C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000039

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16
TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: AFTER GOVERNMENT 22 BAHMAN 'WIN,' NOW WHAT?

REF: 10 RPO DUBAI 33; 10 RPO DUBAI 6

CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Pennypacker, Consular Officer, DOS, IRPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran's much-hyped February 11 anniversary
celebration was cast by both the Islamic government and the 'Green
Path Opposition' (GPO) as a potentially decisive day in their
series of escalating confrontations. Although the day did not match
such hyperbolic rhetoric, the IRIG did demonstrate its ability to
control the event via both its rolling campaign of arrests and
intimidation before February 11 and a substantial security presence
during the day itself. Disrupting President Ahmadinejad's keynote
address at Tehran's Azadi Square had been the GPO's main tactical
objective, but there were minimal if any interruptions in the
speech, and Iranian television proudly broadcast footage (some
real, some possibly canned) of perhaps hundreds of thousands of
pro-regime Iranians demonstrating their support for the government
during the day. Some opposition members did gather at and near
Azadi Square in spite of the IRIG's warnings, but their numbers
were not significant in relation to both regime supporters (many of
whom either bussed in or came out for the various free handouts)
and to the assembled security forces. Post-11 February, regime
leaders issued triumphant statements indicating that the Iranian
people with their overwhelming presence had dealt a decisive blow
to the 'American sedition,' while many GPO activists sought to put
the best face on the day while also questioning GPO strategy and
tactics and decrying the lack of effective leadership. END
SUMMARY.




2. (SBU) Since the December 27 'Ashura' demonstrations both the
regime and the Green Path Opposition (GPO) focused on the Islamic
Rebublic's February 11 anniversary celebration (22 Bahman' in
Iran's calendar), with the latter hoping to disrupt and co-opt this
regime showcase as a sign of its own popular support. After Ashura
the IRIG significantly stepped up its intimidation campaign,
arresting hundreds of opposition supporters, sentencing several
Ashura-day protesters to death, and executing two political
detainees. Many opposition figures proclaimed that 'millions' of
'Greens' would attend Iran's February 11 anni

versary celebration in
Tehran, overwhelming security forces and disrupting President
Ahmadinejad's keynote address. However, the government's crowd
control efforts proved far more successful (reftel), and most agree
that the GPO failed to make its mark on the event. The official
ceremony was largely uninterrupted and Iranian television broadcast
footage of perhaps hundreds of thousands of Iranians on hand for
the speech in Azadi Sqaure.




3. (SBU) Available evidence indicates that limited numbers of the
opposition did gather in and near Azadi Square, though their
numbers were lower than during past protest days. An IRPO contact
who attended the demonstrations near Azadi Square said that those
on hand were less confrontational, less cohesive, and less willing
to overtly show green or chant anti-regime slogans. Indeed, reports
indicate security forces aggressively confronted anyone with green
paraphernalia and otherwise dispersed crowds, even without
resorting to lethal means. Opposition leaders Mehdi Karrubi,
Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Mousavi were similarly confronted
and routed after attempting to participate in the march. Karrubi
allegedly suffered injuries from the attack, during which his son
Ali and others were also arrested. Karrubi's wife Fatemeh, herself
a former deputy minister and current political activist,
subsequently wrote a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei complaining
of the 'torture' inflicted on her son Ali during his detention.
Ex-President Khatami's brother Mohammad Reza, a former Majlis
representative and head of Iran's major reformist political party,
was temporarily arrested along with his wife, Ayatollah Khomeini's
granddaughter. The total number of those detained is unclear.




