CFE/VCC: GUIDANCE FOR 21 JANUARY 2010 VCC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 004628 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015 TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL NATO SUBJECT: CFE/VCC: GUIDANCE FOR 21 JANUARY 2010 VCC AND EXPERTS REF: A. 09 USNATO 551 ¶B. AC/319-N(2009)0038 ¶C. 09 STATE 56790 Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Office Director for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (SBU) This is an action message. See para 2-8. ¶2. (C) U.S. Objectives: USDel objectives for the 21 January 2010 Verification and Coordination Committee (VCC) and VCC Experts meetings include: -- Seeking clarification on attempts in the VCC to modify or resubmit Ref A tasker for VCC Experts; -- Registering U.S. concerns to the VCC Chair over the development and distribution of Ref b; -- Providing preliminary comment, as appropriate, on U.S. views regarding Alliance reporting on compliance during bilateral and training activities; and -- Reporting, as appropriate, on U.S. verification activity scheduling and execution. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Implementation Coordination by Experts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C/REL NATO) In addition to the deconfliction of CFE inspections, Washington expects VCC Experts to begin discussing potential improvements to Alliance procedures for coordinating implementation (See Ref A) under "Any Other Business." USDel should note that while Washington is satisfied with the existing procedures, it welcomes an exchange of views on improving implementation coordination and is interested in examining Allied concerns and suggestions. USDel should report on these discussions and in particular on any proposal that attempts to place restrictions on the ability of Allies to bid on verification activity quotas. - - - - - - - - Experts tasking - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C/REL NATO) At the November 2009 VCC several Allies advocated for the VCC to formally task Experts to review "VD 99 Implementation." The brief discussion concluded with the VCC Chair noting it would consult with interested Allies to draft a proposal that the VCC could discuss at its meeting in January. On 3 December the International Staff (IS) issued Ref B, which proposed tasking VCC Experts "...to discuss implementation issues of VD 99, with a view toward developing possible proposals to improve VD 99 implementation that would not require reopening the document...". The document was issued under silence, Germany subsequently broke silence, and the Chair added the topic to the January agenda. ¶5. (C) At this time Washington remains reluctant to task VCC Experts to review VD 99 implementation under a broad, undefined mandate. Without prejudicing future U.S. actions, USDel may draw, as appropriate, on previous guidance Ref C, paras 12- 18, to articulate U.S. concerns. In any event USDel should report results of the discussion for further consideration in Washington. ¶6. (C/REL NATO) From a procedural standpoint, Washington is concerned that Ref B was issued under silence without prior discussion or approval of the VCC. USDel should not/not initiate discussion in the VCC over procedures, but if others raise objections to this procedural issue in the VCC, USDel may support those objections. Regardless, USDel should deliver the following points to the VCC Chair on the margins: -- The U.S. understood from the November VCC that the Chair might distribute a proposal tasking VCC Experts to review VD STATE 00004628 002 OF 003 99 and that the VCC would discuss this at the its January meeting. This seemed the best approach given the wide range of views expressed in the November meeting. -- The U.S. believes that releasing this proposal under silence procedures was premature given various objections Allies voiced at the meeting in November. -- The U.S. would expect and encourage the Chair to ensure there is, in fact, general agreement among Allies before announcing its intent to issue a document under silence. - - - - - - - - - - Compliance Reporting - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C/REL NATO) In November Canada requested that the VCC discuss Allied expectations regarding compliance reporting during bilateral and training activities. While Canada's request was vague, it appeared that Canada wanted Allies to agree to a unified understanding on what information Allies should report when conducting bilateral and/or training verification activities. ¶8. (C/REL NATO) USDel may note that, as a general principle, the U.S. executes all verification activities, including those conducted as above quota offerings or under bilateral arrangements, in accordance with provisions of their respective agreements and treaties, to include accurate reporting of all compliance concerns. The U.S. would encourage Allies to fully execute all verification activities in accordance with the respective provisions and to accurately report all compliance issues. Such expectations do not necessarily apply to training activities, where specific modalities and arrangements may be tailored by the participants to address specific training concerns. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reporting on U.S. VD 99 Activity - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C//REL NATO) From 19 to 23 October 2009, an inspection team, led by the United States, with a guest inspector from the Czech Republic, conducted a VD 99 Specified Area Inspection in southwestern Kyrgyzstan. The specified area encompassed approximately 19,000 square kilometers and included the cities of Batken, Jalalabad, and Osh. ¶10. (C//REL NATO) The escort team provided access to the specified area in accordance with VD 99 but did not permit the inspection team 48 hours within that specified area. Although the Osh Training Center and the Armaments Depot with peacetime locations in the specified area are not required to be and have not been reported under the VD 99, briefings were provided by the chief of staff of the Training Center and the commander of the Armaments Depot. Access to portions of the Armaments Depot garrison was granted and escorts did not restrict photography. ¶11. (C//REL NATO) The receiving State did not provide a fixed-wing aircraft or a helicopter for overflight of the specified area, although the team flew via commercial airline from Bishkek to Osh (and return) over territory that was in the specified area. With the exception of seeing approximately a platoon-size element of soldiers in the Osh Training Area from the road, the inspection team did not observe field training under way in the specified area. ¶12. (C//REL NATO) The inspection team was delayed on route to Batken for three hours by Uzbek Border Guards who asserted the inspection team was illegally videotaping an Uzbek border post in a 100-meter transit zone along the highway near Kadamza (geographic coordinates 40 degrees, 08 minutes, 59.7 seconds North, and 071 degrees, 43 minutes, 52.9 seconds East.) (The team had to delete approximately 10 seconds of video on which it had unknowingly captured an Uzbek structure in this border zone.) Because of this delay and the Kyrgyz escort team not providing the inspection team its full 48 hours in the specified area, the team was unable to visit the westernmost part of the specified area around Batken. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reporting on U.S. CFE Activity STATE 00004628 003 OF 003 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C//REL) The United States, with guest inspectors from Canada, the Czech Republic, and Denmark, conducted a CFE Treaty above-quota, paid, declared site inspection of the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade (Sep Mech Bde),at Belaya Tserkov', Ukraine, from 16 to 19 November 2009. The United States chose to inspect the 72nd Sep Mech Bde to confirm the brigade's holdings of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty (CAEST) as reported in Ukraine's CFE data declaration as of 1 January 2009. In addition, the United States wanted to assess the unit's overall status and level of readiness. ¶14. (C//REL) Inspectors assessed that the level of holdings of CAEST for the 72nd Sep Mech Bde was as reported in Ukraine's CFE data declaration as of 1 January 2009 with one exception. The unit had some vehicles based on the MT-LBu variant of the MT-LB armored personnel carrier (APC),which had not been declared. Inspectors believed these vehicles met the Treaty's definition of an APC look-alike. Inspectors judged the 72nd Sep Mech Bde to be only partially ready for sustained combat operations. The missions of the brigade were said to be territorial defense of Ukraine and participation in peacekeeping operations. CLINTON