Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10SINGAPORE110
2010-01-27 09:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

REDI CENTER'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN AS USG FUNDING

Tags:  AORC KFLU TBIO PREL PGOV SN 
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DE RUEHGP #0110/01 0270917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270917Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7737
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGP/ODC SINGAPORE SN PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000110 

SIPDIS


STATE PASS DHHS FOR DAN MILLER AND ADRIENNE GOODRICH-DOCTOR
DEPT FOR OES/IHB CRAIG SHAPIRO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS: AORC KFLU TBIO PREL PGOV SN
SUBJECT: REDI CENTER'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN AS USG FUNDING
PROCESS CHANGES

REF: 09 SINGAPORE 1168

Classified By: CDA Daniel Shields for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
----------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000110 SIPDIS STATE PASS DHHS FOR DAN MILLER AND ADRIENNE GOODRICH-DOCTOR DEPT FOR OES/IHB CRAIG SHAPIRO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 TAGS: AORC KFLU TBIO PREL PGOV SN SUBJECT: REDI CENTER'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN AS USG FUNDING PROCESS CHANGES REF: 09 SINGAPORE 1168 Classified By: CDA Daniel Shields for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Dr. Daniel Miller and Dr. Adrienne Goodrich-Doctor of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) met with CDA and Ministry of Health (MOH) officials on December 3 and 4, 2009 to discuss the future of the Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center and recent changes to DHHS funding procedures that will affect the Center's governance. Dr. Miller and MOH discussed several issues, including: the future direction of REDI's activities; prospects for expanding REDI to include partners from other economies and the private sector; and the leadership issues that will arise when current DHHS funding mechanisms end in August 20l0 and REDI begins to seek grants from DHHS Operating Divisions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). DHHS and MOH agreed to another round of discussions in early 20l0 following separate internal USG and GOS reviews to revisit the priorities for the USG and GOS engagement in health for the next five years; determine if the REDI Center has met the original objectives and if there is interest from other USG agencies in continuing to work with REDI; and to determine the best way to move forward to meet the goals of the collaboration. MOH remains supportive of the REDI Center but understands the new U.S. funding changes and stated strong opinions about the types of new USG representation the GOS would accept for the Board of Governors (BoG) of the REDI Center. The confluence of administrative issues and competing opinions about how to take REDI forward in the face of funding changes raises questions about the Center's continuing viability as a government-to-government initiative. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Singapore requests that the Department coordinate an interagency discussion regarding the future direction of the bilateral health cooperation with GOS; the REDI Center's merits and USG interest in working with the REDI Center; the leadership implications of REDI seeking grants on a competitive basis from DHHS agencies and whether it can
continue as an intergovernmental organization. The discussion should also cover who in the USG could assume responsibility for providing scientific and strategic direction to the REDI Center and selecting key representation, such as the U.S. members of REDI's BoG, the deputy director, and likely the next executive director. The United States and Singapore established the REDI Center to monitor, detect and respond to naturally occurring infectious diseases and man-made biological threats. The Department and other USG agencies with programs aimed at addressing these threats may find working with REDI valuable, as it has an established presence in Southeast Asia. This message is intended to inform relevant agencies of REDI's situation so they can convey any interest they may have in working with the REDI Center and participate in a Department led interagency discussion on REDI and future health cooperation with the GOS. End Action Request. DHHS Funding Changes Complicate USG-GOS Arrangement -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On December 4, Econoffs joined Dr. Daniel Miller and Dr. Adrienne Goodrich-Doctor of the DHHS Office of Global Health Affairs (OGHA) in a meeting to discuss recent changes to DHHS funding mechanisms for the REDI Center with GOH Aik Guan, Deputy Secretary for Health Services at MOH and Chairperson of REDI Center's Board of Governors. At REDI's establishment in 2005, OGHA awarded REDI a non-competitive sole-source cooperative agreement which was not typical of similar DHHS initiatives, Dr. Miller said. The funds committed by the United States under terms of the REDI Center agreement were not line items in the DHHS budget. Under the current Administration, OGHA will focus solely on policy and will shift responsibility for program management out of OGHA to implementing agencies like the CDC and the NIH. REDI continues to receive substantial support from the GOS. However, funding is no longer available directly from OGHA, and REDI will therefore have to apply and compete for CDC, SINGAPORE 00000110 002 OF 004 NIH or other USG or private-sector funding. ¶4. (SBU) Once REDI begins to apply for USG funding, those USG personnel that have funding review and approval authority will no longer be able to serve on its BoG due to