SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003: AGREED STATEMENTS

S E C R E T STATE 009670

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2030
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003: AGREED STATEMENTS

REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. PROPOSED
JDT OF THE TREATY

B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. PROPOSED
JDT OF THE PROTOCOL

C. C. MOSCOW 00135

Classified By: ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI
Reasons: 1.4, (b) and (d)


1. (S) Washington has developed guidance for this round
as a result of its intersessional review of the December
19, 2009 U.S. proposed JDTs (Refs A and B) and the Russian
proposed JDTs, which were handed over to U.S. Embassy
Moscow on December 31, 2009. This cable addresses most of
the Agreed Statements to be included in the final version
of Ref B. Delegation is authorized to conclude these
statements on the basis of the texts provided below;
however, any substantive changes must be referred to
Washington for final approval.

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RAPID RELOAD
--------------


2. (S) Delegation is authorized to conclude the Agreed
Statement on rapid reload on the basis of the text
provided by U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller to
Russian Head of Delegation Antonov in Moscow on January 14
(Ref C). Any substantive changes should be referred back
to Washington for approval.

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CONVERTED B-1B HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


3. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B,
U.S. and Russian positions differ only slightly with
respect to the procedures that would be used for the
inspection of B-1B heavy bombers once they have all been
converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments. Washington believes that a provision should be
added to the Agreed Statement that would provide for the
possibility of exempting B-1B air bases from inspections,
similar to that provided for ICBM bases, SLBM bases and
heavy bomber air bases in Paragraph 3 of Section VI of
Part V of the Protocol.


4. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed
Statement contained in paragraph 5 below. The text of the
Agreed Statement contains, in addition to the proposed
procedures for exempting B-1B air bases from inspection, a
number of editorial changes recommended for clarity, and
revised text to eliminate existing brackets.


5. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement.

The Parties agree that, after all B-1B heavy bombers are
converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, such converted B-1B heavy bombers and the
facilities at which they are based, shall be subject to
the provisions contained in this Agreed Statement.

In order to provide assurance that the B-1B heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments remain incapable of
employing nuclear armaments, the following procedures
shall apply thereafter to such B-1B heavy bombers:

(a) No later than one year after entry into force of the
Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a
one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate that the B-1B is
incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The procedures
for such an exhibition shall be consistent with the
procedures for a heavy bomber conversion exhibition
conducted pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of Part
Three of this Protocol. Following the exhibition, the
distinguishing features that differentiate a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments from a heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments shall be recorded in the
official report of that exhibition and shall be applied
thereafter for identification of a B-1B heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(b) The United States will notify the Russian Federation
that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air
Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated when all the B-1B
heavy bombers based there have been converted into heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(c) Eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based may
be inspected as formerly declared facilities. Such
inspections shall fall within the annual quota for Type
Two inspections established in Section VII of Part Five of
this Protocol. No more than one such inspection may be
conducted each year.

(d) The United States may use procedures in accordance
with Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol, except as
modified below, during the inspection to demonstrate that
the designated B-1B heavy bombers remain incapable of
employing nuclear armaments:

(i) In infrequent special cases, and for purposes not
inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may
temporarily exempt B-1B bases from inspection.
Notification of such exemptions shall be provided through
diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the
reason for the exemption.

(ii) At the point of entry, which for such an inspection
is Travis Air Force Base, California, the inspection team
that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or
Dyess Air Force Base for a formerly declared facility
inspection will be informed of the number of B-1B heavy
bombers currently located at the base. If less than 50
percent of such heavy bombers based at that base are
present, the inspection team leader shall have the right
to:

(a) inform the member of the in-country escort that the
inspection of the designated base shall take place; or

(b) designate another inspection site associated with the
same point of entry; or

(c) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the
territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number
of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is
entitled shall not be reduced.

(iii) Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the
in-country escort team leader shall provide an annotated
site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B
heavy bombers that are present at the base;

(iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed,
the inspection team leader will designate no more than
three B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments for inspection;

(v) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect
each of the three designated B-1B heavy bombers to confirm
that those heavy bombers remain incapable of employing
nuclear armaments; and

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in the official inspection report.

