SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002: TREATY TEXT ARTICLES AND OTHER

S E C R E T STATE 009672

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2030
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002: TREATY TEXT ARTICLES AND OTHER
ISSUES

REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. PROPOSED
JDT OF THE TREATY

B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. PROPOSED
JDT OF THE PROTOCOL

C. MOSCOW 00135

D. GENEVA 1235 (SFO-GVA-VI-159)

Classified By: ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI
Reason: 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (S) Washington has developed guidance for this round
as a result of its intersessional review of the December
19, 2009 U.S. proposed JDTs (Refs A and B) and the Russian
proposed JDTs, which were handed over to U.S. Embassy
Moscow on December 31, 2009. This is one of several
guidance cables for the session beginning February 1, 2010
in Geneva, and focuses primarily on certain articles in
the Treaty text.

--------------
Article VIII
--------------


2. (S) Delegation is authorized to conclude the text of
Article VIII on the basis of the text provided by U.S.
Head of Delegation Gottemoeller to Russian Head of
Delegation Antonov in Moscow on January 14 (Ref C). Any
substantive changes should be referred back to Washington
for approval.

--------------
Article IX
--------------


3. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to
Washington a revised version of Article IX based on the
text provided in para 4 below. This revised version is
intended to clarify that a Party will determine for itself
when its actions may create an "ambiguous situation."


4. (S) Begin text for Article IX:

In those cases in which a party determines that its
actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall
take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of
this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness and
predictability concerning strategic offensive arms. Such
measures may include, but are not limited to, providing
information in advance on activities such as those
associated with deployment or increased readiness of
strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of
misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This
information may be provided through diplomatic channels or
by other means.
End text.

--------------
Article V
--------------


5. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to
Washington a revised version of Article V based on the
text provided in para 7 below.


6. (S) Delegation is not/not authorized to agree to the
inclusion in Article V of paragraph 3 concerning the
prohibition on converting silo launchers to interceptor
launchers and vice versa until the U.S. and Russia have
reached agreement on the telemetry issue along the lines
that General Jones and Admiral Mullen discussed with their
Russian counterparts in Moscow January 21-22, 2010. When
Delegation is authorized to agree to this provision,
Delegation should ensure that the text is revised either
to include the word "modified" as provided in the text in
para 7 below, or that the text explicitly references the
five launchers the United States intends to be excluded
from the prohibition. This provision is intended to
exclude the five ground-based interceptor launchers at
Vandenberg, which the United States has described in the
JCIC as having been modified, rather than converted.
Therefore, it is important to have the provision encompass
the concept of modification as well as conversion. If the
Russian delegation strongly resists insertion of the word "
modified," Delegation is authorized to not include the
word "modified" so long as the negotiating record is very
clear that Russia understands and agrees that the word "
converted" is used in a broad sense (not simply in the
treaty-specific sense of "conversion or elimination") and
that the legal effect of this provision is to exclude the
five interceptor launchers at Vandenberg from the
prohibition in this provision. Delegation shall also
inform Russia that since these launchers are no longer
ICBM launchers, the U.S. will not be reporting them as "
ICBM launchers" under the Treaty.


7. (S) Begin text for Article V:


1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization
and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried
out.

2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic
offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right
to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm
for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.
[3. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or
SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein. Each Party further undertakes not
to convert or use launchers of missile defense
interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein.
This provision shall not apply to former ICBM launchers
that were converted or modified prior to signature of this
Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein.]2
End text.

--------------
Article XIV
--------------


8. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to
Washington a revised version of Article XIV based on the
text provided in para 9 below and a revised notification
based on the text in para 10 below.


9. (S) Begin text for Article XIV:

To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),procedures
for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of
the Protocol to this Treaty, to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the
obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of
this Treaty; and

(c) determine whether and how provisions of this
Treaty apply to a new kind of strategic offensive arm for
which a notification has been provided in accordance with
paragraph TBD of Section TBD of Part Four of the Protocol
to this Treaty.

