BOSNIA: MAINTAINING U.S. COMMAND OF NATO HQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000121 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019 TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA: MAINTAINING U.S. COMMAND OF NATO HQ SARAJEVO IS CRITICAL Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) I have for two-and-a-half years argued that the U.S. needs to maintain leadership of the NATO HQ in Sarajevo, both to show strong U.S. committment to the stability and security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to provide firm leadership, in partnership with the Embassy, in promoting and guiding Bosnia's still incomplete efforts at defense reform. This is especially important as the international community debates the future of Dayton's civilian oversight structure, the Office of the High Representative, whose waning efficacy raises doubt about the international community's commitment to Bosnia's future. USMC BG John Bullard, first as Deputy Commander and now as Commander, restored U.S. leadership to this critical mission. To my surprise, he is slated to leave in May/June 2010, less than six months after having assumed command. The U.S. command billet runs through January 2011. It is essential, as a matter of U.S. leadership here, that we retain command of NATO HQ Sarajevo, and at a flag level. I respectfully urge the Joint Staff to identify a successor for the position of NATO HQ Sarajevo Commander when Bullard leaves, as the U.S. maintains command until January 2011. Additionally, we should commit now to maintain command of NATO HQ Sarajevo in the next flags-to-post. End summary. ¶2. (C/NF) Over the past two years, Bosnia has stumbled from one political crisis to another and made little progress towards its putative goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, which is the cornerstone of our strategy for ensuring that Bosnia's still deep ethnic divides do not become a source of political instability or conflict in the region. Statements and actions by the leadership of the Republika Srpska have sought to delegitimize and undermine the state and raise profound questions about their commitment to Bosnia's (RS) territorial integrity. It is no coincidence that Republika Srpska leaders have also been the loudest advocates for drawing down the international community's presence in Bosnia (including the closure of OHR) and urging that the traditional leadership role the of U.S. be assumed by the Europeans. RS politicians view Europeans as more pliable -- a view reinforced by weaker EU positions on our recent joint U.S.-EU push for reforms, as well as their experience in negotiating police reform with the EU in 2007-8. ¶3. (C/NF) We must work now to assign a General/Flag Officer to replace Bullard immediately upon his departure, and commit now to maintaining the command of NATO HQ in 2011. NATO's role in ending the war, and NATO HQ's success in implementing defense reform and forging a unified armed forces in Bosnia -- one of the only bright spots in the reform agenda since Dayton -- give it a credibility that EUFOR (and European leadership in general) lack in Bosnia. Our credibility has always been related to the fact that NATO and defense reform have had an American face. Bosnians remember that it was NATO under U.S. command, in support of vigorous bilateral U.S. diplomacy, that ended the war in 1995. Now that we have reestablished U.S. command at NATO HQ, having a gap in that command or losing the command in the next flags-to-post would reduce our ability to leverage NATO's influence in Bosnia, reinforce the growing perception that the international community -- and particularly the United States -- is heading for the door. This would damage our ability to lock-in continuing demands of the defense reform agenda and move Bosnia towards NATO membership. The creation of a single, multi-ethnic Armed Forces has always been a U.S.-led and resourced project and has laid the foundation for Bosnia's invitation to join Partnership for Peace, begin Intensified Dialogue, participate in the Multinational Force in Iraq, and contribute an ethnically integrated deployment, we hope in the coming year, to ISAF. Finishing defense reform is critical to locking Bosnia on its Euro-Atlantic path. American leadership, within NATO HQ's mandate, of defense reform is crucial. ¶4. (C/NF) Over the past 14 years the U.S. has made a SARAJEVO 00000121 002 OF 002 substantial investment in Bosnia. These investments have been essential to securing our interests here, in the Balkan region, and more broadly, in strengthening Euro-Atlantic values. The deteriorating political situation over the past two years has showed that our accomplishments here remain fragile. A drawdown in the international presence or the failure of international institutions to provide effective leadership of the reform agenda can lead to a roll back of the reform process and an upswing in interethnic tensions. Given Bosnia's current political trajectory and the European Union's inability to drive reform, I believe it is imperative for the U.S. to keep leadership of the defense reform process. It was for these reasons we sought to restore U.S. leadership of NATO HQ Sarajevo. Now that we have reassumed command, we must make sure that we maintain the post and, with it, U.S. committment to leader Bosnia's defense reform process and support Bosnia's progress on its Euro-Atlantic path as its only option. ENGLISH