START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): TELEMETRY MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-137.


2. (U) Meeting Date: December 13, 2009
Time: 3:05 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) This was the fourth meeting to discuss telemetry
provisions to be included in the START Follow-On Treaty. The
U.S. side requested the meeting and developed a set of
questions to which they wanted answers in order to better
understand the Russian proposal on telemetry provisions that
was provided earlier in the day to U.S. Head of Delegation
Rose Gottemoeller.


4. (S) The Russian proposal was to provide for the exchange
of unencrypted telemetry data and interpretive data on up to
five flight tests on each side each year, with the specific
flights chosen by the conducting Party. This exchange would
be on a parity basis, with total number of flight tests with
data exchange and the mix of ICBM and SLBM flight tests the
same on both sides. Any flight tests from UK Trident
submarines would have mandatory exchange and would count in
the U.S. SLBM flight test quota. The provisions for exchange
of data and communication of the flights selected would be
negotiated in the next phase and included in the Annex.
Coordination of the data exchanges and handling of other
details would take place within the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC). End summary.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: When does encryption apply?; Who
decides which launches?; What is the meaning of parity?

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WHEN DOES ENCRYPTION APPLY?
--------------


6. (S) Mr. Siemon explained to Gen. Poznikhir that he
requested this meeting to better understand the Russian
proposal for telemetry provisions to be included in the START
Follow-On Treaty that was provided to HOD Gottemoeller
earlier in the day. The Russian proposal follows.

Begin text:

Document of the Russian side
December 12, 2009

Proposal of the Russian Side on Language for Telemetry

For a three-year period beginning from the date of entry
into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange
telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than
five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per year.

In addition, if Trident II SLBM launches take place on
behalf of Great Britain, telemetric information about them
shall be included in the annual quota of the U.S. side.

The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried
out for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs
conducted by the sides, and in an agreed amount.

After three years of treaty implementation, the sides
shall consider the conditions and method of further
telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and
SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.

End Text.


7. (S) Poznikhir thanked his American counterparts for their
quick reaction to the Russian proposal. He pointed out the
text had been reviewed by President Medvedev personally and
read word-for-word by him during his phone call with
President Obama on December 12, 2009. Siemon began
addressing a list of questions that the U.S. side had
prepared to clarify key points in the proposal. The list of
questions follows.

Begin List.

Questions on the December 12, 2009 Russian Telemetry Proposal


1. Will launches be encrypted or unencrypted? Will the five
launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged
be handled differently from the others?


2. Which Party determines the five launches for which
telemetric information will be exchanged?


3. Are recorded media, playback equipment, and interpretive
data included in the Russian concept?


4. How would the parity concept work for selecting the
number of flight tests?


5. Where and how would additional details be recorded?


6. Will flight test notifications under the 1988 Agreement
contain additional information on broadcast frequencies,
modulation types, and the use of encryption?


7. Will the exchange of telemetry include all telemetry
broadcast during the flight test? Does this include telemetry
from a reentry vehicle? Will telemetry that pertains to the
functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing
mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM be broadcast through the
reentry vehicle?


8. How would your proposal relate to flight tests of
prototype ICBMs or SLBMs?

End List.


8. (S) Siemon asked whether the launches would be encrypted
or unencrypted. Poznikhir responded that flight tests could
be either encrypted or unencrypted at the choice of the Party
conducting the flight test. Each side would have the right
to encrypt all launches but that did not mean that all flight
tests necessarily would be encrypted. He pointed to the
recent example of the flight test of a Bulava missile which
broadcast unencrypted data although that was no longer a
requirement under the START Treaty.


9. (S) Siemon next asked whether the five launches for which
telemetric information would be exchanged would be handled
differently from other flight tests. He clarified that
pre-launch notifications under START provided the information
about whether or not a flight was to be encrypted. He
questioned whether, on a normal basis, the Russian Federation
would encrypt data during flight tests and whether these five
launches would be exceptions to this rule. Poznikhir
repeated that each side had the right to encrypt and that it
was not an obligation but a choice. Each Party would also
have the right to select five launches for which to exchange
data. He remarked that the U.S. side was probably interested
in knowing if the Russian flight tests of missiles in
development would be encrypted. He stated that when a Party
intended to exchange data, encryption would probably not be
used so that the other side would have access to the data.

