, and defense reforms. Georgia
continues to be a strong supporter of NATO operations and is
a contributor to international security missions. Georgia
currently has troops deployed with the French and Turks in
Afghanistan, and is scheduled to deploy this spring a
battalion to participate in the ISAF operations, alongside
U.S. Marines in Helmand Province. U.S. Marines have been on
the ground in Georgia since September 2009 training about 700
Georgian land force troops for their deployment alongside
U.S. troops in March 2010.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
QRELATIONS WITH RUSSIA


13. (SBU) While official relations between Russia and Georgia
remain contentious, the two governments reached a preliminary
agreement in December to reopen a border crossing for transit
traffic to Armenia and limited access for Georgians, and the
government has indicated that it is willing to sign a
protocol as early as March. Georgian Airways ran a few
charter flights to Moscow and St. Petersburg in January --
the first direct commercial flights since a brief period in
2008 -- and is negotiating for permission for more regular
flights.

A TOUGH NEIGHBORHOOD


14. (C) Georgia is also concerned by a significant increase
in military supplies from Russia to Armenia planned for 2010
primarily via overflights between Russia and Armenia.
Although Georgia has continued to allow the flights to
maintain a good relationship with Armenia, it does not

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believe Armenia has the capacity to use these shipments
itself and fears that such armaments as large-caliber
ammunition for aircraft could be intended for Russian forces
in Armenia, instead of the Armenian military. Not only could
such shipments disrupt the balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, but they could potentially be used to squeeze
Georgia from the south as well.


15. (S) Georgia is also trying to manage its relationship
with Iran. Georgia agrees with many of our concerns about
Iran's policies, and has been willing to raise those concerns
directly with the Iranians. Georgia still faces lingering
anger from Tehran for extraditing an Iranian arms smuggler to
the United States several years ago. At the same time, it
cannot afford to alienate a powerful regional neighbor and
major commercial partner -- especially as it seeks to prevent
any further recognitions of the breakaway regions. Although
the government has assured us that a proposed hydro project
does not involve Iranian banks, we continue to monitor the
deal.
BASS