INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 017005 SIPDIS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED ASTANA AND ALMATY FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS),2-4 MARCH 2010 REF: 2009 STATE 120541 ¶1. (U) In accordance with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) Agreement, which calls for annual consultations, the U.S. NRRC will visit the Arms Control and Inspection Activity Support Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The NRRC Consultations focus on NRRC operational issues, specifically on the future of the GGCLs in the wake of the December 5, 2009, expiration of the START Treaty. Should policy-related issues arise during the consultations, the U.S. delegation can serve as a conduit to forward views and report proposals to the Washington policy community. The delegation has no authority to discuss, or to commit the USG on, policy matters. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. The START follow-on treaty will be a strictly bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia. There will thus be a drastic, but not complete, reduction in message traffic utilizing the Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The U.S. and its partner countries therefore need to discuss the future of the GGCLs. Terminating the GGCL agreements with Kazakhstan requires twelve months notice, but such decisions will require policy guidance. ¶3. (SBU) The original agreements to establish the GGCLs are based on both the INF and START treaties. Even with the expiration of START, the INF Treaty continues in force, and a small number of notifications are required yearly. The GGCLs can be maintained in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and there are significant benefits, both practical and political in nature, to the U.S. in maintaining direct, secure connections with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus and in encouraging those countries to maintain their current NRRC-like structures, which help them to fulfill their obligations under other treaties. ¶4. (SBU) The US delegation, led by the Staff Director of the NRRC and consisting of representatives from the Department of State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of Information Resources Management (IRM) will discuss with its counterparts whether they are willing and able to maintain the current satellite-based configuration, or whether they wish to explore alternatives, such as an internet-based system similar to those in use for the notifications required under the various Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes. -------------- INSTRUCTIONS -- U.S. AGENDA -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The following is guidance on the U.S. agenda for the NRRC Consultations. Begin Points for Discussion: - Since 1994, our Continuous Communication Links (CCLs) have been valuable and productive in providing bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The CCLs, or Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs),as the United States usually refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means of communication between our countries, in particular for exchanging treaty-related notifications. STATE 00017005 002 OF 003 SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS),2-4 MARCH 20 - However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009, there is now a drastic reduction in message traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make decisions about the future of the CCLs. - The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations. - The CCLs have been the core around which our successful national centers for security and confidence building communications have developed. These centers now host INF notifications and the network terminals to support Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe notifications. - We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers. Both sides of our CCL know how the links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's information-passing capabilities and competencies. The CCLs provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to exchange classified information directly, and an established backup capability for our senior officials to communicate with the each other. They serve as an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation between our respective governments. - If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would be lost and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our national centers. - Potential uses of the GGCLs: The GGCLs present a capability to transfer secure, large electronic files between host governments, and could have potential uses for communications, information sharing and transparency. ¶6. (SBU) If raised: If Kazakhstan proposes discontinuing its GGCL, the United States should urge that the link be maintained for a provisional period, during which alternative technologies can be explored and possibly installed. The proposed provisional period would be 24 months, with a 12 month consultative review. ¶7. (SBU) If there is agreement to maintain the satellite GGCL: U.S. can provide technical assistance. The U.S. can not provide financial assistance. ¶8. (U) If raised: If Kazakhstan requests to switch to an Internet-based GGCL: The delegation will bring the Kazakh proposals back to the U.S. policy community. ¶9. (U) If the Kazakh side desires to terminate: A suitable plan for termination of the CCL agreement will be discussed in Washington, and the U.S. will accommodate Kazakhstan's request. ¶10. (U) Plan for GGCL Consultations: A 12 month consultative review meeting will be discussed. ¶11. (U) Delegation should seek agreement on a continuation of watch officer exchanges. If agreement is reached, seek proposed dates for such exchanges). ¶12. (U) The delegation will provide a briefing on the current operations of the U.S. NRRC. ¶13. (U) The U.S. NRRC delegation should draw on detailed talking points cleared separately through the Interagency for each U.S. and Kazakhstan agenda item. ¶14. (U) Post assistance is greatly appreciated. The U.S. STATE 00017005 003 OF 003 SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS),2-4 MARCH 20 NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend these discussions. If there are any questions, please contact NRRC Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 or currydl@state.gov or dlcurry57@hotmail.com. CLINTON CLINTON