End text.


10. (S) Begin text for notification of Strategic Offensive
Arms of New Types and New Kinds:

Notification of the development of a new kind of strategic
offensive arm, no later than 30 days after the first
flight test of such an arm as a weapon delivery vehicle,
unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised
earlier within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.

End text.

--------------
Treaty Article VI
--------------


11. (S) Once the Russian delegation has agreed to Treaty
or Protocol text, as appropriate, codifying the use of
unique identifiers on all ICBMs, SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers; that ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs
will not exceed 125,000 sq km nor their basing areas
exceed 5 sq km; that the sides will provide 48-hour
advance notification of new missile exits from production
facilities; and the right to cancel an inspection if fewer
than 50 percent of deployed ICBMs are available for
inspection at an ICBM base, then Delegation is authorized
to drop Article VI from the Treaty.

--------------
ASBMs
--------------


12. (S) Background and Guidance: In Refs A and B, nuclear
air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range greater
than 600 km are, by omission, not included in the
definition of "heavy bomber nuclear armaments."
Delegation is instructed to delete the phrase "with a
range of less than 600 kilometers" from the relevant
definitions and corresponding categories of data in Part
Two of Ref B (Database). This will ensure that all
nuclear air-to-surface missiles regardless of range are
included in the definition of heavy bomber nuclear
armaments. (Note: The definitions of the terms "heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments," "heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments," and "nuclear armament for
heavy bombers" each currently contain the phrase "nuclear
air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600
kilometers.")
--------------
Soft-Site Launchers
--------------


13. (S) Background and guidance: Under the December 19
New START JDT, soft-site launchers used for ICBM or SLBM
launches would count as non-deployed launchers. Since
Russia has agreed to the U.S.-proposed aggregate limit of
800 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers, delegation is instructed to
negotiate the following changes to ensure that soft-site
launchers at test ranges and space launch facilities are
not counted as non-deployed launchers under the aggregate
limit: Delegation should seek to add to Part One of Ref B
the definition for "soft-site launcher" exactly as it
appears in START, and to modify the definitions for "
non-deployed launcher of SLBMs" and "non-deployed launcher
of ICBMs" by adding the phrase "other than a soft-site
launcher" after the words "means an SLBM launcher" and "
means an ICBM launcher," respectively.

--------------
Mobile Training Launchers
--------------


14. (S) Background and Guidance: It has been established
during the negotiations that there are no mobile training
launchers or SLBM training launchers, and that all
references to training launchers should apply only to silo
training launchers. Therefore, Delegation should ensure
that the term "mobile training launcher" does not appear
in the treaty documents.

--------------
Warhead/Armament
--------------


15. (S) Background and guidance: With respect to heavy
bombers, the terms "nuclear warheads" and "nuclear
armaments" are used inconsistently throughout Refs A and

B. In reference to heavy bombers, Article II, paragraph 1
uses the term "nuclear armaments" and subparagraph 1.(b)
uses the term "nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy
bombers." Article III, subparagraph 2.(b) uses the term "
nuclear armaments," but since it refers to the unit of
account related to the aggregate limit that was specified
in Article II, subparagraph 1.(b),it should use the term "
warheads." Delegation is instructed to redraft Article
III, subparagraph 2.(b) as follows: "For each deployed
heavy bomber, the number of nuclear warheads shall be
one." Additionally, the definition of "warhead" needs to
be agreed and then the texts of the Treaty and Protocol
need to be scrubbed to ensure consistent and logical use
of the terms "warhead" and "armament" throughout.
Washington notes that the U.S.-proposed correction to
Article II was initially raised by the U.S. Negotiator
with the Russian Negotiator in a January 14, 2010 meeting
in Moscow (Ref C).