(e) If, after the completion of the conversion of all
B-1B heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments, during a Type One inspection being
conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments, heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear
armaments are present when pre-inspection movement
restrictions are implemented, those heavy bombers shall
not be subject to the Type One inspection.

(f) If the United States decides to convert all of
another type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments, in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol,
into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
those converted heavy bombers shall also be subject to the
aforementioned verification measures.

End text.

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-
Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear
Armaments
and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments
-------------- --------------
-


6. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B,
U.S. and Russian positions differ with respect to the
requirements associated with joint basing, as well as the
application of provisions for joint basing.


7. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed
Statement contained in paragraph 8 below. The text of the
agreed statement contains a number of editorial changes
recommended for clarity. In paragraph b (iv),if needed,
delegation may propose the designation for inspection of
two deployed heavy bombers and two heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments vice three and one.


8. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement on Joint Basing of
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy
Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments:

The Parties agree that, notwithstanding paragraph 8/9 of
Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right
at an air base to ((carry out joint basing of))1 ((jointly
base))2 heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear
armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have
been converted in accordance with the provisions of Part
Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments, until the last heavy bomber of such
a type is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments.

(a) All heavy bombers of such a type located at an air
base shall be subject to inspection until the last such
heavy bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments has
been converted into a heavy bomber of the same type
equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In this connection,
inspections of heavy bombers declared during
pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear
armaments shall be conducted within the established annual
inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One
inspections). During the same inspection heavy bombers of
the same type declared to be equipped for non-nuclear
armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have not
been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments.

(b) The inspection of an air base where heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers
of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments are
jointly based, shall be conducted in accordance with Part
Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type
One inspection procedures:

(i) If the inspection team has designated such an air base
for inspection, in addition to the provisions specified in
paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol,
which apply to deployed heavy bombers, the inspection team
shall also be informed of the number of heavy bombers of
the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently
located at that base.

(ii) Both the heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
and the heavy bombers of the same type equipped for
non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be
subject to the pre-inspection restrictions specified in
paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol;

(iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the
provisions specified in subparagraph 6(c) of Section VI of
Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country
escort shall annotate on the site diagram provided to the
inspection team leader, the locations of each such
declared heavy bomber of the same type equipped for
non-nuclear armaments;

(iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed,
the inspection team leader shall designate, in accordance
with subparagraph 7(c) of Section VI of Part V of this
Protocol, no more than three deployed heavy bombers
((equipped for nuclear armaments))2 depicted on the site
diagram for inspection in accordance with paragraph
((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this
Protocol;

(v) In addition, the inspection team shall have the right
to inspect, if so designated, no more than
((one))1((three))2 heavy bomber((s))2 of the same type
equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm that such
heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear
armaments; and

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in an official inspection report prepared in accordance
with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of
this Protocol.

(((c) The application of this Agreed Statement with
respect to each specific type of heavy bomber shall be
agreed within the Bilateral Consultative Commission.))2

(())1: U.S. Proposed Text
(())2: Russian Proposed Text

End text.

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Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or
Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
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9. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B,
the United States and Russia substantively agreed that
heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona awaiting
conversion or elimination would be considered deployed
heavy bombers. The U.S.-proposed edits in paragraph 11
below clarify how the basing of such heavy bombers relates
to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, which requires
heavy bombers to be based only at air bases.


10. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed
Statement contained in paragraph 11 below. Delegation may
drop the reference to the definition of "deployed heavy
bomber" in the agreed statement, as it is not relevant to
the statement. Any other substantive changes should be
referred to Washington for final approval.


11. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement.

The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of
the terms "air base" and "deployed heavy bomber" in Part
One of this Protocol, and the requirements of paragraph 2
of Article IV of the Treaty, U.S. heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments awaiting conversion or elimination
may be based at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona.
Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy
bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are
eliminated.

