SHANGHAI ECONOMISTS PREDICT RESUMPTION OF GRADUAL RMB

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000026 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM NSC FOR MEDEIROS, LOI, SHRIER STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD/WINTER/MCCARTIN/KATZ/MAIN USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, SZYMANSKI, MAC/OCEA TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA -- DOHNER/HAARSAGER/WINSHIP TREASURY FOR IMFP -- SOBEL/CUSHMAN STATE PASS CEA FOR BLOCK STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK MANILA FOR ADB USED PARIS FOR US/OECD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PGOV CH SUBJECT: SHANGHAI ECONOMISTS PREDICT RESUMPTION OF GRADUAL RMB APPRECIATION ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Shanghai economists told visiting Embassy Beijing Economic Minister Counselor that the current global economic climate has led to Central Government policy paralysis on several critical issues, including currency appreciation and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, as Beijing continues to focus its efforts on maintaining economic stability. In 2010, as China's exports return to normal, economists predict that the renminbi (RMB) will resume its gradual appreciation to 3-5 percent/year and that inflation will also rise to 3-5 percent. SOE reform will continue to be delayed until a new unforeseen crisis forces change. End Summary. =================================== RMB APPRECIATION MAY RESUME Q2 2010 =================================== ¶2. (SBU) In a February 20 roundtable with Embassy Beijing Minister Counselor for Economics Bill Weinstein, local academics noted that the current global economic climate had led to Central Government policy paralysis on several key issues, including currency appreciation and SOE reform. Professor XU Mingqi of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, said that the Chinese Government realized that the RMB needed to increase in value and was looking for a "calm moment" to resume its gradual appreciation. Xu predicted that once China's exports returned to "normal" growth rates, possibly as soon as March or April 2010, the RMB would resume its steady pre-crisis appreciation rate of 3-5 percent per year. (Note: Xu implied that China's export growth average of nearly 28 percent from China's WTO entry until 2008 was "normal." End note.) Xu stressed that there would not be a major one-off adjustment due to the negative impact such a move would have on exporters and the likelihood that a sudden appreciation would lead to even greater inflows of speculative capital. Professor ZHANG Zehui of the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong (CELAP),was slightly more cautious, stressing that RMB appreciation would further harm the already battered export sector, making appreciation politically difficult. ============================= INFLATION 3-5 PERCENT IN 2010 ============================= ¶3. (SBU) While the economists all believed that inflation as measured by China's consumer price index (CPI) will increase moderately in 2010, they differed on degree. Xu emphasized that the Central Government viewed growth, not inflation, as its main policy target and that, given the uncertain economic climate, the PBOC would be reluctant to use extreme monetary tightening to bring inflation under control. Therefore, Xu predicted inflation would hit 5 percent this year, although, he acknowledged this figure was on the high end of the consensus, making him a bit of an outlier. Xu added that rising price levels will have the same economic effect as RMB appreciation by making Chinese products more expensive overseas, and that the SHANGHAI 00000026 002 OF 003 Chinese leadership therefore prefers to use a combination of appreciation and inflation to gradually revalue the RMB. Professor XI Junyang of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, agreed that 2010 would see modest inflationary pressures building and predicted that CPI will rise to 3 percent in 1H 2010, accelerating to 3-4 percent in the second-half of the year. Xi stressed that China had been through several inflationary periods since beginning economic reforms thirty years ago and the government had learned its lesson: maintaining a stable price level is critical. Professor Xi cited the PBOC's January 12, 2010 decision to raise banks' required reserve ratios by 0.50 percentage points as proof, adding that the move was "beyond [his] expectations." ¶4. (SBU) The economists downplayed the likelihood of additional stimulus beyond what was previously announced in 2010. Xu noted that in 2009, while the Central Government announced RMB1.5 trillion in spending on stimulus projects, local governments announced as much as 10 times this amount and simply did not have the capacity or resources to issue more stimulus this year. The Central Government's current monetary and fiscal tightening makes a large additional stimulus program just as unlikely. ¶5. (SBU) Professor Xu noted that unemployment in Shanghai, while not as much of a high-profile issue as inflation, is also a major concern for the municipal government. He stated that while the official unemployment rate is 4.3 percent, this does not count some groups, such as migrant workers and "laid off" (xia gang) industrial workers. In actuality, Shanghai's unemployment could be as high as 10 percent. In addition, underemployment remains a real concern, particularly among recent university graduates who are unable to find decent jobs. Xu agreed with the widely-held view that China needs to maintain growth rates of 8-9 percent/year in order to create enough new jobs to offset large numbers of new entrants into the workforce, as many as 10mn/year. ================ SOE REFORM DEAD? ================ ¶6. (SBU) The economists broadly agreed on the difficulty of carrying out SOE reform in the current economic climate. According to Xu, reform is not an urgent agenda item because the government is completely focused on maintaining economic stability, and that, short of a major crisis to catalyze action, SOE reform was inconceivable. Professor Xi agreed, noting that all of the easy steps towards reform had already been taken. Xi said that in addition to being stuck in an economic environment that was not conducive to reform, the government lacked incentives: SOE reform will strip local governments of revenue streams and deny local officials important levers of power. Nevertheless, over the long term, Xi believed the continuous financial drain of thousands of hugely inefficient SOEs on government coffers, might force change. Xi also postulated that the government may sell off SOEs as a way to finance social security programs. SHANGHAI 00000026 003 OF 003 =========== REBALANCING =========== ¶7. (SBU) China's ability to rebalance its economy in the coming years drew mixed reviews. Current economic uncertainty makes bold reform difficult and the threat of a deteriorating trade relationship with the United States may galvanize Beijing's unwillingness to take additional steps towards rebalancing. Professor Xu pointed out that recent safeguards and anti-dumping cases had soured prospects for reform, and expressed concern that this could be the beginning of a trend, particularly if special interest groups in the United States filed additional 421 special safeguards cases. These actions would almost certainly lead to retaliation by China, he said. ¶8. (SBU) Specific rebalancing measures, such as the 2009 program to subsidize the purchase of white-goods in the countryside, were not particularly effective, according to Professor Zhang. She stressed that many Chinese were still simply too poor to become the type of large-scale consumer that could drive GDP growth. Zhang predicted that consumption would remain a minor driver of GDP growth for many years. Professor Xu expected 2010 GDP to be fueled by "40-50 percent investment, 20 percent exports and 30 percent consumption." ¶9. (SBU) Econ MinCoun Weinstein has cleared this cable. CAMP