--------------
Space Launch Facilities
--------------


16. (S) Guidance: To clarify that space launch
facilities identified in Part Two of the Protocol are not
subject to inspection, Delegation is instructed to change
the reference in Article XII paragraph 3 from "Part Two of
the Protocol" to "Section X of Part Two of the Protocol,"
which is the provision that delineates which types of
facilities are subject to inspection and which are not.

--------------
SLBM Launchers
--------------


17. (S) Delegation is instructed to ensure consistent use
of terminology that SLBM launchers are "installed on"
submarines or simply "on" submarines. The Treaty and
Protocol should not use the terminology that SLBM
launchers are "located" on ballistic missile submarines,
as is currently used in paragraph 1(b) of Article IV.

--------------
Changes to Part Three of the Protocol
--------------


18. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement to modify subparagraph 4(b) of Section III of
Part Three of the Protocol. The U.S. JDT (Ref B) and the
Russian JDT both agree in this subparagraph to paint the
upper surfaces of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs
white if they are used at any military facility.
Delegation should press for a different paint scheme that
would be more conducive to observation by NTM of such
vehicles in all seasons, such as black and white stripes.


19. (S) Delegation is instructed to change the last
sentence of Paragraph 7 of Section III of Part Three of
the Protocol to read: "...shall be considered a launcher
of the other type of ICBM." The term "new type" is a
defined term in the treaty and is too narrow for this
case, since an ICBM launcher could also be converted for
another existing type of ICBM.


20. (S) Delegation is instructed to continue to press for
Russian agreement to revise paragraph 4 of Section IV of
Part Three of the Protocol so that the middle sentence
reads "The submarine shall remain at the declared facility
and visible to national technical means of verification
until final scrapping has been completed and notification
thereof has been provided." The new phrase "and visible
to national technical means of verification" is already in
Russia's current JDT, but is bracketed as U.S-proposed
text. Such a provision is consistent with current Russian
practices and will ensure that SSBNs can continue to be
monitored until they are scrapped.

--------------
Heavy Bomber Conversion
--------------


21. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek to add
the word "All" before the words "heavy bombers" in Article
III, subparagraph 6(c). The change is intended to make
clear that this subparagraph applies to all heavy bombers
of a type after all have been converted.

--------------
Mobile ICBM Base Coordinates
--------------


22. (S) Background: In Ref D, the United States has
agreed to drop from Part One of the Protocol the terms "
restricted area" and "deployment area" in favor of the
Russian-preferred terms "basing area" and "ICBM base,"
respectively. In the definition of "ICBM base" the United
States has sought to limit the size of an ICBM base for
mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 125,000 sq. km.
in size. In the definition of "basing area" the United
States has sought to limit the size of an ICBM basing area
to no more than 5 sq. km. in size.


23. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to continue
to seek to include the U.S.-proposed size constraints in
the definitions for "basing area" and "ICBM base."
Delegation is instructed to seek agreement that, while
site diagrams will not be required to depict the entire
area of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the
boundaries of such ICBM bases for mobile launchers of
ICBMs shall be defined by straight lines connecting
geographic points, and the geographic coordinates of each
such point shall be provided in Part Two of the Protocol.
In addition, delegation should seek agreement that ICBM
bases may not overlap. Washington recommends these
agreements be recorded in a new paragraph in Section I of
Part Two of the Protocol.

-------------- ---
Technical Data on Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments
-------------- ---


24. (S) Background: The Russian delegation has proposed
dropping Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol, which
specifies technical data for heavy bomber armaments.
Washington notes that, because the number of warheads
associated with heavy bombers will be based on an
attribution rule, there is no need to have technical data
on heavy bomber armaments in order to conduct inspections
at air bases.


25. (S) Guidance: Delegation is authorized to agree to
the Russian proposal to delete Section IX of Part Two of
the Protocol entitled "Heavy Bomber (Nuclear) Armaments
Technical Data."

--------------
Previous Guidance
--------------


26. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous
guidance remains in effect.

End guidance.
CLINTON