End text.

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U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from
SSBNs
-------------- --------------


12. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B,
differences remain in the U.S. and Russian positions with
respect to providing assurances that the four U.S. SSGNs
remain incapable of launching SLBMs. Russia proposes
inspecting two converted launchers on an SSGN during a
Type One inspection at a submarine base, while the United
States proposes inspecting only one such launcher to
confirm that the launcher has not been reconverted for use
by an SLBM.


13. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed
Statement contained in paragraph 15 below. The text of
the agreed statement contains a number of editorial
changes recommended for clarity, and revised text intended
to remove some existing brackets.


14. (S) Provided that Russia agrees to an appropriate
quid pro quo as determined by the U.S. Head of Delegation,
delegation may also agree in subparagraph (c)(iv) of the
text in paragraph 15 below to the Russian proposal to
designate two launchers on an SSGN for inspection.


15. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement:

U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) Converted from SSBNs

The Parties agree that the U.S. guided missile submarines,
known to the United States of America as "SSGNs" and to
the Russian Federation as "PLARK", shall be subject to the
provisions contained in this Agreed Statement.

In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the
United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs,
the following provisions shall apply to such submarines:

(a) No later than three years after entry into force of
the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an
initial one-time exhibition of each of the four SSGNs.
The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that
the launchers on such submarines are incapable of
launching an SLBM.

(b) Subsequent to the completion of the initial
exhibitions, the United States of America shall also
provide periodic opportunities for the Russian Federation
to confirm that none of the launchers on the four SSGNs
have been reconverted to make them capable of launching
SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that the launchers
on such a submarine have not been re-converted and are
incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian Federation
shall have the right, while conducting a Type One
inspection at a submarine base, to inspect the designated
launcher((s))2 of an SSGN if such a submarine is located
within the area depicted on the coastlines and waters
diagram of the submarine base during the period of
inspection. The number of such inspections shall not
exceed a total of six, during the duration of the Treaty,
for all four SSGNs existing at the time of entry into
force of the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections
for each SSGN.

(c) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be
consistent with the procedures for conducting an
inspection of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a
deployed SLBM, in accordance with Section VI of Part Five
of this Protocol, with the following modifications:

(i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be
subject to pre-inspection restrictions specified in
paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol
and shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection
restrictions have been implemented, no temporary shelters,
each of which obstructs the viewing of four SSGN
launchers, shall be installed. If such temporary shelters
were installed prior to the implementation of
pre-inspection restrictions, the SSGN launchers under
these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The
total of SSGN launchers obstructed from viewing because
they are under such shelters on a single SSGN shall not
exceed eight launchers.

(ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine
base, and in addition to the provisions contained in
paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a
member of the in-country escort shall provide written
information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection
under the terms of this Agreed Statement and the number of
launchers on those submarines;

(iii) The location of each SSGN subject to pre-inspection
restrictions shall be annotated on the coastline and
waters diagram;

(iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to
designate ((one))1 ((two))2 launcher((s))2 on an SSGN for
inspection, if such launchers are on a submarine located
at that base, instead of ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher
or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one non-deployed SLBM
launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 7(b) of Section
VI of Part Five of this Protocol;

(v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate
to the inspectors that the designated launcher is
incapable of launching an SLBM; and

(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded
in an official inspection report prepared in accordance
with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of
this Protocol.

(d) If the United States of America converts other SSBNs
into SSGNs, such SSGNs shall be subject to the measures
specified in this Agreed Statement, and an additional
number of inspections will be agreed between the Parties
within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.

End text.

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Trident I SLBMs
--------------


16. (S) Background: The Trident I missile will not be an
existing type of SLBM under the New START Treaty because
no Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers remain on U.S. Ohio class
submarines. Near the end of the seventh negotiating
session, the Russian delegation proposed that the United
States issue a Unilateral Statement regarding the status
of Trident I SLBMs that would declare them to be retired
and constrain their use to land-based launchers. It would
also declare that all former Trident I SLBM launchers have
been converted to cruise missile launchers.


