Uzbekistan: Karimov Decree Offers Opportunities, But

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000055 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/01 TAGS: PREL PGOV AORC UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Karimov Decree Offers Opportunities, But Requires USG Decisions REF: 10 TASHKENT 19; 10 TASHKENT 45 CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Uzbek President Karimov signed a decree on January 11 calling for strengthened bilateral cooperation with the U.S. following the ABC meetings in Washington. The decree, which has since leaked to the press, tasks all Uzbek government entities with facilitating the implementation of the measures laid out in the GOU's ABC work plan (previously reported in Ref A). The decree, while a unilateral step by the GOU, provides an important opening to advance U.S. interests in Uzbekistan in the near term, but will require positive signals on such issues as high-level visits and military-technical cooperation if this opportunity is to be fully realized. End Summary. ¶2. (C) President Karimov's January 11 decree on strengthening relations with the U.S. (text at para 6) has had a salutary effect on the GOU bureaucracy and provided the high-level imprimatur necessary to facilitate improved cooperation with the U.S. across a number of areas. The decree was leaked to the press and its contents, which also include the GOU's ABC work plan, are circulating widely in the unofficial internet press, creating a flurry of speculation in the usually information-deprived world of Uzbek journalists and bloggers. We have clarified to journalists that the decree represents the GOU's desired work plan and that not all elements have been agreed to by the USG. FMF and IMET -------------- ¶3. (C) The fact that Karimov has effectively tasked his government to advance the relationship with the U.S. presents an important opportunity at a critical time as the USG manages the Afghanistan plus up. Karimov and the GOU are seeking legitimacy and recognition in two ways: First, they want the recognition and prestige that would accrue from a visit by Secretary Clinton to Uzbekistan. Second, they want to see progress on the issue of military-technical cooperation and what they know would be the concomitant lifting or waiving of the Congressional restrictions on FMF and IMET. Our challenge is to leverage this opening to our best advantage, but we cannot assume that time is our ally. The GOU is clearly looking for "signals," and, as part of any additional NDN-related requests, we would be well-served to be able to offer tangible responses to the Uzbeks on the question of a high-level visit or military-technical cooperation. SCO Summit -------------- ¶4. (C) Another opening for engagement that merits consideration is the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that will take place in Tashkent in June. As reported Ref B, the Russians and Chinese have apparently told the Uzbeks that they would countenance U.S. participation in the summit, provided that it is at the level of the Secretary. The SCO summit presents an opportunity to engage with this important regional organization and, with Russian President Medvedev and the Chinese leadership also expected to be on hand, to conduct a significant amount of other business. At the same time, the Secretary's participation would check the box for the Uzbeks of a visit to Tashkent without Uzbekistan being the primary purpose of the trip, possibly deflecting criticism from some quarters. ¶5. (C) Although it is doubtful that a commitment to have the Secretary participate in the SCO summit in Tashkent would obviate the need to respond favorably to the Uzbeks' request for military-technical cooperation, the promise of a visit would generate sufficient goodwill to buy us more time to work with the TASHKENT 00000055 002 OF 003 Congress on this sensitive issue. Particularly with the Kazakh OSCE presidency, diplomacy in Tashkent is about balance and showing Karimov that Uzbekistan can come in from the cold and be a serious partner. The SCO summit might be just such an opportunity and provide leverage for further progress on more sensitive issues, such as human rights. Text of Presidential Decree -------------- ¶6. (SBU)Begin text: Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan 11 January 2010 (On measures to implement the Action Plan for strengthening bilateral cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States of America in 2010) With the purpose of further development and strengthening of mutually beneficial bilateral relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the U.S., consecutive implementation of provisions in the Declaration on strategic partnership and cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and United States of America dated from 12 March 2002, as well as other bilateral intergovernmental and interagency agreements in the political, trade-economic and humanitarian areas: ¶1. Take into consideration the results of the first round of Uzbek-American political consultations, which took place on 17-18 December 2009 in Washington D.C. ¶2. Pay special attention to the high level of participants at the political consultations by members of the American side - experts from the State Department, National Security Council and other state structures of the U.S., as well as their constructive approach and positive attitude on all issues of development of bilateral relations with Uzbekistan. ¶3. To underline the important practical meaning of concrete suggestions expressed during the political consultations by the American side for further development of bilateral relations in the area of politics, security, economy, human dimension, and providing peace and stability in Afghanistan. ¶4. Approve an action plan to strengthen bilateral cooperation between Republic of Uzbekistan and United States of America in 2010 (referred to as Action Plan) according to the Attachment. Ministries and agencies responsible for implementation, mentioned in the attachment to the current decree, are to provide timely implementation of events provided in the Action Plan. ¶5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Economic relations, Investment and Trade, Ministry of Economy, Defense Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency Situations, National Security Service and other Ministries and Agencies mentioned in the attachment of the current decree: -Provide comprehensive preparation of documents and materials for the next round of Uzbek-American political consultations; TASHKENT 00000055 003 OF 003 -Report on a quarterly basis to the Uzbek Presidential Apparatus about the implementation of the Action Plan. ¶6. Control for implementation of current decree is assigned to M. Ataev, Secretary of National Security Council under the President of Uzbekistan and V. Norov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. President of the Republic of Uzbekistan /Stamp/ I. Karimov Tashkent. End text. NORLAND