Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10STATE15563
2010-02-20 01:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ 
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UNCLAS STATE 015563 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS, THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 23-26, 2010)

REFS:
A) 2010 State 005807(Guidance for Consultations and
Meetings on Issues Related to CW Destruction and the
2012 Deadline)
B) 2009 State 105819 (Guidelines for the 58th Session of
the OPCW Executive Council)
C) 2008 State 126586 (Supplemental Guidance for the 13th
Conference of the States Parties, December 2-5, 2008)
D) 2010 State 007952 (Guidelines for Consultations on
Situations Not Foreseen by the Convention)
E) 2010 The Hague 000039 (Experts' Meeting on the Iraqi
Al Muthanna Bunkers)

-----------------
Summary/Overview
-----------------

UNCLAS STATE 015563 SENSITIVE SIPDIS, THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ SUBJECT: CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 23-26, 2010) REFS: A) 2010 State 005807(Guidance for Consultations and Meetings on Issues Related to CW Destruction and the 2012 Deadline) B) 2009 State 105819 (Guidelines for the 58th Session of the OPCW Executive Council) C) 2008 State 126586 (Supplemental Guidance for the 13th Conference of the States Parties, December 2-5, 2008) D) 2010 State 007952 (Guidelines for Consultations on Situations Not Foreseen by the Convention) E) 2010 The Hague 000039 (Experts' Meeting on the Iraqi Al Muthanna Bunkers) -------------- Summary/Overview -------------- ¶1. (U) The fifty-ninth session of the Executive Council (EC-59) will involve much routine Council business. Several politically loaded issues, both on and off the agenda, are likely to receive significant attention on the Council floor and on the margins. The issue of "how and when" to initiate discussions on the 2012 final extended chemical weapon (CW)destruction deadline has not received much attention during the intersessional period, but the opportunity for mischief remains. And, of course, the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction progress reports will provide Iran ample opportunity for political theater. The issuance of a Note by the Director-General (DG) on the composition of the Technical Secretariat (TS) may be used by the South African ambassador to pressure the DG on the need for increased geographical representation in the hiring of TS staff members from the developing world - especially from the African Group. ¶2. (U) One issue which is politically loaded and may consume time on the margins is Michael Hurley's (Ireland) facilitation on "Situations Not Covered" by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This was intended to be a limited effort to address chemical weapons (CW) recovered in a non-state party during armed conflict. Some, however, are attempting to take the issue in a direction (e.g., expanded scope, legally binding, and application of treaty provisions for declarations, inspections, and destruction) that is inimical to U.S. interests. Following several rounds of consultations and severe criticism of the facilitator's draft text by several delegations, Hurley recently circulated a paper containing five elements that that he hopes could offer a way ahead. The United States, UK and perhaps othe
r delegations still have significant problems with Hurley's five elements. In addition, the Russian delegation is also likely to be anxious to speak to the U.S. delegation (Del) on the continued verification measures at converted chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). ¶3. (SBU) Del objectives for EC-59: --ensure that the facilitator for Situations Not Covered, the TS, and key delegations are well aware that the United States will not accept any decision that is of expanded scope or legally binding. Work to ensure that any additional draft that may be tabled is heading in a direction that the United States can work with; --ensure that the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction progress reports are simply noted and work to ensure that Iran - to the extent possible - becomes isolated should it decide to use the United States reports to grandstand on the U.S. projected inability to meet the extended 2012 CWC destruction deadline; and --ensure that any discussions or consultations that may be held on "how and when" to initiate discussions on the 2012 final extended CW destruction deadline remain focused on the process elements of "how and when." -------------- -------------- --- Agenda Item/Issue Paragraphs -------------- -------------- --- Status of implementation of the Convention (Item 5): a. Detailed plans for verification of chemical weapons destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 b. Facility agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 c. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8-12 d. Progress made in meeting revised deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons and related issues. . 13-23 e. Timely submission of declarations under Article VI of the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 f. Status of implementation of Article X . . . . . . . . 25 g. Status of implementation of Article XI . . . . . . . 26 h. Industry-Cluster issues, including enhancement of OCPF declarations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27-30 i. Procedure for off-site sample analysis and adherence to OPCW Confidentiality Regime requirements. . . . . . . . .31 j. Implementing the regime for handling confidential information in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 OPCW's Central Analytical Database (Item 6):. . . . . 