17. (U) Former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers on current
U.S. SSBNs have been converted to launchers of Trident
II/D-5 SLBMs. The four U.S. SSGNs are currently
configured with up to twenty-two of their twenty-four
former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers converted to Multiple
All-Up-Round Canister launchers of Tomahawk cruise
missiles, up to eight former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers
converted to storage containers, and two former Trident
I/C-4 SLBM launchers converted to Special Operating Forces
lockout chambers.


18. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on an Agreed Statement vice a Unilateral
Statement on the basis of the revised text contained in
para 19 below. The text below reflects both the original
Russian proposal as (( ))2 and the preferred U.S. wording
as (( ))1. If the Russian delegation proves unwilling to
conclude this as an Agreed Statement, Delegation is
authorized to conclude a unilateral statement based on the
text in para 19 below. Any substantive changes must be
referred to Washington for approval.


19. (S) Begin text.

((Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,))1 ((The
United States of America declares that))2 Trident I SLBMs,
which were contained in Ohio-class submarines, ((are no
longer existing types))1 ((have been retired))2 and their
launchers have been converted((.))1 ((to launch sea-based
cruise missiles.))2 The remaining Trident I SLBMs shall
not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.
((These SLBMs will be launched from land-based
launchers.))2

End text.

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Agreed Statement on Leninsk
--------------


20. (S) Background: During the last session in Geneva,
the U.S. delegation drafted a proposed agreed statement
addressing Russia's continuing use of the Leninsk Test
Range in Kazakhstan for some of its ICBM flight tests even
though Kazakhstan will not be a party to the new START
treaty. The text was provided informally to the Russian
delegation, and Russia incorporated it as a bracketed
U.S.-proposed text in its JDT of the Protocol that was
handed over to U.S. Embassy Moscow on December 31, 2009.
Russia numbered the text as the "Seventh Agreed Statement"
and titled it "Movements of Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
between Declared Facilities in the Russian Federation and
the Leninsk Test Range, Kazakhstan."


21. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek
agreement on an agreed statement on Leninsk on the basis
of the revised U.S.-proposed text contained in paragraph
22 below. Delegation should ensure the Agreed Statement
guarantees that Russian ICBMs remain subject to all treaty
provisions when they are outside Russian territory, while
avoiding subjecting the Leninsk facility to restrictions
that Kazakhstan would view as infringing on its
sovereignty.


22. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement:

Movements of ICBMs to and from the Leninsk Test Range,
Republic of Kazakhstan


1. The Parties understand that the Russian Federation may
conduct flight tests of ICBMs at the Leninsk Test Range,
Republic of Kazakhstan.


2. The Parties agree that ICBMs that depart from the
territory of the Russian Federation for purposes of flight
testing at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan,
remain subject to the Treaty, including the following
provisions:

(a) The Russian Federation shall provide notifications of
transits of such ICBMs and their remaining launch
canisters, as applicable, in accordance with paragraph 1
of Section III of Part Four of this Protocol. Such
notifications shall specify the Leninsk Test Range,
Republic of Kazakhstan, as the place of destination or
origin, as applicable.

(b) The duration of each transit of such ICBMs shall be
limited to no more than 30 days, in accordance with
paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty.

(c) Flight tests of such ICBMs shall be subject to all
applicable provisions of the Treaty.


3. The Parties agree that the Russian Federation shall
retain ownership and control of such ICBMs while they are
outside its territory and shall return to its territory
any launch canister remaining after a flight test
conducted at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of
Kazakhstan.


4. The Parties agree that ICBMs located at the Leninsk
Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, and in transit to it,
shall be considered to be located at and in transit to a
test range, but that the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of
Kazakhstan, is not a facility subject to the Treaty.
Therefore, it shall not be subject to inspection and its
silo launchers of ICBMs shall not count against the limit
specified in paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty.

End text.

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Previous Guidance
--------------


23. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous
guidance remains in effect.

End guidance.
CLINTON