4. (C) After the fact, GPO elements have expressed a variety of
opinions regarding 22 Bahman. The more perfervid suggest the
opposition itself was responsible for the large turnout at Azadi
Square or instead claim victory from the number of security forces
and intimidation necessary to subdue the opposition, deeming the
government victory 'pyrrhic' or 'hollow.' Expatriate GPO leaders
sought to put the best face on the day's events, with IRPO GPO

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contacts arguing that the regime's massive security turnout was an
indicator of its fear of the GPO and that the GPO showing in the
face of the unparalleled security presence was itself a GPO
victory, as was the lack of GPO casualties. An IRPO contact who has
participated in most of the demonstrations since the election
similarly argued that opposition's inability to take Azadi Square
was not a 'defeat' for the opposition because it had never been
within the realm of possibility given the government's crowd
control abilities.




5. (C) However, more realistic GPOers admit to post 22 Bhaman anger
and demoralization. Some criticized the pre-22 Bahman hyperbole
which they argue set unrealistically high expectations for the day.
In this regard, some Iran-based opposition supporters speak of
widespread anger with 'expat Greens' who from the safety of Europe
and North America set an impossibly high bar for oppositionists on
the ground, thus skewing interpretations of the day's events and
demoralizing GPO supporters.




6. (C) Another significant GPO complaint was the 'Trojan Horse'
strategy, whereby GPO marchers were to hide their green GPO symbols
until they were on the main axis of the Tehran march or in Azadi
Square. The consensus was that many 'Greens' in the February 11
crowd were too cowed by the extensive security presence to manifest
their true colors, especially when so few others in the crowd were
so doing and when the few who did so were immediately immobilized
by security. This reluctance created a dynamic where GPO marchers
were waiting for others to 'show their green' before they did so.
(COMMENT: The actual number of GPO marchers in the Azadi Square
crowd is unknown. END COMMENT).




7. (SBU) Many oppositionists have cited the day's failure as due to
a lack of effective GPO leadership. The GPO's current leadership
in Iran - Karrubi, Mousavi, and Khatami - has not directly
commented on 22 Bahman after the fact. Karrubi in a February 13
interview with the Sunday Telegraph said that he and Mousavi would
meet this week and announce a joint plan. He maintained that the
opposition would seek permission to hold future demonstrations but
without such permission they would devise alternative means of
outreach to their supporters. Khatami and Mousavi have not
released any statements since 11 February.




8. (SBU) For the government's part, there are no indications that
the regime thought its putative February 11 victory in any way
'hollow' or 'pyrrhic.' The full array of government officials
proclaimed the day a triumph of 'national unity,' with
pro-government reports made reference to '50 million' turnout
nationwide in support of the government, with five million of those
in Tehran. Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a statement thanking the
Iranian people for their participation, saying that "the presence
of tens of millions of perceptive and motivated people"...was
sufficient for the rebels and those deceived in Iran, who
hypocritically speak of 'the people,' to come to their senses."
The Armed Forces Joint Staff, The IRGC, and even Greater Tehran's
IRGC 'Rasulollah' unit issued congratulatory statements ascribing
the day's epic victory to 'the people.' Hardline conservative
'Kayhan' newspaper took special delight in relaying the days'
events in describing how Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami each were
repulsed in their efforts to join the demonstration by ordinary
Iranian marchers shouting slogans like 'death to the hypocrites.'




9. (C) COMMENT: Since the opposition adopted the strategy of
co-opting national holidays late last summer, the government has
continuously recalibrated its efforts to deter visible
anti-government demonstrations without resorting to a level of
violence that would 'test' the security forces or potentially
engender a significant backlash against the regime. For 22 Bahman,
it appears the government succeeded in finding the right balance of
intimidation and force to effectively neutralize the opposition.
Nevertheless, the government's 'victory' on 22 Bahman is tactical,
not necessarily strategic, and though quiescent in the face of
government brutality, it is doubtless the case that significant

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swaths of the population continue to oppose this regime in greater
or lesser degree. The options for channeling this opposition into
effective (or even visible) actions, however, remain unclear.
Furthermore, the IRIG, having learned that it can neutralize the
opposition on these 'remebrance days,' will now be less likely to
contemplate compromise at either the elite or popular level. END
COMMENT.
EYRE