SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 007: RESPONSE TO RFG-003 ON

S E C R E T STATE 014948

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2030
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 007: RESPONSE TO RFG-003 ON
ELIMINATION MONITORING

REF: GENEVA 000081 (SFO-GVA-VIII-0051)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Guidance: In Ref, delegation outlines two possible
options for reaching agreement on monitoring of
solid-fueled first stage ICBM, solid-fueled first stage
SLBM, and mobile ICBM launcher eliminations. Delegation
is instructed to pursue a variant which is a hybrid of
Option 1 and Option 2 from Ref. Under this approach, each
year the Russians would create two batches of eliminated
items for possible Type Two inspection by the United
States at both the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM
launcher CorE facilities (for a total of four batches).
Each batch would contain approximately 25 percent of the
year's output of eliminated items for that facility. If
the United States elected not to inspect these 25 percent
batches, the eliminated items would still be displayed in
the open for 60 days for NTM viewing prior to their final
disposition. Delegation should note that the 60-day
window for displaying 100 percent of eliminated items in
the open for monitoring by NTM is critical and must be
part of any final agreement.


2. (S) If the United States chose not to conduct one or
more of the announced "batch" inspections under this
alternative, the U.S. would have the right to conduct a
full Type Two inspection (in lieu of each "batch"
inspection not executed) during the periods of the treaty
year when solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs as well as mobile
ICBM launchers were incrementally being eliminated,
notified as available for inspection, and displayed in the
open in small groups. The conduct of Type Two inspections
would entail full Type Two inspection rights to inspect
the entire CorE facilities, at both Votkinsk and
Piban'shur, at times chosen by the inspecting Party. In
no case would either facility be subject to more than two
inspections each year (both announced "batch" inspections
and regular Type Two inspections).


3. (S) As noted in Ref, this approach is predicated on
Russia providing site diagrams for the Votkinsk and
Piban'shur facilities that were the same as those provided
under the START Treaty and on their willingness to make
available all items subject to inspection within the
inspectable area during such an inspection. This proposal
would allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of
all the data declared for the facilities and to confirm
the elimination of all items being displayed in the open
in accordance with a 60-day display window using a team of
up to 10 inspectors.


4. (S) Should Russia reject this approach, delegation is
authorized to pursue Option 2, as described in Ref.

End guidance.
CLINTON