33-35 Report on the implementation in 2009 of the recommendations of the External Auditor (Item 7): . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Administrative and Financial Matters (Item 8): a. Implementation of the Verification Information System.37 b. OPCW income and expenditures for FY 2009 . . . . . . .38 c. Transfer of funds in 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 d. Report on implementation of the tenure policy. . . . .40 e. Composition of the Technical Secretariat . . . . . . .41 f. Implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 g. Adjustments to the Director-General's gross salary . .43 h. Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02 . . . . . . . . . . . .44 Report on the Scientific Advisory Board(Item 9):. . . . .45 OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism effort (Item 10): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Any other business (Item 11): a. Credentials of Executive Council representatives. . . 47 b. Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 Verification Implementation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 c. Key terms used in Executive Council reports. . . . . .49 d. Enhanced transparency on OPCW procedures . . . . . 50-54 e. Consultations with Iraqi delegation. . . . . . . . . .55 f. Consultations with the Indian delegation . . . . . . .56 g. Consultations with the Libyan delegation . . . . . . .57 -------------- -------------- Item 5: Status of implementation of the Convention -------------- -------------- --5(a): Detailed plans for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons-- ¶4. (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at the Leonidovka chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF),Russian Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.1, dated November 16, 2009). The detailed plans for verification and facility agreements for both the Leonidovka and Maradykovsky CWDFs are being modified to reflect the specific chemical weapons to be destroyed and the operational specifics for the respective second destruction trains. Del may join consensus in approving the amendments to the detailed plans for verification for Leonidovka. ¶5. (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at the Maradykovsky CWDF, Russian Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.2, dated November 16, 2009). Del may join consensus for approval. --Subitem 5(b): Facility agreements-- ¶6. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian Federation for the Leonidovka CWDF (EC-59/DG.1, dated November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. ¶7. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian Federation for the Maradykovsky CWDF (EC-59/DG.2, dated November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 5(c): Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities-- ¶8. (U) The Council is again requested to consider and note a Note by the TS on a proposal for general guidelines on the nature of continued verification measures at converted CWPFs ten years after the DG's certification of their conversion (EC-56/S/3(asterisk), dated April 14, 2009),and to approve a draft decision on the matter (EC-57/DEC/CRP.1, dated June 3, 2009. (9). (U) Del should work to have both documents deferred. The issue remains under consideration in several capitals and Washington is still conducting its own internal review. Del is encouraged to hold consultations on the margins of the EC with the UK, Germans and other interested delegations. Del should gather as much information as possible on the positions of other delegations. ¶10. (U) Del should indicate that the United States believes that converted facilities need to be assessed on an individual basis irrespective of the country in which they are located. Such an assessment should include current activities of the facility and take into account the overall configuration of the plant site, which can be quite large in certain situations, as well as the activities that are underway there and in adjacent or adjoining facilities. Converted facilities that are co-located on a plant site where other chemical production or processing activities are underway may pose special risks and therefore require special verification arrangements to ensure confidence. The United States is still in the process of assessing all converted facilities that are subject to continued verification measures. ¶11. (U) Washington understands that Russia is considering the destruction of some of its formerly converted CWPFs, but has not provided any specific information. Del should seek the names and locations of the converted CWPFs that Russia is considering for destruction. Russia is also interested in learning more about the process that the United States utilized for the destruction of the former Marquardt CWPF (part of the binary program). In November 2000, the U.S. notified the TS that the Marquardt buildings had been demolished and in 2001 the TS inspected Marquardt and closed out the CWPF as destroyed; it no longer falls under treaty requirements for a converted CWPF. Del should inform Russia that TS inspections verified the conversion of the Marquardt facility in 1997 and 1998. In 2000, the Marquardt facility was sold to another company who demolished the facility; standard demolition techniques were used and the destruction requirement was satisfied, notified and confirmed by the TS in 2001. ¶12. (U) A State Party: Del should seek a bilateral meeting with this delegation and inform them of the points in paragraph (10) above and indicate that the United States believes that the converted facility may need to be subject to continuing verification measures. Del should inform A State Party that the United States is still developing its position on the type of verification measures that should apply, and that the two countries will need to cooperate closely on this issue. Washington understands from the previous consultation that A State Party is opposed to new (or continued) verification measures. --Subitem 5(d): Progress made in meeting revised deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons-- ¶13. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note two national papers by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.1, dated October 22, 2009, and EC-59/NAT.5, dated January 18, 2010). No substantive action is required on the two Notes. ¶14. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note two national papers by the United States of America on the status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.2, dated October 20, 2009 and EC-59/NAT.6, dated January 12, 2010). No substantive action is required on the two Notes. ¶15. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note two national papers by the Russian Federation on the status of its destruction activities (EC-59/P/NAT.1, dated October 19, 2009; and EC-59/P/NAT.2, dated February 17, 2010). No substantive action is required in the two Notes. ¶16. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note two national papers by China entitled "Report on the Status of the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China" (EC-59/NAT.3( asterisk),dated October 14, 2009; and EC-59/NAT.7, dated January 19, 2010),and two national papers by Japan entitled "The Report on the Current Status of the ACW Projects in China" (EC- 59/NAT.4, dated October 15, 2009; and EC_59/NAT.8, dated January 20, 2010). No substantive action is required on these four Notes. ¶17. (U) At EC-58 the Council requested the Chairperson to engage in informal consultations with interested delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons, and to keep the Council informed of these consultations. The Chair will report to the Council on informal consultations held in accordance with this request. ¶18. (U) Chairman Lomonaco is expected to report on the positive and generally constructive tone of the first consultation, and may restate his concept that the consultations should provide a forum for discussion that parallels the formal sessions of the Council. As appropriate, Del should complement the Chairman and fellow delegations on the productive beginning, emphasize the U.S. intent for continued, active participation, and support a reasonable schedule for addressing the completion of CW destruction by the 2012 deadline. Del should push back if Iran attempts to reintroduce the concept of an ad-hoc working group, and deploy previous guidance (Ref. A) should Iran attempt to open discussion of the U.S. destruction schedule. ¶19. (U) At EC-58 the Council decided to establish a facilitation to develop guidelines for the security and destruction of CW that comes into the possession and/or control of a State Party in situations unforeseen by the Convention. The facilitator (Michael Hurley) will report to the Council on the consultations held. ¶20. (U) Del should use the margins and informal meetings with Hurley and other delegations to argue for a draft decision that is political in nature (e.g., not legally binding) and focused exclusively on the recovery of CW in non-state parties during future armed conflicts, events that were not envisaged by the CWC. A legally binding draft decision that is of broad and potentially unlimited scope is not acceptable to the United States. Any draft decision should also not be declarative in nature and avoid the use of "shall, must, will" in favor of "should, may, etc." ¶21. (U) Del should exchange legal views with the TS Legal Advisor and work constructively with him, South Africa and others to focus on the elements presented by Hurley that may offer common ground. For instance, the need for an "acceptable level of transparency and timely reporting" (element 3 of the five elements defined by Hurley),having a role for the policy-making organs (element 4),and reporting to the Council (element 5) contain useful and constructive concepts. Concerning element 5, Del must avoid use of such terms as "full facts before the Executive Council for review." The EC is not a tribunal. The recovering State Party should provide to the EC information on what was recovered, how it was handled, secured, or destroyed, and any potential impact on the safety of the local population and the environment. This information should be provided in a manner and at a time that is consistent with contemporaneous security conditions. ¶22. (U) Element 1 (threshold for triggering the use of the guidelines) and Element 2 (verification in accordance with the Verification Annex and CWC) as drafted, are problematic. The basic problem is that there should be no "threshold for triggering the guidelines" and " application of the CWC" because the recovery of CW in a non-state party during periods of armed conflict was not foreseen by the drafters of the CWC. Therefore, elements 1 and 2 are not acceptable. A possible way ahead may be to put general treaty references in the preambular section of a draft decision with the admonition that recovering States Parties should be mindful of these CWC provisions and should attempt to guide their actions in that spirit. Operative sections of the text could focus on the limited scope of the draft decision, the non-binding nature of the political agreement, along with elements on transparency that would be desirable