USUN TALKING POINTS FOR MINURCAT CONSULTATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 013732

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT
SUBJECT: USUN TALKING POINTS FOR MINURCAT CONSULTATIONS


1. This is an action request. USUN may draw from the points
in paragraph 2 during a briefing before the Security Council
on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
(MINURCAT) scheduled for February 17, 2010.


2. Begin points:

--I would like to thank U/SYG Le Roy and U/SYG Holmes for
their briefing today on the consequences of terminating the
mission when its mandate expires. We appreciate the
difficult constraints within which MINURCAT has been forced
to operate due to the Government of Chad's (GOC) request for
termination of the mission. We are particularly concerned
about the negative humanitarian consequences of an early
withdrawal. We also note that such an early withdrawal
could set a precedent for other withdrawing peacekeeping
missions prematurely . A sudden withdrawal is in no one's
interests. We believe the Council should send a strong
message to Chadian President Deby that he should reconsider
his decision, and he should negotiate with the United Nations
to find a mutually beneficial way for MINURCAT to continue
its mission. Today, I would like to make three points:
first, MINURCAT's presence has made a difference; second,
regional instability in the next twelve months may increase,
thus arguing in favor of maintaining MINURCAT's presence; and
third, the Council must carefully consider how it responds to
President Deby's request.

MINURCAT'S Accomplishments

--MINURCAT was established to help create security conditions
conducive to a voluntary, sustainable return of refugees and
displaced persons, and to facilitate delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the nearly 600,000 refugees and internally
displaced persons in camps along the Chad/Sudan border.

--MINURCAT has contributed to improved security in IDP and
refugee camps through its development and training of the
Chadian Detachment Integre Securite (DIS).

--We are concerned that without continued training and
support by the UN, the DIS may not remain a viable security
force. At a minimum, any discussion of MINURCAT's withdrawal
must factor in the Government of Chad's willingness to take
on funding of the DIS, including the development of
infrastructure needed for DIS facilities.

--Similarly, absent MINURCAT or a viable DIS, any discussion
of withdrawal must acknowledge the security vacuum that would
result, as well as diminished protection for IDPs and
refugees.

Regional Stability

--We must consider the impact on regional stability of a
MINURCAT withdrawal. Such a withdrawal would likely result
in diminished protection of civilians, including IDPs and
refugees, at a time when demand for this protection and the
need for humanitarian services will likely increase.

--In neighboring Sudan, as April elections and the January
2011 referenda approach, there is the possibility of
increased violence and instability, particularly in Darfur.
Increased conflict in Darfur could result in additional
refugee flows into eastern Chad. Both Chad and the Central
African Republic (CAR) are also scheduled to hold elections
this year - CAR in April and Chad in November.

--Growing instability in northeastern CAR resulted in
increased flows of refugees from CAR into southern Chad
earlier this year, and the security situation remains
unstable. Additionally, although Chad and Sudan signed a
peace agreement normalizing relations on January 15, the two
parties have previously signed agreements that were quickly
broken. The Chad/Sudan border remains volatile.

--All of these factors argue in favor of maintaining
MINURCAT's presence in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR.

Maintaining Council Credibility

--We can all agree that for MINURCAT to be successful,
cooperation from the Government of Chad is needed. It is
apparent that a break-down in communication between the
Council and the GOC led to the precipitous decision of the
GOC to call for MINURCAT's withdrawal. The important point
now is how the Council moves forward to address this matter.

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--We believe better communication between the Government of
Chad and the UN can result in a win-win situation. We have
urged President Deby to engage positively in negotiations for
MINURCAT's continuation. We believe the guiding principle for
withdrawal in these negotiations should be an approach based
on benchmarks and not on a calendar based timeline. Draw
down of MINURCAT troops should be based on the extent to
which the GOC can provide adequate protection to refugees and
internally displaced persons.

--The GOC may argue that it is currently capable of providing
this protection; however, the Council mandated this
peacekeeping mission, and we must decide if we are convinced
the GOC can now assume these responsibilities. We must also
ensure that we communicate to the GOC what the potential
consequences of failing to do so might be.

Thank you.
CLINTON