SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002: TREATY TEXT ARTICLES AND OTHER

S E C R E T STATE 009672 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2030 TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002: TREATY TEXT ARTICLES AND OTHER ISSUES REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE TREATY ¶B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE PROTOCOL ¶C. MOSCOW 00135 ¶D. GENEVA 1235 (SFO-GVA-VI-159) Classified By: ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI Reason: 1.4 (B) & (D) ¶1. (S) Washington has developed guidance for this round as a result of its intersessional review of the December 19, 2009 U.S. proposed JDTs (Refs A and B) and the Russian proposed JDTs, which were handed over to U.S. Embassy Moscow on December 31, 2009. This is one of several guidance cables for the session beginning February 1, 2010 in Geneva, and focuses primarily on certain articles in the Treaty text. -------------- Article VIII -------------- ¶2. (S) Delegation is authorized to conclude the text of Article VIII on the basis of the text provided by U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller to Russian Head of Delegation Antonov in Moscow on January 14 (Ref C). Any substantive changes should be referred back to Washington for approval. -------------- Article IX -------------- ¶3. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to Washington a revised version of Article IX based on the text provided in para 4 below. This revised version is intended to clarify that a Party will determine for itself when its actions may create an "ambiguous situation." ¶4. (S) Begin text for Article IX: In those cases in which a party determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness and predictability concerning strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, providing information in advance on activities such as those associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information may be provided through diplomatic channels or by other means. End text. -------------- Article V -------------- ¶5. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to Washington a revised version of Article V based on the text provided in para 7 below. ¶6. (S) Delegation is not/not authorized to agree to the inclusion in Article V of paragraph 3 concerning the prohibition on converting silo launchers to interceptor launchers and vice versa until the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on the telemetry issue along the lines that General Jones and Admiral Mullen discussed with their Russian counterparts in Moscow January 21-22, 2010. When Delegation is authorized to agree to this provision, Delegation should ensure that the text is revised either to include the word "modified" as provided in the text in para 7 below, or that the text explicitly references the five launchers the United States intends to be excluded from the prohibition. This provision is intended to exclude the five ground-based interceptor launchers at Vandenberg, which the United States has described in the JCIC as having been modified, rather than converted. Therefore, it is important to have the provision encompass the concept of modification as well as conversion. If the Russian delegation strongly resists insertion of the word " modified," Delegation is authorized to not include the word "modified" so long as the negotiating record is very clear that Russia understands and agrees that the word " converted" is used in a broad sense (not simply in the treaty-specific sense of "conversion or elimination") and that the legal effect of this provision is to exclude the five interceptor launchers at Vandenberg from the prohibition in this provision. Delegation shall also inform Russia that since these launchers are no longer ICBM launchers, the U.S. will not be reporting them as " ICBM launchers" under the Treaty. ¶7. (S) Begin text for Article V: ¶1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. ¶2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. [3. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further undertakes not to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to former ICBM launchers that were converted or modified prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.]2 End text. -------------- Article XIV -------------- ¶8. (S) Delegation is instructed to negotiate ad ref to Washington a revised version of Article XIV based on the text provided in para 9 below and a revised notification based on the text in para 10 below. ¶9. (S) Begin text for Article XIV: To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) determine whether and how provisions of this Treaty apply to a new kind of strategic offensive arm for which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph TBD of Section TBD of Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. End text. ¶10. (S) Begin text for notification of Strategic Offensive Arms of New Types and New Kinds: Notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm, no later than 30 days after the first flight test of such an arm as a weapon delivery vehicle, unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised earlier within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. End text. -------------- Treaty Article VI -------------- ¶11. (S) Once the Russian delegation has agreed to Treaty or Protocol text, as appropriate, codifying the use of unique identifiers on all ICBMs, SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; that ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs will not exceed 125,000 sq km nor their basing areas exceed 5 sq km; that the sides will provide 48-hour advance notification of new missile exits from production facilities; and the right to cancel an inspection if fewer than 50 percent of deployed ICBMs are available for inspection at an ICBM base, then Delegation is authorized to drop Article VI from the Treaty. -------------- ASBMs -------------- ¶12. (S) Background and Guidance: In Refs A and B, nuclear air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 km are, by omission, not included in the definition of "heavy bomber nuclear armaments." Delegation is instructed to delete the phrase "with a range of less than 600 kilometers" from the relevant definitions and corresponding categories of data in Part Two of Ref B (Database). This will ensure that all nuclear air-to-surface missiles regardless of range are included in the definition of heavy bomber nuclear armaments. (Note: The definitions of the terms "heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments," "heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments," and "nuclear armament for heavy bombers" each currently contain the phrase "nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers.") -------------- Soft-Site Launchers -------------- ¶13. (S) Background and guidance: Under the December 19 New START JDT, soft-site launchers used for ICBM or SLBM launches would count as non-deployed launchers. Since Russia has agreed to the U.S.