SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 004: ICBM SILOS; RV

S E C R E T STATE 012134 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2030 TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 004: ICBM SILOS; RV COVERS; AND NEW KINDS REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE TREATY ¶B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. PROPOSED JDT OF THE PROTOCOL ¶C. GENEVA 1235 (SFO-GVA-VI-159) ¶D. STATE 9672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002) ¶E. STATE 9671 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 001) Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- -------------- -- ICBM silo training launchers and engineering models of ICBM silos -------------- -------------- -- ¶1. (S) Background: DoD estimates that, in order for the United States to comply with the 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers and nuclear- capable heavy bombers, an additional reduction of such systems will have to be made. For operational and costreasons, it is desirable to minimize the number of ICBM or SLBM launchers or heavy bombers that will need to be eliminated. The engineering models of silos at Hill AFB were included in START as ICBM training launchers via the Thirteenth Agreed Statement at Soviet insistence. There is no launch control center at Hill AFB, so these silos could not launch an ICBM. These silos are used for testing silo/missile modifications. The same is true for the ICBM silo training launchers located at the three U.S. ICBM bases; there are no launch control centers connected with these launchers. Additionally, the launcher doors for those training sites would have to be manually removed to support a launch. Although these engineering models and silo training launchers were counted as silo training launchers under the START Treaty, they do not meet the definition of ICBM launcher since they are not intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM. Therefore, the U.S. does not intend to count the engineering models of silos at Hill AFB and silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases as non-deployed ICBM launchers for purposes of the 800 overall limit. (Washington notes that silo training launchers at ICBM bases are already limited in number by paragraph 7 of Article IV.) ¶2. (S) Guidance: Bearing in mind high level agreement to an aggregate ceiling of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers, to include bombers along with deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launcher (Ref E),delegation is directed to advise the Russian Federation that the United States does not intend to include, as non-deployed launchers, the ICBM silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases and the engineering models of ICBM silos at Hill AFB within the 800 overall limit because these silos are incapable of launching ballistic missiles and do not meet the definition of ICBM launcher. -------------- Reentry Vehicle Cover Measurements -------------- ¶3. (S) Background: As reflected in U.S. paragraph 15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, the U.S. and Russian positions differ regarding the use and measuring of covers during warhead inspections. As reported in Ref C, Russia proposes using only "individual covers" on reentry vehicles. Russia does not consider the hard covers used on the U.S. Trident II/D-5 SLBM to be " individual covers." (Washington notes that Trident II hard covers will have a number of conical "towers" equal to the declared number of warheads for the inspected SLBM.) Regarding measuring, the United States has proposed measuring all reentry vehicle covers, while Russia only agrees to measuring hard covers. During START, Russia used hard components under its soft covers, but maintained that these components were separate from the soft covers themselves, and did not display them nor allow measurements of these hard elements. On the majority of Russian missiles the soft covers that used hard components were essentially conformal and did not hamper confirmation of the number of RVs, but on the SS-25 and SS-27 the use of separate hard components prevented soft covers from conforming to the shape of the RVs, and created such a large volume that it was not possible to confirm the number of RVs on the front section. The United States has been notified that Russia has begun deployment of variations of the SS-27 equipped with multiple warheads. ¶4. (S) Guidance: Delegation is instructed to continue to reject the Russian proposal for using only "individual covers" for reentry vehicles during warhead inspections, unless agreement is reached to permit the use of the type of unitary hard cover for SLBMs during warhead inspections that the United States used during the START Treaty SLBM RV OSI. Delegation is authorized to remove the requirement to measure soft conforming reentry vehicle covers contingent upon agreement with Russia for a one-time exhibition of each type of hybrid reentry vehicle cover. Delegation should seek agreement that during the hybrid reentry vehicle cover exhibitions, inspectors will be provided the opportunity to view and measure the " hybrid" reentry vehicle covers in their fully assembled state, i.e. as they would appear when placed on the front section of a missile, and to view and measure all elements of "hybrid" covers. During subsequent inspections, inspectors will be permitted to view and measure all elements of the hybrid covers to ensure that they have not changed. Additionally, delegation should negotiate ad ref to Washington a definition to be included in Part One of the Protocol of the term "hybrid reentry vehicle cover" that would apply to those covers that include soft elements as well as hard components, tensioners, or any device or material that gives shape to the cover independently of the RV. If delegation is unable to obtain Russian agreement on the approach to hybrid covers outlined above, delegation is not authorized to modify the approach but should seek further guidance from Washington. -------------- New Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms -------------- ¶5. (S) Background: With respect to the guidance on Treaty Article V provided in Ref D, Washington notes that the intent of the provision is not to capture new non-nuclear systems as new kinds of strategic offensive arms (SOA). There is no definition of "new kind" of SOA in the new START Treaty, just as "new kind" was not defined in START. In START, the U.S. made it clear both to the Soviet Union during the negotiations and to the U.S. Senate during the ratification process that the U.S. view was that future non-nuclear systems could not be considered a new kind of SOA and, thus, would not be subject to the Treaty. Washington believes the Delegation should make a similar statement of the U.S. views on this matter to the Russian delegation so that the new START Treaty negotiating record is clear. Such a statement in the negotiating record can be cited during the ratification process. ¶6. (S) Guidance: The Delegation is directed to inform Russia of the U.S. view that a future non-nuclear system that does not otherwise meet the definitions in this Treaty would not be considered a new kind of strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be subject to the Treaty. If one Party deploys a new kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges this assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is, however, no obligation to delay deployment of such a system pending such resolution. -------------- Previous Guidance -------------- ¶7. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous guidance remains in effect. End guidance. CLINTON