BOSNIA: PDASD MCMILLAN'S MEETING WITH BIH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000123 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 TAGS: PREL MARR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: PDASD MCMILLAN'S MEETING WITH BIH PRESIDENCY Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On January 28, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph McMillan met with Bosnian Tri-Presidency Chairman Zeljko Komsic and Tri-Presidency Member Nebojsa Radmanovic. During the meeting, PDASD McMillan explained that Bosnia did not receive an invitation for NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) in December in large part due to Allies' concerns that Bosnia's leadership is unable to reach timely decisions on key defense issues -- a critical flaw for a member of a consensus organization. PDASD stressed that MAP remains available to Bosnia. The U.S. will continue to support Bosnia on its path to NATO integration, but its political leadership must demonstrate that Bosnia can be a credible and decisive partner. Presidency Chairman Komsic and President Radmanovic acknowledged that Bosnia had not fulfilled the requirements for MAP, but argued that the country should nonetheless be granted MAP in order to ensure internal stability. PDASD McMillan explained that internal stability is a prerequisite for, rather than a goal of, NATO membership. End summary. ¶2. (C) Chairman Komsic thanked the U.S. Government, Department of Defense and Maryland National Guard for their assistance with Bosnia's defense reform. He apologized for President Haris Silajdzic's absence, citing a conflicting commitment. ¶3. (C) PDASD McMillan explained he was in Sarajevo to lead the Second Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDCs) between the United States and Bosnia. McMillan reiterated that while Bosnian leadership should be proud of the defense reforms implemented thus far, a great deal remains to be done. He emphasized that progress on outstanding defense reform issues was a necessary, though not sufficient, step towards a NATO MAP. McMillan clarified that, while he expected to address outstanding defense reform issues with Minister of Defense Selmo Cikotic during the BDCs and offer strong USG support, there were many issues that cannot be resolved at the defense level and require action from Bosnia's political leadership. ¶4. (C) McMillan assured the Tri-Presidency that NATO MAP remains on the table for Bosnia and U.S. commitment to see Bosnia as a NATO member is unwavering. He stressed, however, that NATO, as a consensus organization, needs decisive partners. He explained that Bosnia did not receive a MAP invitation in December due in large part to Allies' concerns that Bosnia's leadership is unable to make timely decisions on key defense issues. PDASD McMillan cited two examples of this indecisiveness: the persistent lack of an agreement on defense property issues and the failure to determine which ISAF deployment offer to accept. PDASD emphasized that it was not necessary for Bosnia to deploy to Afghanistan to become a member of NATO -- a number of NATO Allies are not deployed there. It was necessary, however, to show Allies that Bosnia can make a decision on the deployment. ¶5. (C) President Radmanovic lamented the Allies' decision to deny Bosnia-Herzegovina's MAP application and called the failure to gain entry into MAP a stain on the Tri-Presidency's work. He expressed concern that the decision not to grant MAP was fueling rising anti-NATO sentiment in parts of the country and urged the U.S. to support Bosnia's MAP application in order to counter this growing skepticism. ¶6. (C) President Komsic argued that Bosnian leadership was not indecisive and had already determined that Bosnia would send forces to Afghanistan -- but had not yet determined the specifics of the deployment. Komsic explained that a co-deployment offer from the UK had only recently surfaced and required evaluation before a final deployment decision could be made. Komsic also explained that the Presidency had asked Minister Cikotic to deliver a concrete proposal on immovable property by the end of February and stressed that it was necessary to ensure the inventory accurately described the existing properties. McMillan replied that Komsic's explanation of both issues simply reinforced the point that Bosnia could not come to closure on important defense SARAJEVO 00000123 002 OF 002 decisions. ¶7. (C) Komsic acknowledged that Bosnia had not fulfilled MAP requirements and agreed with the 2009 NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan assessment's conclusion that politics in Bosnia hindered progress. He argued that the Tri-Presidency was not solely responsible for this situation because much depended on the actions of Parliament and political parties. Komsic nonetheless insisted that Bosnia should be granted a Membership Action Plan because it had invested a great deal of effort pursuing MAP and because NATO membership was critical to the existence of the country and to regional security. The Chairman argued that while he understood the Allies' trepidation regarding the ability of three presidents to render decisions, Bosnia needed NATO more than countries like Croatia and Albania because of the greater threat of violence in Bosnia. ¶8. (C) PDASD McMillan acknowledged that many viewed NATO membership as critical to the internal security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but stressed that internal stability was a condition, not a goal, of NATO membership. He agreed with President Komsic's statement that security in the Balkans was not guaranteed until Bosnia was incorporated into Euro-Atlantic institutions and stated that he would deliver to Washington the message that Bosnian leadership remains committed to pursing reforms. ¶9. (U) PDASD McMillan has cleared this cable. ENGLISH