SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003: AGREED STATEMENTS

S E C R E T STATE 009670 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2030 TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003: AGREED STATEMENTS REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE TREATY ¶B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE PROTOCOL ¶C. C. MOSCOW 00135 Classified By: ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI Reasons: 1.4, (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Washington has developed guidance for this round as a result of its intersessional review of the December 19, 2009 U.S. proposed JDTs (Refs A and B) and the Russian proposed JDTs, which were handed over to U.S. Embassy Moscow on December 31, 2009. This cable addresses most of the Agreed Statements to be included in the final version of Ref B. Delegation is authorized to conclude these statements on the basis of the texts provided below; however, any substantive changes must be referred to Washington for final approval. -------------- RAPID RELOAD -------------- ¶2. (S) Delegation is authorized to conclude the Agreed Statement on rapid reload on the basis of the text provided by U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller to Russian Head of Delegation Antonov in Moscow on January 14 (Ref C). Any substantive changes should be referred back to Washington for approval. -------------- CONVERTED B-1B HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶3. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B, U.S. and Russian positions differ only slightly with respect to the procedures that would be used for the inspection of B-1B heavy bombers once they have all been converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Washington believes that a provision should be added to the Agreed Statement that would provide for the possibility of exempting B-1B air bases from inspections, similar to that provided for ICBM bases, SLBM bases and heavy bomber air bases in Paragraph 3 of Section VI of Part V of the Protocol. ¶4. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed Statement contained in paragraph 5 below. The text of the Agreed Statement contains, in addition to the proposed procedures for exempting B-1B air bases from inspection, a number of editorial changes recommended for clarity, and revised text to eliminate existing brackets. ¶5. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, after all B-1B heavy bombers are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, such converted B-1B heavy bombers and the facilities at which they are based, shall be subject to the provisions contained in this Agreed Statement. In order to provide assurance that the B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments, the following procedures shall apply thereafter to such B-1B heavy bombers: (a) No later than one year after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate that the B-1B is incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The procedures for such an exhibition shall be consistent with the procedures for a heavy bomber conversion exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of Part Three of this Protocol. Following the exhibition, the distinguishing features that differentiate a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments from a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be recorded in the official report of that exhibition and shall be applied thereafter for identification of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (b) The United States will notify the Russian Federation that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated when all the B-1B heavy bombers based there have been converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (c) Eliminated facilities where converted B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are based may be inspected as formerly declared facilities. Such inspections shall fall within the annual quota for Type Two inspections established in Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol. No more than one such inspection may be conducted each year. (d) The United States may use procedures in accordance with Section VII of Part Five of this Protocol, except as modified below, during the inspection to demonstrate that the designated B-1B heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments: (i) In infrequent special cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt B-1B bases from inspection. Notification of such exemptions shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for the exemption. (ii) At the point of entry, which for such an inspection is Travis Air Force Base, California, the inspection team that has designated either Ellsworth Air Force Base or Dyess Air Force Base for a formerly declared facility inspection will be informed of the number of B-1B heavy bombers currently located at the base. If less than 50 percent of such heavy bombers based at that base are present, the inspection team leader shall have the right to: (a) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base shall take place; or (b) designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry; or (c) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. (iii) Upon arrival at the eliminated facility, the in-country escort team leader shall provide an annotated site diagram to show the location of each of the B-1B heavy bombers that are present at the base; (iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader will designate no more than three B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments for inspection; (v) The inspection team shall have the right to inspect each of the three designated B-1B heavy bombers to confirm that those heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in the official inspection report. (e) If, after the completion of the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, during a Type One inspection being conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are present when pre-inspection movement restrictions are implemented, those heavy bombers shall not be subject to the Type One inspection. (f) If the United States decides to convert all of another type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol, into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, those converted heavy bombers shall also be subject to the aforementioned verification measures. End text. -------------- -------------- - Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments -------------- -------------- - ¶6. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B, U.S. and Russian positions differ with respect to the requirements associated with joint basing, as well as the application of provisions for joint basing. ¶7. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed Statement contained in paragraph 8 below. The text of the agreed statement contains a number of editorial changes recommended for clarity. In paragraph b (iv),if needed, delegation may propose the designation for inspection of two deployed heavy bombers and two heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments vice three and one. ¶8. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement on Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments: The Parties agree that, notwithstanding paragraph 8/9 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right at an air base to ((carry out joint basing of))1 ((jointly base))2 heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, until the last heavy bomber of such a type is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (a) All heavy bombers of such a type located at an air base shall be subject to inspection until the last such heavy bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments has been converted into a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In this connection, inspections of heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One inspections). During the same inspection heavy bombers of the same type declared to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. (b) The inspection of an air base where heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments are jointly based, shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection procedures: (i) If the inspection team has designated such an air base for inspection, in addition to the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol, which apply to deployed heavy bombers, the inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located at that base. (ii) Both the heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and the heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the provisions specified in subparagraph 6(c) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall annotate on the site diagram provided to the inspection team leader, the locations of each such declared heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments; (iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader shall designate, in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Section VI of Part V of this Protocol, no more than three deployed heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2 depicted on the site diagram for inspection in accordance with paragraph ((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (v) In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy bomber((s))2 of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an official inspection report prepared in accordance with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol. (((c) The application of this Agreed Statement with respect to each specific type of heavy bomber shall be agreed within the Bilateral Consultative Commission.))2 (())1: U.S. Proposed Text (())2: Russian Proposed Text End text. -------------- -------------- Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B, the United States and Russia substantively agreed that heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona awaiting conversion or elimination would be considered deployed heavy bombers. The U.S.-proposed edits in paragraph 11 below clarify how the basing of such heavy bombers relates to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, which requires heavy bombers to be based only at air bases. ¶10. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed Statement contained in paragraph 11 below. Delegation may drop the reference to the definition of "deployed heavy bomber" in the agreed statement, as it is not relevant to the statement. Any other substantive changes should be referred to Washington for final approval. ¶11. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of the terms "air base" and "deployed heavy bomber" in Part One of this Protocol, and the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments awaiting conversion or elimination may be based at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated. End text. -------------- -------------- U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) Background: As reflected in Part Nine of Ref B, differences remain in the U.S. and Russian positions with respect to providing assurances that the four U.S. SSGNs remain incapable of launching SLBMs. Russia proposes inspecting two converted launchers on an SSGN during a Type One inspection at a submarine base, while the United States proposes inspecting only one such launcher to confirm that the launcher has not been reconverted for use by an SLBM. ¶13. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on the basis of the revised text of the Agreed Statement contained in paragraph 15 below. The text of the agreed statement contains a number of editorial changes recommended for clarity, and revised text intended to remove some existing brackets. ¶14. (S) Provided that Russia agrees to an appropriate quid pro quo as determined by the U.S. Head of Delegation, delegation may also agree in subparagraph (c)(iv) of the text in paragraph 15 below to the Russian proposal to designate two launchers on an SSGN for inspection. ¶15. (S) Begin text of Agreed Statement: U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) Converted from SSBNs The Parties agree that the U.S. guided missile submarines, known to the United States of America as "SSGNs" and to the Russian Federation as "PLARK", shall be subject to the provisions contained in this Agreed Statement. In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs, the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: (a) No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of the four SSGNs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching an SLBM. (b) Subsequent to the completion of the initial exhibitions, the United States of America shall also provide periodic opportunities for the Russian Federation to confirm that none of the launchers on the four SSGNs have been reconverted to make them capable of launching SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that the launchers on such a submarine have not been re-converted and are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian Federation shall have the right, while conducting a Type One inspection at a submarine base, to inspect the designated launcher((s))2 of an SSGN if such a submarine is located within the area depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram of the submarine base during the period of inspection. The number of such inspections shall not exceed a total of six, during the duration of the Treaty, for all four SSGNs existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections for each SSGN. (c) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be consistent with the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM, in accordance with Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modifications: (i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be subject to pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol and shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection restrictions have been implemented, no temporary shelters, each of which obstructs the viewing of four SSGN launchers, shall be installed. If such temporary shelters were installed prior to the implementation