--------------
WHO DECIDES WHICH LAUNCHES?
--------------


10. (S) Siemon next asked which Party would determine the
five launches for which telemetric information would be
exchanged. Poznikhir replied that the Party conducting the
flight tests would select the flights on which it would
exchange data. He added that all the technical details for
exchange of flight test data would need to be discussed and
finalized during the negotiations on the Annex before the
Bilateral Consultative Commission could be convened and
oversee this process. Siemon agreed that specific details of
the flight test data exchanges would be recorded in the Annex
and that at the end of three years, the BCC could decide the
future of the data exchange process. He asked if the Russian
side envisioned the process working similar to START, in
which flight tests were routinely unencrypted, with the right
to encrypt for a limited number each year. Poznikhir replied
in the negative, saying that the new agreement would provide
for five launches each year with data exchange and that all
others could be encrypted or not by the choice of the Party
conducting them. Mr. Engelhardt asked for clarification
using the example of a Party conducting ten launches, with
seven encrypted by its own choice. In that case, would the
Party provide data for only the three unencrypted flights or
also for two of the encrypted flights as well? Poznikhir
replied that, according to parity, if one side only provided
data on three flights, the other side would provide data on
only three of its flights. He commented that he did not
believe it was possible to exchange data on encrypted
flights.


11. (S) Siemon remarked that the U.S. was not in a position
to make commitments for the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, to
clarify the Russian proposal, he asked whether the UK would
be obligated to provide data for all of its flight tests in a
given year. Poznikhir referred to the wording in the Russian
proposal, saying that the number of UK submarine flights for
which data would be exchanged could be discussed in the BCC
but that if the UK decided to conduct launches, the Russian
side should be able to have access to the data. Siemon asked
whether the U.S. would have the option of declaring that a
particular UK flight test would not apply to its quota.
Poznikhir replied that the UK flight tests would be
mandatory. If, for instance, the U.S. and Russia agreed to
exchange data on two SLBM flights and three ICBM flights, one
of the two SLBM flights would be a UK test if one was
conducted.

--------------
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF PARITY?
--------------


12. (S) Siemon asked how the parity concept would work in
selecting the number of flight tests. Would parity mean
equal numbers of flight tests and agreement on the SLBM/ICBM
mix and would the U.S. and UK have to agree on the flight
test obligations? Poznikhir replied the categories of SLBM
and ICBM flights seemed correct but that the U.S. and Russia
should carefully think over and discuss the options, then
decide at a later time what the best way to implement would
be. Zaitsev remarked that the original Russian concept had
been to allow exchange data on any five launches but that
they believed it would be better to decide together.


13. (S) Siemon then asked whether the exchange would include
recorded media and interpretive data? Poznikhir replied in
the affirmative and went on to say that in the past, the U.S.
and Russia have also exchanged playback equipment. For those
pieces of playback equipment that continued to apply, there
was no need for an additional exchange. As new equipment was
introduced, there would be a need to work out exchanges in
the future. Siemon asked whether prototype ICBM and SLBM
flights would be included in the data exchanges. Poznikhir
replied that all flight tests would be eligible for exchange.



14. (S) Siemon remarked that the proposed language the
Russian side had provided would best fit in the protocol but
that additional language was necessary to clarify what would
be included in the Annex. The basic treaty provides
agreement of the sides on a commitment ) the protocol needs
to provide enough definition to describe how it will be
implemented. Poznikhir replied that would be developed by
the BCC or a special group of experts during subsequent
negotiations in Geneva, Moscow, or Washington. The proposed
text for the protocol had been provided by the Russian
President himself and could not be corrected. Siemon
suggested that some clarifying information could be added on
how to negotiate the more detailed provisions. The sides
would explain in the protocol the process for reaching
agreement and where in the documentation the agreements would
be recorded. Specific provisions would then be agreed upon
during the development of the Annex.


15. (S) Poznikhir clarified his vision for determining the
flight tests on which data would be exchanged in a given year
using the principle of parity. One way would be for the BCC
to discuss and determine which launches would apply by the
end of the year for the following year. Another would be to
provide notifications in advance communicating which launches
would apply. Siemon suggested that the best way would be for
the Parties to agree as they developed the Annex, describing
what the BCC process would be, and recording the agreed
process in the Annex so that both sides would have a clear
picture of how it would work.


16. (S) Siemon reiterated that the most difficult part for
the U.S., in considering the Russian proposal, was that the
U.S. was not in a position to make commitments for the UK.
The U.S. would have no objection to an agreement on telemetry
data exchange between the UK and the Russian Federation.
Siemon observed that the UK and Russian Federation had
cooperated on nuclear programs in the past and suggested that
may be a better venue in which to discuss such a data
exchange. Poznikhir remarked that this agreement should
instead be between the U.S. and UK because he believed the
U.S. made use of the data from UK flights. Both Parties
agreed they would support the discussions to develop the
Annex.


17. (S) Documents exchanged:

Provided to the Russian side:

None

Provided to the U.S. side:

None



18. (S) List of Participants

U.S.

Mr. Siemon
Mr. Engelhardt
Lt Col Goodman
Ms. Pura
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen. Poznikhir
Col. Zaitsev
Mr. Pogodin (Int)
CLINTON