ADVISORY TO COMMONWEALTH ALLIES REGARDING CHINA,S

S E C R E T STATE 002126 C O R R E C T E D COPY - CAPTION ADDED SIPDIS NOFORN GENEVA: FOR CD DEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2035 TAGS: AS CA CH MCAP NZ PARM PREL TSPA UK SUBJECT: ADVISORY TO COMMONWEALTH ALLIES REGARDING CHINA,S IMPENDING INTERCEPT FLIGHT-TEST REF: (A) 07 LONDON 155 Classified By: David E. Hoppler Reasons 1.4 (a),(d),(e),and(g) ¶1. (S//NF) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Embassies Canberra, London, Ottawa, and Wellington are instructed to deliver the talking points (and hand over as a U.S. Non-Paper) in paragraph 3 to appropriate Host Nation foreign and defense policy officials as soon as possible on Monday, January 11, 2010, given that the intercept flight-test is expected imminently. Embassies are requested to provide confirmation of delivery and any immediate responses. ¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that China may conduct an intercept flight-test using an SC-19 missile from the Korla Missile Test Complex against a CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile launched from the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center in the next several days. An SC-19 was used previously as the payload booster for the January 11, 2007 direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) intercept of the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite. Previous SC-19 DA-ASAT flight-tests were conducted in 2005 and 2006. The United States does not expect China to provide any prior notification of its imminent intercept flight-test, post-test announcement, nor do we expect any post-event explanation without China being asked or questioned in a demarche. (S//NF) Action addressee posts should coordinate closely with host governments prior to, during, and after China conducts the next SC-19 flight-test to ensure that all necessary officials in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand have timely and complete information regarding China's activities. The need for such close coordination was underscored in the aftermath of China's first successful SC-19 DA-ASAT flight-test on January 11, 2007 (UTC). Although UK analysts had provided key contributions to monitoring this program, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Cabinet Office officials said they had been "personally unaware" that China had been developing a DA-ASAT system until they were informed by Embassy London on January 14, 2007, three days after China's flight-test. (REF A) ¶3. (S//REL TO USA, CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL) BEGIN TALKING POINTS/U.S. NON-PAPER: -- Washington estimates that China may be planning to use its SC-19 missile to conduct an intercept flight-test against a CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile that could happen within the next several days. We anticipate that the SC-19 will launch from the Korla Missile Test Complex (a new location for SC-19 activity) in western China. The CSS-X-11 will launch from Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center, approximately 1,100 kilometers east of Korla. -- The SC-19 was used previously as the payload booster for the January 11, 2007, direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) intercept of the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite, as well as in DA-ASAT flight-tests conducted in 2005-06. -- The United States is currently examining the range of our diplomatic options and will closely consult with (Host Nation) regarding possible joint diplomatic responses after the flight-test. The United States will also seek your ideas in how to respond over the longer-term. -- Since the national security imperative is not to jeopardize sensitive intelligence "sources and methods," as well as enable collection on this event, Washington has decided not to demarche Beijing prior to this expected flight-test. Furthermore, it is our assessment that any demarche transmitted prior to the launch event will not dissuade China from conducting the SC-19 flight-test. -- U.S. diplomatic and public diplomacy strategies will be shaped by the observables of the event, China's diplomatic/public explanations (if any),and upon our post-test analysis of risks to "sources and methods." -- Should China's flight-test preparations progress, the United States is willing, to the greatest extent possible, to provide updates on significant milestones via diplomatic channels. However, we also suggest communicating via established military-to-military and intelligence liaison channels as appropriate. END TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER. END CABLE TEXT. CLINTON