SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 004: ICBM SILOS; RV

S E C R E T STATE 012134

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2030
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 004: ICBM SILOS; RV
COVERS; AND NEW KINDS

REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S.
PROPOSED JDT OF THE TREATY

B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S.
PROPOSED JDT OF THE PROTOCOL

C. GENEVA 1235 (SFO-GVA-VI-159)

D. STATE 9672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002)

E. STATE 9671 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 001)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, VCI. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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ICBM silo training launchers and engineering models
of ICBM silos
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1. (S) Background: DoD estimates that, in order
for the United States to comply with the 800 limit on
deployed and non-deployed launchers and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, an additional reduction of
such systems will have to be made. For operational
and costreasons, it is desirable to minimize the number of
ICBM or SLBM launchers or heavy bombers that will need to be
eliminated. The engineering models of silos at Hill
AFB were included in START as ICBM training
launchers via the Thirteenth Agreed Statement at
Soviet insistence. There is no launch control
center at Hill AFB, so these silos could not launch
an ICBM. These silos are used for testing
silo/missile modifications. The same is true for
the ICBM silo training launchers located at the
three U.S. ICBM bases; there are no launch control
centers connected with these launchers.
Additionally, the launcher doors for those training
sites would have to be manually removed to support a
launch. Although these engineering models and silo
training launchers were counted as silo training
launchers under the START Treaty, they do not meet
the definition of ICBM launcher since they are not
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and
launch an ICBM. Therefore, the U.S. does not intend
to count the engineering models of silos at Hill AFB
and silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases as
non-deployed ICBM launchers for purposes of the 800
overall limit. (Washington notes that silo training
launchers at ICBM bases are already limited in
number by paragraph 7 of Article IV.)


2. (S) Guidance: Bearing in mind high level
agreement to an aggregate ceiling of 800 deployed
and non-deployed launchers, to include bombers along
with deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM
launcher (Ref E),delegation is directed to advise
the Russian Federation that the United States does
not intend to include, as non-deployed launchers, the
ICBM silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases and the
engineering models of ICBM silos at Hill AFB within
the 800 overall limit because these silos are
incapable of launching ballistic missiles and do not
meet the definition of ICBM launcher.

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Reentry Vehicle Cover Measurements
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3. (S) Background: As reflected in U.S. paragraph
15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, the
U.S. and Russian positions differ regarding the use
and measuring of covers during warhead inspections.
As reported in Ref C, Russia proposes using only
"individual covers" on reentry vehicles. Russia
does not consider the hard covers used on the U.S.
Trident II/D-5 SLBM to be " individual covers."
(Washington notes that Trident II hard covers will
have a number of conical "towers" equal to the
declared number of warheads for the inspected SLBM.)
Regarding measuring, the United States has proposed
measuring all reentry vehicle covers, while Russia
only agrees to measuring hard covers. During START,
Russia used hard components under its soft covers,
but maintained that these components were separate
from the soft covers themselves, and did not display
them nor allow measurements of these hard elements. On the
majority of Russian missiles the soft covers that
used hard components were essentially conformal and did
not hamper confirmation of the number of RVs, but on the
SS-25 and SS-27 the use of separate hard components
prevented soft covers from conforming to the shape
of the RVs, and created such a large volume that it
was not possible to confirm the number of RVs on the
front section. The United States has been notified
that Russia has begun deployment of variations of
the SS-27 equipped with multiple warheads.



4. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to
continue to reject the Russian proposal for using
only "individual covers" for reentry vehicles during
warhead inspections, unless agreement is reached to
permit the use of the type of unitary hard cover for
SLBMs during warhead inspections that the United
States used during the START Treaty SLBM
RV OSI. Delegation is authorized to remove the
requirement to measure soft conforming reentry
vehicle covers contingent upon agreement with Russia for a
one-time exhibition of each type of hybrid reentry
vehicle cover. Delegation should seek agreement
that during the hybrid reentry vehicle cover
exhibitions, inspectors will be provided the
opportunity to view and measure the " hybrid"
reentry vehicle covers in their fully assembled
state, i.e. as they would appear when placed on the
front section of a missile, and to view and measure
all elements of "hybrid" covers. During subsequent
inspections, inspectors will be permitted to view
and measure all elements of the hybrid covers to
ensure that they have not changed. Additionally,
delegation should negotiate ad ref to Washington a
definition to be included in Part One of the Protocol
of the term "hybrid reentry vehicle cover" that would
apply to those covers that include soft elements as well
as hard components, tensioners, or any device or material
that gives shape to the cover independently of the RV. If
delegation is unable to obtain Russian agreement on
the approach to hybrid covers outlined above,
delegation is not authorized to modify the approach
but should seek further guidance from Washington.

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New Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms
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5. (S) Background: With respect to the guidance on
Treaty Article V provided in Ref D, Washington notes
that the intent of the provision is not to capture
new non-nuclear systems as new kinds of strategic
offensive arms (SOA). There is no definition of "new
kind" of SOA in the new START Treaty, just as "new
kind" was not defined in START. In START, the U.S.
made it clear both to the Soviet Union during the
negotiations and to the U.S. Senate during the
ratification process that the U.S. view
was that future non-nuclear systems could not be
considered a new kind of SOA and, thus, would not be
subject to the Treaty. Washington believes the
Delegation should make a similar statement of the
U.S. views on this matter to the Russian delegation
so that the new START Treaty negotiating record is
clear. Such a statement in the negotiating record
can be cited during the ratification process.


6. (S) Guidance: The Delegation is directed to
inform Russia of the U.S. view that a future non-nuclear
system that does not otherwise meet the definitions
in this Treaty would not be considered a new kind of
strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be
subject to the Treaty. If one Party deploys a new
kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the
Treaty, and the other Party challenges this
assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to
attempt to resolve the issue. There is, however, no
obligation to delay deployment of such a system
pending such resolution.

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Previous Guidance
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7. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded,
previous guidance remains in effect.

End guidance.
CLINTON