but not mandatory, and recommended guidelines for reporting to the EC with due accommodations for safety and security considerations, as assessed by the recovering State Party. ¶23. (U) Del should oppose any efforts by some delegations to make this a separate and regular EC agenda item. This is not necessary. The issue currently falls under Status of Implementation and that is where it should be handled until the interested States Parties believe enough progress has been made to warrant discussion by the Council. --Subitem 5(e): Timely submission of declarations under Article VI of the Convention-- ¶24. (U) The Council is requested to note the Note by the DG on the timely submission by States Parties of declarations under Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (EC-59/DG.8, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 5(f): Status of implementation of Article X-- ¶25. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a report by the DG on the status of implementation of Article X of the Convention as at 31 December 2009 (EC- 59/DG.12,dated February 9, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 5(g): Status of implementation of Article XI - - ¶26. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a report by the DG on the status of implementation of Article XI of the Convention as at December 31, 2009 (EC-59/DG.13, dated February 11, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 5(h): Industry-Cluster issues, including enhancement of OCPF declaration-- ¶27. (U) The Council has considered a Note by the TS on enhancing information on the characteristics of plant sites in other chemical production facility (OCPF) declarations (EC-53/S/5, dated June 17, 2008) and a Note by the DG concerning information on the enhancement of OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11, dated June 17, 2008) at previous sessions, and is requested to consider the Notes further. ¶28. (U) No action is required on these two Notes. There has been no progress through consultations on these two Notes since EC-57. Previous Del guidance on the two Notes still applies (Ref. B). As appropriate, Del should restate the need for the TS to provide assessments that clearly demonstrate the beneficial impact that would result from implementing the actions proposed in TS and in the DG Notes. Del may support the TS continuing its efforts to better focus OCPF inspections by working with States Parties in considering alternative approaches to those contained in the two Notes. ¶29. (U) Del should raise the United States' concern with the lack of progress in addressing longstanding industry-related issues, in particular in expanding the OCPF selection methodology to implement fully the provisions of Paragraph 11 of Part IX of the Verification Annex to include proposals by States Parties, and the need for the Council to identify qualified facilitators so that key issue can be addressed. ¶30. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note the report by the DG on the performance of the modified methodology for the selection of OCPFs for inspection (EC-59/DG.5, dated January 18, 2010). No action is required on this report. The report provides an update of the report noted during EC-58 (first year (2008) report) and covers the first two years of implementation. The results are consistent with 2008 report except that in 2009 there were fewer sites selected of high relevance to the CWC (high A14 scores) and the maximum limit (20) on numbers of Schedule 3 plus OCPF inspections was reached by China and the United States, resulting in higher than statistically predictable OCPF selections in other States Parties - Iran complained about this issue in EC-57 and EC-58. The initial inspection of a large number of Schedule 3 plant sites in China likewise appears to have resulted in higher than statistically predicted OCPF selections in the United States. The future impact of this development will need to be discussed within the interagency. Del guidance on comments still applies (Ref. B). --Subitem 5(i): Technical arrangement between the TS and designated laboratories concerning the procedures for off-site analysis of samples and for adherence to the requirements of the OPCW Confidentiality Regime-- ¶31. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a Note by the DG entitled the "Technical Arrangement between the TS and Designated Laboratories Concerning the Procedures for Off-site Analysis of Samples and for Adherence to the Requirements of the OPCW Confidentiality Regime" (EC-57/DG.5, dated June 3, 2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. However, Del should request clarification from the German and French delegations on their concerns with the Note. --Subitem 5(j): Implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information by the TS in 2009-- ¶32. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a report by the DG on the implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information by the Secretariat in 2009 (EC-59/DG.6 C-15/DG.1, dated January 27, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. -------------- Item 6: OPCW Central Analytical Database -------------- ¶33. (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the Secretariat on continued inclusion in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) of analytical data for analytical derivatives of scheduled chemicals (EC- 57/S/1, dated June 11, 2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. ¶34. (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-58/DG.4, dated September 4, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on the inclusion (EC-58/DEC/CRP.1, dated September 10, 2009). Del may agree to approve the decision. ¶35. (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-59/DG.3, dated December 16, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on the inclusion (EC-59/DEC/CRP.4, dated January 21, 2010). Del may agree to approve the decision. -------------- -------------- Item 7: Report on the implementation in 2009 of the recommendations of the External Auditor -------------- -------------- ¶36. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a Note by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the recommendations of the External Auditor (EC- 59/S/1, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. -------------- - Item 8: Administrative and financial matters -------------- - --Subitem 8(a): Current status of implementation of the Verification Information System-- ¶37. (U) The Council is requested to take note of the status report on the Verification Information System (EC-59/S/3, dated February 1, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. -- 8(b): OPCW income and expenditure for the financial year to 31 December 2009-- ¶38. (U) The Council is requested to note a report by the DG on OPCW income and expenditure for the financial year to 31 December 31, 2009 (EC-59/DG.9, dated February 4, 2010. No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 8(c): Transfers of funds in 2009-- ¶39. (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the DG on transfers of funds during 2009 (EC-59/DG.7 C- 15/DG.2, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 8(d): Report on the implementation of the policy on tenure-- ¶40. (U) The Council is requested to note a DG report on implementation of the tenure policy in 2008 (EC-57/DG.4, dated 3 June 2009),and an addendum dated February 8, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 8(e): Composition of the Technical Secretariat-- ¶41. (U) Following deliberations at CSP-14, the Council is requested to discuss and take a decision on the structure and content of a yearly report on the composition of the TS. The Council is requested to consider a Note by the DG on this subject (EC-59/DG.10, dated February 8, 2010). This yearly reporting was instigated by the South African ambassador, who is seeking more transparency on TS hiring practices and continues to push for greater hiring of African candidates. This item is likely to be deferred, as it is difficult for the Council to take a decision on a document that has not been circulated only two weeks before the session. Del may support deferral of the document. --Subitem 8(f): Implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards-- ¶42. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note the Note by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (EC-59/S/4, dated February 12, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Subitem 8(g): Adjustment to the Director-General's gross salary-- ¶43. (U) A decision of the Conference at its First Special Session (C-SS-1/DEC.4, dated 25 July 2002) stipulated that the terms of appointment of the DG shall be subject to adjustments by the Council to keep the terms in line with those of other executive heads within the United Nations system. The Council is requested to adopt a decision adjusting the Director-General's gross salary (EC-59/DEC/CRP.3, dated January 21, 2010). Del can join consensus on a decision that will adjust the DG's gross salary in line with other executive heads within the United Nations system. --Subitem 8(h): Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02-- ¶44. (U) The Council is requested to consider the amendment to Staff Rule 9.4.02 (this document is not yet available to delegations),and to recommend the amendment to the Conference at its Fifteenth Session (this document is not yet available to delegations). If not raised by others, Del should request that consideration of these documents be deferred until EC-60 due to their late distribution. -------------- -------------- Item 9: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board -------------- -------------- ¶45. (U) The Council is requested to note the report of the Fourteenth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) (SAB-14/1, dated November 11, 2009) and the Note by the DG in response to the report of the Fourteenth Session of the SAB (EC-59/DG.4, dated January 14, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. -------------- -------------- --- Item 10: The OPCW's contribution to global anti- terrorism efforts -------------- -------------- --- ¶46. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note the Note by the DG on the status of the OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts (EC- 59/DG.11, Dated February 8, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. Del should, as appropriate, take the floor and thank the DG and associated staff for producing this very comprehensive report. The TS should be encouraged to provide regular updates. Per Ref. C, Del should explain, as necessary, U.S. "redlines" on chemical safety and security. Specifically, Del should point out that the OPCW is not organized or staffed as a chemical terrorism organization and that the OPCW should not develop requirements or guidance documents for States Parties or industry that provide direction on chemical safety and security. -------------- Item 11: Any other business -------------- --Credentials of representatives to the Executive Council-- ¶47. (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve an addendum to the report by the DG on the credentials of representatives of members of the Council. Del should review this document when available and may agree to approve the document. --Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 Verification Implementation Report-- ¶48. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note the corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 Verification Implementation Report (VIR) (EC- 58/HP/DG.1/Corr.1, dated December 29, 2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Key terms regularly used in Executive Council reports- - ¶49. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note the Note by the Secretariat on key terms used in the reports of the Council (EC-59/S/2, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. --Enhanced transparency in the procedure of the policy- making organs of the OPCW-- ¶50. (U)The Note by the Chairperson entitled "Enhancing Transparency in the Procedures of the Policy-Making Organs of the OPCW" (EC-59/2, dated 4 February 2010) has been circulated to members of the Council. As Washington understands it, the Council is not being asked to approve or note this document; it is a proposal of basic guidelines on transparency measures for when informal groups meet under the policy-making organs in effort to resolve a deadlocked issue. ¶51. (U) Washington is aware of the perceived lack of transparency regarding the meeting of informal gatherings to try and resolve deadlocked issues in a small group setting. The absence of transparency and inclusiveness can undermine the perceived legitimacy of the outcome or even prevent agreement. This is an on- going problem that should be addressed in some capacity. The Note by the Chairperson is too restrictive though. For instance, convening informal groups as "a last resort" (paragraph 6a) could mean in reality that such a group never convenes. Also, the informal gathering should not be "a step prior to the convening of open- ended facilitation" - such a process would likely undue any agreement reached in the informal gathering. Regional consultations (paragraph 8) should not be allowed to hold-up progress within the informal group or to prevent the Chairperson from giving regular progress reports. It is also not appropriate (paragraph 9) that the conclusions of the informal group be presented to the facilitation group before the outcomes are tabled in plenary. A facilitation is not a ratifying or approving body and such a mechanism adds an unnecessary layer and would likely result in prolonged consultations and a breakdown of agreement. ¶52. (U) Del should approach Lomonaco early and seek clarify on his intentions. Are his intentions to have the discussion paper noted, or to convene a consultative process? Del can support the aims of the paper (e.g., increased transparency) but should lay down a marker that the paper as drafted is too restrictive. The overall responsibility of the Chairperson is to achieve results. Restrictive requirements or prescriptive guidelines for small-group work (a standard component of multilateral negotiations) can interfere with the Chairperson's ability to make progress and resolve roadblocks. ¶53. (U) Del should work with Lomonaco on the elements of his Note that may offer a way ahead. For instance, having representation from each regional group attending small-group gatherings will help facilitate transparency. The facilitator of the facilitation and the Chairperson should be invited to all small group gatherings. The Chairperson should also be encouraged to present regular progress updates to the Council from the informal groups. The Chairperson may also encourage other interested delegations to attend small group gatherings. ¶54. U) Del should also seek out the views of other key delegations. While the Council is not taking action on this Note, Del should make it clear to the EC Chair and other delegations, that the basic guidelines as presented do not constitute any operating guidance for the policy-making organs. The guidelines are simply a suggestion and Del should work to steer them in a direction as outlined above. If the guidelines are presented in a manner that conforms with above guidance, del may agree to note the note - if necessary. --Consultations with the Iraqi delegation-- ¶55. (SBU) Six participants from Baghdad are expected to join their CWC delegation during EC-59 for bilateral meeting on the margins. The U.S.-GOI agenda should include continued discussion of specifics on GOI reporting of recovered CW; status of GOI decisions on making corrections via amendment to the CWC declaration and a proposal to use encapsulation for the Al Muthanna bunkers, as suggested by the TS during recent GOI-U.S.- TS experts' meeting (Ref. E); and GOI preparations for presentations on the proposed amendment and its general plan for CW destruction to be presented during EC-60 in April. Del will focus on addressing any open questions from the experts meeting, eliciting Iraq's decisions and timeline for deploying its general plan and planning for USG assistance to GOI preparations for EC-60. --Consultations with the Indian delegation on industry issues- ¶56. (U) Consultations may be held with the Indian delegation on industry issues including preparations to host inspections, host team procedures during inspections and evaluation of the effectiveness of inspections as a follow-up to discussions held on the margins of CSP-14. --Consultations with the Libyan delegation on CW destruction - ¶57. (U) The United States should continue consultations with the Libyan delegation on the status of its CW destruction and conversion efforts. Del should seek out the UK and Italian delegations to determine whether a joint meeting among the four delegations would be more productive. CLINTON

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