of pre-inspection restrictions, the SSGN launchers under these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The total of SSGN launchers obstructed from viewing because they are under such shelters on a single SSGN shall not exceed eight launchers. (ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, and in addition to the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall provide written information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection under the terms of this Agreed Statement and the number of launchers on those submarines; (iii) The location of each SSGN subject to pre-inspection restrictions shall be annotated on the coastline and waters diagram; (iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate ((one))1 ((two))2 launcher((s))2 on an SSGN for inspection, if such launchers are on a submarine located at that base, instead of ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 7(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the inspectors that the designated launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM; and (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an official inspection report prepared in accordance with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol. (d) If the United States of America converts other SSBNs into SSGNs, such SSGNs shall be subject to the measures specified in this Agreed Statement, and an additional number of inspections will be agreed between the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. End text. -------------- Trident I SLBMs -------------- ¶16. (S) Background: The Trident I missile will not be an existing type of SLBM under the New START Treaty because no Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers remain on U.S. Ohio class submarines. Near the end of the seventh negotiating session, the Russian delegation proposed that the United States issue a Unilateral Statement regarding the status of Trident I SLBMs that would declare them to be retired and constrain their use to land-based launchers. It would also declare that all former Trident I SLBM launchers have been converted to cruise missile launchers. ¶17. (U) Former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers on current U.S. SSBNs have been converted to launchers of Trident II/D-5 SLBMs. The four U.S. SSGNs are currently configured with up to twenty-two of their twenty-four former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers converted to Multiple All-Up-Round Canister launchers of Tomahawk cruise missiles, up to eight former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers converted to storage containers, and two former Trident I/C-4 SLBM launchers converted to Special Operating Forces lockout chambers. ¶18. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on an Agreed Statement vice a Unilateral Statement on the basis of the revised text contained in para 19 below. The text below reflects both the original Russian proposal as (( ))2 and the preferred U.S. wording as (( ))1. If the Russian delegation proves unwilling to conclude this as an Agreed Statement, Delegation is authorized to conclude a unilateral statement based on the text in para 19 below. Any substantive changes must be referred to Washington for approval. ¶19. (S) Begin text. ((Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,))1 ((The United States of America declares that))2 Trident I SLBMs, which were contained in Ohio-class submarines, ((are no longer existing types))1 ((have been retired))2 and their launchers have been converted((.))1 ((to launch sea-based cruise missiles.))2 The remaining Trident I SLBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. ((These SLBMs will be launched from land-based launchers.))2 End text. -------------- Agreed Statement on Leninsk -------------- ¶20. (S) Background: During the last session in Geneva, the U.S. delegation drafted a proposed agreed statement addressing Russia's continuing use of the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan for some of its ICBM flight tests even though Kazakhstan will not be a party to the new START treaty. The text was provided informally to the Russian delegation, and Russia incorporated it as a bracketed U.S.-proposed text in its JDT of the Protocol that was handed over to U.S. Embassy Moscow on December 31, 2009. Russia numbered the text as the "Seventh Agreed Statement" and titled it "Movements of Non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs between Declared Facilities in the Russian Federation and the Leninsk Test Range, Kazakhstan." ¶21. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to seek agreement on an agreed statement on Leninsk on the basis of the revised U.S.-proposed text contained in paragraph 22 below. Delegation should ensure the Agreed Statement guarantees that Russian ICBMs remain subject to all treaty provisions when they are outside Russian territory, while avoiding subjecting the Leninsk facility to restrictions that Kazakhstan would view as infringing on its sovereignty. ¶22. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement: Movements of ICBMs to and from the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan ¶1. The Parties understand that the Russian Federation may conduct flight tests of ICBMs at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan. ¶2. The Parties agree that ICBMs that depart from the territory of the Russian Federation for purposes of flight testing at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, remain subject to the Treaty, including the following provisions: (a) The Russian Federation shall provide notifications of transits of such ICBMs and their remaining launch canisters, as applicable, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section III of Part Four of this Protocol. Such notifications shall specify the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, as the place of destination or origin, as applicable. (b) The duration of each transit of such ICBMs shall be limited to no more than 30 days, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. (c) Flight tests of such ICBMs shall be subject to all applicable provisions of the Treaty. ¶3. The Parties agree that the Russian Federation shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs while they are outside its territory and shall return to its territory any launch canister remaining after a flight test conducted at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan. ¶4. The Parties agree that ICBMs located at the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, and in transit to it, shall be considered to be located at and in transit to a test range, but that the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, is not a facility subject to the Treaty. Therefore, it shall not be subject to inspection and its silo launchers of ICBMs shall not count against the limit specified in paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty. End text. -------------- Previous Guidance -------------- ¶23. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous guidance remains in effect. End guidance. CLINTON