-proposed aggregate limit of 800 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, delegation is instructed to negotiate the following changes to ensure that soft-site launchers at test ranges and space launch facilities are not counted as non-deployed launchers under the aggregate limit: Delegation should seek to add to Part One of Ref B the definition for "soft-site launcher" exactly as it appears in START, and to modify the definitions for " non-deployed launcher of SLBMs" and "non-deployed launcher of ICBMs" by adding the phrase "other than a soft-site launcher" after the words "means an SLBM launcher" and " means an ICBM launcher," respectively. -------------- Mobile Training Launchers -------------- ¶14. (S) Background and Guidance: It has been established during the negotiations that there are no mobile training launchers or SLBM training launchers, and that all references to training launchers should apply only to silo training launchers. Therefore, Delegation should ensure that the term "mobile training launcher" does not appear in the treaty documents. -------------- Warhead/Armament -------------- ¶15. (S) Background and guidance: With respect to heavy bombers, the terms "nuclear warheads" and "nuclear armaments" are used inconsistently throughout Refs A and ¶B. In reference to heavy bombers, Article II, paragraph 1 uses the term "nuclear armaments" and subparagraph 1.(b) uses the term "nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers." Article III, subparagraph 2.(b) uses the term " nuclear armaments," but since it refers to the unit of account related to the aggregate limit that was specified in Article II, subparagraph 1.(b),it should use the term " warheads." Delegation is instructed to redraft Article III, subparagraph 2.(b) as follows: "For each deployed heavy bomber, the number of nuclear warheads shall be one." Additionally, the definition of "warhead" needs to be agreed and then the texts of the Treaty and Protocol need to be scrubbed to ensure consistent and logical use of the terms "warhead" and "armament" throughout. Washington notes that the U.S.-proposed correction to Article II was initially raised by the U.S. Negotiator with the Russian Negotiator in a January 14, 2010 meeting in Moscow (Ref C). -------------- Space Launch Facilities -------------- ¶16. (S) Guidance: To clarify that space launch facilities identified in Part Two of the Protocol are not subject to inspection, Delegation is instructed to change the reference in Article XII paragraph 3 from "Part Two of the Protocol" to "Section X of Part Two of the Protocol," which is the provision that delineates which types of facilities are subject to inspection and which are not. -------------- SLBM Launchers -------------- ¶17. (S) Delegation is instructed to ensure consistent use of terminology that SLBM launchers are "installed on" submarines or simply "on" submarines. The Treaty and Protocol should not use the terminology that SLBM launchers are "located" on ballistic missile submarines, as is currently used in paragraph 1(b) of Article IV. -------------- Changes to Part Three of the Protocol -------------- ¶18. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement to modify subparagraph 4(b) of Section III of Part Three of the Protocol. The U.S. JDT (Ref B) and the Russian JDT both agree in this subparagraph to paint the upper surfaces of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs white if they are used at any military facility. Delegation should press for a different paint scheme that would be more conducive to observation by NTM of such vehicles in all seasons, such as black and white stripes. ¶19. (S) Delegation is instructed to change the last sentence of Paragraph 7 of Section III of Part Three of the Protocol to read: "...shall be considered a launcher of the other type of ICBM." The term "new type" is a defined term in the treaty and is too narrow for this case, since an ICBM launcher could also be converted for another existing type of ICBM. ¶20. (S) Delegation is instructed to continue to press for Russian agreement to revise paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part Three of the Protocol so that the middle sentence reads "The submarine shall remain at the declared facility and visible to national technical means of verification until final scrapping has been completed and notification thereof has been provided." The new phrase "and visible to national technical means of verification" is already in Russia's current JDT, but is bracketed as U.S-proposed text. Such a provision is consistent with current Russian practices and will ensure that SSBNs can continue to be monitored until they are scrapped. -------------- Heavy Bomber Conversion -------------- ¶21. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek to add the word "All" before the words "heavy bombers" in Article III, subparagraph 6(c). The change is intended to make clear that this subparagraph applies to all heavy bombers of a type after all have been converted. -------------- Mobile ICBM Base Coordinates -------------- ¶22. (S) Background: In Ref D, the United States has agreed to drop from Part One of the Protocol the terms " restricted area" and "deployment area" in favor of the Russian-preferred terms "basing area" and "ICBM base," respectively. In the definition of "ICBM base" the United States has sought to limit the size of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 125,000 sq. km. in size. In the definition of "basing area" the United States has sought to limit the size of an ICBM basing area to no more than 5 sq. km. in size. ¶23. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to continue to seek to include the U.S.-proposed size constraints in the definitions for "basing area" and "ICBM base." Delegation is instructed to seek agreement that, while site diagrams will not be required to depict the entire area of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the boundaries of such ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be defined by straight lines connecting geographic points, and the geographic coordinates of each such point shall be provided in Part Two of the Protocol. In addition, delegation should seek agreement that ICBM bases may not overlap. Washington recommends these agreements be recorded in a new paragraph in Section I of Part Two of the Protocol. -------------- --- Technical Data on Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments -------------- --- ¶24. (S) Background: The Russian delegation has proposed dropping Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol, which specifies technical data for heavy bomber armaments. Washington notes that, because the number of warheads associated with heavy bombers will be based on an attribution rule, there is no need to have technical data on heavy bomber armaments in order to conduct inspections at air bases. ¶25. (S) Guidance: Delegation is authorized to agree to the Russian proposal to delete Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol entitled "Heavy Bomber (Nuclear) Armaments Technical Data." -------------- Previous Guidance -------------- ¶26. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous guidance remains in effect. End guidance. CLINTON