COOPERATION TO MEET SUPPLY OF HELIUM-3 FOR IAEA

UNCLAS STATE 003312 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA RS SUBJECT: COOPERATION TO MEET SUPPLY OF HELIUM-3 FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN LIGHT OF SHORTAGE SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Helium-3 (He-3) is an important but rare isotope used in several civilian applications including medical imaging and diagnostics, cryogenics, and neutron detection. The enormous increase in demand for He-3 over the past few years has resulted in a severe shortage of the gas. The United States has been a principal supplier but does not have enough He-3 in stock to meet current international demand. Diplomatic efforts are underway to raise awareness of the shortage and find solutions. In the meantime, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to monitor nuclear material are already hampered by the shortage in the He-3 supply. Since He-3 is produced by both the United States and Russia, Washington would like to reach out to Rosatom to request that they also supply He-3 to the IAEA to support international nuclear safeguards efforts. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) He-3 has been typically produced by the radioactive decay of tritium (H-3). It is used in a wide range of applications, including medical imaging, oil/gas exploration, cryogenics and low temperature physics, and neutron detection. Since He-3 is inert and non-toxic, it has found broad application in neutron detection. As a result, the increased deployment ) both domestically and abroad ) of nuclear security-related radiation detection systems has been a major contributor to the significant reduction of the U.S. He-3 stockpile. The United States can no longer meet either its domestic nor international needs for He-3. The United States is actively working to mitigate the effects of this shortage, and diplomatic efforts are underway to raise awareness of the shortage and find solutions. ¶4. (SBU) Some of the work of the IAEA to ensure proper safeguards in nuclear facilities and to strengthen international inspections in order to prevent misuse of nuclear materials has been dependent on the use of He-3 for safeguards instrumentation. In particular, nuclear material accountancy measurements are essential to IAEA safeguards. He-3 is a critical component of coincidence and multiplicity counting devices used for such measurements. ¶5. (SBU) He-3 has been traditionally produced for worldwide commercial use only by the United States and Russia. Russia has been selling He-3 at market price. Russia supplies He-3 to the manufacturers of Russian portal monitors and to other international customers. It is estimated that Russia supports industrial needs for He-3 by supplying thousands of liters of the gas to the open market per year. The United States has been essentially the only supplier of He-3 for IAEA safeguards instrumentation, providing gas for their equipment at a discounted price. The manufacturers of the IAEA safeguards equipment have been mostly U.S. laboratories and U.S. companies, which in turn purchase the He-3 needed in the instrumentation from Reuter Stokes. We note that the He-3 supply process involves not only the supplier country and the IAEA customer, but also the manufacturers of He-3 detectors. ¶6. (SBU) In past years, the United States used its He-3 reserves to support international monitoring efforts. However, the United States can no longer meet the demand for He-3. A concerted international effort is needed, with cooperation from other countries and users to increase supply, decrease demand, and investigate alternative technologies to those using He-3. Given Russia,s historical production of He-3 for commercial purposes, the United States would like to reach out to our Rosatom counterparts to obtain Russia,s support in providing their He-3 for IAEA international safeguards. END BACKGROUND. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Embassy Moscow is requested to contact the appropriate official(s) in Rosatom and deliver the message summarized in the talking points in paragraph 8. Embassy may also draw on the background in paragraphs 3-6 as needed. -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Post can draw from the following points for use in its outreach discussions with Russian counterparts. -- In the past decades, Russia and the United States have been harvesting and storing helium-3 (He-3) from the radioactive decay of tritium. -- Applications for He-3 are diverse, including medical imaging and diagnostics, oil/gas exploration, and cryogenics. -- He-3 is the preferred material for neutron detection. It provides fewer false positives than other techniques, is inert and non-toxic, has a large thermal neutron cross section, and allows the manufacture of smaller and lighter equipment. -- There has been an enormous increase in demand for He-3 over the past few years for radiation detectors based on neutron detection technology. This equipment is used for nuclear security and safeguards activities in nuclear facilities and at international borders, as well as for big science R&D projects (e.g. fusion and large neutron sources). -- As a consequence of the increased demand, there is a worldwide shortage of He-3. Greater international cooperation is needed to increase the supply and decrease the demand for this valuable resource. -- The United States has been supplying He-3 for IAEA safeguards instrumentation by providing the gas to the companies that manufacture He-3 tubes for use in the IAEA safeguards equipment. -- Due to the shortage, the United States will have to cut its allocation of He-3 for IAEA safeguards significantly. This could hamper the ability of the IAEA to provide safeguards equipment around the world. -- The United States requests that Russia supply some of the He-3 needed for international nuclear safeguards in support of the IAEA in order to meet this expected shortfall. -- In particular, nuclear material accountancy measurements are essential to IAEA safeguards. The devices currently used to perform these measurements are coincidence and multiplicity counting devices, all dependent on the use of He-3. -- Examples of safeguards equipment that the IAEA uses, and which use He-3, are: - Epithermal neutron multiplicity counters used for impure plutonium verification and U-235 verification; - Active well coincidence counters used for accountancy measurements at conversion and enrichment plants, and during dismantlement processes; - Uranium neutron coincidence counters employed in UO2 fuel fabrication plants and reactors for accountancy measurements; - Portable radiation detection equipment for IAEA human inspection applications worldwide; - Spent fuel monitors used at reactor sites; - UF6 verification equipment for enrichment plants; - Plutonium in-process verification equipment for reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants; - Waste assay systems used in enrichment, reprocessing, and fabrication plants. -- We understand that Russia,s current capacity to supply He-3 is limited. However, based on our shared nonproliferation goals for supporting IAEA safeguards work * particularly as more countries pursue nuclear energy programs * the United States seeks Russia,s assistance in freeing up capacity to supply the IAEA with the He-3 it needs to do its work. -- The work of the IAEA is crucial to ensure proper safeguards in nuclear facilities worldwide. -- The United States urges Russia to approach the IAEA and open discussion on whether some of the IAEA,s He-3 requirements can be met with a Russian supply to manufacturers of He-3 tubes dedicated for use in IAEA safeguards instrumentation. END OF TALKING POINTS -------------- REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINTS OF CONTACT -------------- ¶9. (U) Washington thanks Post for its assistance. Please inform State of any response or comment from Rosatom by January 19, 2010. Department points of contact for this matter are Jonathan Sanborn (SanbornJB@state.gov; 202-647-9730),Brendan Plapp (PlappBB@state.gov; 202-647-6109),and Zaira Nazario (NazarioZD@state.gov; 202-647-8229). CLINTON