legal and ethical restrictions in U.S. laws and regulations. Dr. Miller currently serves on REDI's BoG, along with two other members representing CDC and NIH. The other three BoG members, including Depsec Goh, are from Singapore. Dr. Miller suggested that appropriate USG candidates for REDI's future BoG might include health experts from DHHS or CDC seconded to the State Department as they would not be in line to approve or reject grant applications but would have relevant health expertise. The change in funding and the associated governance challenges outlined by Dr. Miller prompted questions from DepSec Goh regarding whether the REDI Center could realistically continue as a government-to-government initiative. Singapore does not want the United States to install proxy BoG members that have no decision-making power and no direct links to the USG, DepSec Goh stated strongly. Dr. Miller agreed and assured DepSec Goh that the USG had several options that could be explored. Concerns about REDI Center's Executive Director -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) Under the terms of the USG-GOS agreement, Singapore is in line to nominate the next Executive Director (ED) once the current ED contract expires. However, DepSec Goh said he would prefer to allow the United States to choose the next ED to ensure that person can effectively navigate the USG grant application process. Goh and Miller agreed that the ED should be entrepreneurial and adept at working with the private sector. Change Can be a Good Thing -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Dr. Miller framed the discussion on REDI in positive terms, suggesting that the changes with DHHS funding mechanisms presented an opportunity to revisit the goals and objectives of the current agreement with the GOS to determine if priorities have changed and to consider planning for the next five years of engagement, as well as to do a thorough stock-taking of REDI's achievements and if necessary realign the Center's mission with the current global health environment. REDI was established following the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and represented the U.S. and Singapore's goals to develop an effective international initiative to monitor, detect and address both natural and man-made threats. Much of REDI's work to date has been focused on public health capacity-building initiatives related to Avian Influenza (AI) threats in Indonesia. REDI has done little so far regarding man-made biological threats and that may be an area to expand in the future, Miller and Goh agreed. ¶7. (SBU) Goh said that the two governments had created the REDI Center out of a political desire to forge bilateral cooperation in health, but with inadequate thought as to how REDI would achieve the goals and objectives in the current USG/GOS agreement in practical terms. Goh advocated putting more emphasis on how REDI could work with the private sector to bring benefits to industry. For example, one proposal he suggested pertained to bringing Food and Drug Administration officials to Singapore to help harmonize health product standards and facilitate export of Singapore goods to the United States. (Note: In Post's assessment, this does not fit with REDI stated mission. End Note.) More Emphasis on Man-Made Threats -------------- ¶8. (SBU) During a separate meeting with CDA ahead of the December 4 meeting with MOH, Dr. Miller and Emboffs noted that other USG agencies and foreign governments have expressed an interest in the area of biological threat reduction, an area that REDI was established to address. Representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) visited REDI in December and found that REDI's positive relationships with health organizations and ministries in Southeast Asia could be SINGAPORE 00000110 003 OF 004 useful to DTRA's mission. DTRA is considering developing a proposal with REDI regarding how they can work together on a bio-threat reduction roadmap for the region. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) asked Emboffs to observe a European Union (EU) meeting with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regarding establishing a CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) Center of Excellence in the region (reftel). The EU did not mention REDI specifically, but intends to create the Center of Excellence by building on existing regional and bilateral initiatives that deal with biological threats. President Obama recently released the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which included objectives such as reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct and obtaining timely and accurate insight on current and emerging risks, which are capabilities that the REDI Center was designed to cultivate in the region. Singapore Cautious About Other Government Partners -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Singapore and the United States began REDI as a bilateral organization, but envisaged expanding it into a multilateral organization by including other Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies. DepSec Goh said that Taiwan was the first APEC economy to ask to join but Singapore did not want to bring in Taiwan and risk upsetting China. As a result, REDI has never expanded beyond a bilateral organization. Emboffs asked about making REDI an ASEAN initiative, citing the EU's interest in an ASEAN CBRN Center of Excellence and a proposed deliverable from the recent U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting that included greater pandemic-preparedness cooperation with the private sector. Goh adamantly opposed the ASEAN option, saying that given ASEAN's lack of success in program management it would be the "kiss of death" to getting anything