A/S CAMPBELL'S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000187 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF JP CH KN KS SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH ROK DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEE YONG-JOON Classified By: EAP A/S Kurt Campbell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a February 3 meeting with EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon dismissed ROK press speculation that a North-South summit was imminent. Lee related that veteran DPRK Six-Party Talks negotiator Kim Gye-gwan would visit China week of February 8, and speculated Kim Jong-il would go to the PRC in March. Lee, who had just returned from Beijing, said he and his Japanese and Chinese counterparts agreed to establish a trilateral secretariat in Seoul next year; Lee would consult with his counterparts on U.S. participation as an observer. The DFM reassured Campbell that the ROKG remained committed to establishing a PRT in Afghanistan by July. Lee hoped the USG would "take into consideration" the overall security situation on the Korean peninsula as the date for OPCON transfer to Korea drew nearer. According to Lee, the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP) was instrumental in the smooth implementation of the Camp Hialeah return; the ROKG hoped to use it for future base returns. Lee claimed that open-ended strategic flexibility "jeopardized" an important aspect of ROK security: a strong U.S. military presence on the peninsula. The ROKG's preference is that this year's "2 plus 2" meeting (between Secretaries Clinton and Gates and their ROK counterparts) be held in Seoul during the first half of the year. End Summary. DFM Lee: On Prospects for North-South Summit -------------- ¶2. (C) During a February 3 meeting with EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon dismissed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Lee stressed that if a summit happened, the North Korean nuclear issue would be a key element. Kim Gye-gwan's visit to China -------------- ¶3. (C) Lee, who had just returned from Beijing, related that veteran DPRK Six-Party Talks negotiator Kim Gye-gwan would visit China the week of February 8. Lee said that, according to his PRC interlocutors, Kim accepted the invitation only after intense Chinese lobbying. Lee speculated that a trip by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the PRC would occur in March. China-Japan-ROK Trilateral -------------- ¶4. (C) Commenting about his visit to Beijing, Lee said he and his Japanese and Chinese counterparts agreed to establish a trilateral secretariat in Seoul next year. The deputy foreign ministers would meet again in April to "tee up" deliverables for a May 2010 summit on Cheju island. According to Lee, the institutionalized Japan-ROK-PRC summit integrated more than fifty on-going meetings with China and Japan and created positive momentum for the East Asian Community. He asserted the establishment of the secretariat in 2011 will prompt Seoul to play a more active role in regional architecture. Responding to a question from A/S Campbell, Lee said he would consult with his counterparts on participation of the United States as an observer once the secretariat is established. ¶5. (C) DFM Lee observed that the Chinese way of conducting business had changed greatly. In the past, he noted, Chinese foreign ministry officials never diverted from reading talking points and "playing it safe"; now, Lee said, Chinese diplQats were "eager participants" in free flowing discussions. Afghanistan PRT -------------- ¶6. (C) Lee noted that the Afghanistan PRT bill would go forward to the National Assembly this month, and assured Campbell that the ROKG was committed to establishing a PRT "under any circumstances" by July. Even if the construction of the PRT base could not be completed, the troops would nonetheless deploy and stay temporarily at Bagram airbase. OPCON Transfer -------------- ¶7. (C) While noting that he respected the decision to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to Korea in April 2012 and that the process was on track, Lee said he nonetheless hoped the USG would "take into consideration" the overall security situation on the Korean peninsula as the handover date drew nearer. A/S Campbell praised the ROK military's capability, and assured Lee that OPCON transfer would be well coordinated between the ROK and United States. Base Returns -------------- ¶8. (C) Lee affirmed that base returns were on the "right track," noting the "extremely sensitive" but successful transfer of Busan's Camp Hialeah in January. According to Lee, the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP) was instrumental in the smooth implementation of the Hialeah return; the ROKG hoped to use it for future returns. Director General for North American Affairs Chang Ho-jin seconded Lee's comments about the positive role of the JEAP. Chang called for the ROK and the United States to use similar scientific criteria and an agreed "scenario" (i.e. an agreement on what condition property should be in as it is returned) to "narrow the gap" between the two sides during future environmental risk assessments at former U.S. bases. and Strategic Flexibility/ "2 plus 2" -------------- ¶9. (C) When the ROK agreed to the principles of strategic flexibility in 2006, it had not agreed to "open-ended" strategic flexibility, Lee said. The open-ended arrangement, which allowed U.S. troops based in Korea to be deployed elsewhere, "jeopardized" an important aspect of ROK security: a strong U.S. military presence on the peninsula. Lee suggested that bilateral consultations should be held to determine a guaranteed minimum level of U.S. military presence in South Korea, in the context of strategic flexibility. ¶10. (C) The deputy foreign minister said it was the ROKG's preference that this year's 2 plus 2 meeting (between Secretaries Clinton and Gates and their ROK counterparts) be held in Seoul during the first half of 2010. Lee added that it would be useful to hold annual or biennial "2 plus 2" meetings at the Assistant Secretary level. Such consultations could cover issues like strategic flexibility, OPCON transfer, instability planning, and other Alliance issues. STEPHENS