accomplished. Goh was more receptive to bringing in partners like the EU or Australia. Goh also proposed establishing an international advisory panel for REDI, which would allow foreign government and even private sector representatives to provide guidance to REDI, without directly tying that guidance to funding and a formal government-to-government agreement. Goh suggested that might mitigate some GOS concerns about including Taiwan. Finding a Way Forward -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Emboffs, Dr. Miller and DepSec Goh agreed during the December 4 meeting that both the USG and the GOS need to complete separate internal reviews to revisit priorities for bilateral engagement in health for the next five years, and to determine whether the REDI Center has met its original objectives and has value for the future. Both sides acknowledged that the review process might determine that the current bilateral agreement be revised or perhaps terminated if there was no perceived role of REDI in the GOS/USG health engagement. Goh said that he would have to consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but he did not think there would be much GOS objection to allowing the REDI Center agreement to terminate, especially if the United States could not find suitable BoG members with decision-making capacity. However, if both sides determine that REDI Center should continue, Goh said that a government-to-government agreement would be required to ensure adequate oversight and momentum. The governments must be involved to provide the bigger-picture policy objectives and spur action by any agencies or private companies involved in the Center, Goh concluded. Comment: Post's Concerns about REDI Governance -------------- - ¶11. (C) Embassy Singapore has spent considerable time and effort coming to a better understanding of how changes to the DHHS funding mechanisms will affect the viability of the REDI Center. Now that the picture is clearer, Post is most concerned about the governance issues caused by the funding changes. If the OGHA and current BoG members can no longer provide guidance to REDI, there is currently no easily identifiable USG office that can take the lead on finding new BoG members, the next Executive Director, and Deputy Director as well as follow through on renegotiating the USG-GOS agreement. Dr. Miller proposed appointing for SINGAPORE 00000110 004 OF 004 example, senior level USG personnel from DHHS or CDC detailed to the Department. Embassy Singapore is not equipped to assume these responsibilities and notes that most of REDI's work has been outside Singapore in countries like Indonesia and Vietnam. It would be more appropriate for a Department office, which would have operational but not grant-awarding responsibilities, to assume oversight for REDI if the Department and other agencies like DTRA and perhaps USAID see value in partnering with REDI. ¶12. (C) Given the continued USG focus on addressing biological threats in Asia, it would be unfortunate to allow a functioning organization like REDI to terminate. However, if no USG office can take the lead as administrator for REDI, Post sees no bilateral issues with allowing USG support for the REDI Center to cease once USG funding ends and the terms of the current agreement conclude. USG and GOS financial obligations to the Center will continue for at least two years regardless of whether the agreement is renewed or not. REDI may also be able to continue operations if it secures its own funding. However, it would not be able to function as an international organization. Comment: DHHS/OGHA Meeting Comments -------------- ¶13. (C) DHHS fully supports in principle, the REDI Center and the bilateral health agreement with the GOS. However, it was determined during the meeting with DepSec Goh that there was a need for both the USG and the GOS to have internal discussions before determining whether to revise or terminate the current bilateral agreement. DHHS agreed to participate in an interagency discussion led by the State Department to explore ideas for future bilateral health cooperation with the GOS that would be of benefit to the Asia Pacific Region and to plan for the next five years of engagement. The other part of the interagency discussion would focus on a review of the REDI Center to determine whether it has effectively assisted the USG and the GOS with meeting the goals and objectives in the bilateral agreement and to determine if there is any USG interest in working with the Center. The interagency discussion should first focus on planning for the next five years of engagement and determining if there should be any changes in priorities and goals before discussing and how REDI is equipped to assist the USG and the GOS in the future. ¶14. (C) Dr. Miller agreed with DepSec Goh that appointing proxy USG representatives to the BOG would not be beneficial and assured DepSec Goh that there are plenty of qualified USG candidates to serve on the BOG for the REDI and there are several options that the USG can explore. The USG would only nominate qualified senior level USG representatives to serve on the BOG. Additional Background on the REDI Center -------------- ¶15. (SBU) If USG offices have specific questions about the REDI Center, they can contact: Econoffs - Ulla Saleh at SalehUR@state.gov (through April 15 only) and Peter Thorin (ThorinPD@state.gov); and/or OGHA officers - Dr. Daniel Miller at Daniel.Miller@hhs.gov and Dr. Adrienne Goodrich-Doctor at Adrienne.Goodrich-Doctor@hhs.gov. Additional background may be found on the REDI Center's Website at http://www.redi.org.sg ¶16. (U) DHHS cleared this cable. SHIELDS Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm

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