IRAN: 22 BAHMAN - TAKING IT TO THE STREETS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000033 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10 TAGS: PGOV IR SUBJECT: IRAN: 22 BAHMAN - TAKING IT TO THE STREETS CLASSIFIED BY: Kathleen McGowan, Political Officer, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Iranian government and the 'Green Path Opposition' (GPO) February 11 will once again face-off on the streets of Tehran and other cities as the country commemorates the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. On this holiday, the Iranian equivalent of our own Fourth of July, each side will attempt to outnumber the other on the streets of Tehran, with much focus on the main east-west 'Azadi/Enqelab-e Eslami' street that bisects central Tehran and leads to the vast Azadi ('Freedom') Square in West Central Tehran, where President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to deliver the day's keynote address. Since the violent December 27 'Ashura' clashes the government has worked doggedly to deter potential future protests through both intimidation and sweeping preemptive arrests. Regime officials are already implementing the now-familiar steps of disrupting Internet, SMS and telephone services, cordoning off key arteries used to access Azadi Square, and are reportedly installing security cameras and loudspeakers throughout the vicinity. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY (CONT): For its part, the GPO's February 11 goals are to flood the streets with identifiable supporters as a show of strength, demonstrating that the Iranian people do not support the status quo and seek change, however ill-defined. Tactically, the GPO will seek to both document their large numbers by pictures and video for transmission abroad, and to force the government "off script" by co-opting if not disrupting the carefully orchestrated ceremonies. Though the GPO organization remains decentralized, the titular leadership - Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami - have sought to reinsert themselves into the popular movement with strong statements exhorting supporters to come out in defense of their rights and the 'original goals' of the Revolution. Expectations for tomorrow on each side are high, with some regime extremists seeing the day as "the final nail in the seditionists' coffin" and at least some oppositionists seeing it as the start of regime collapse. However, no one knows or can know what will happen. Despite predictions of drastic change and definitive victories, it is more likely that the day's events will not be decisive for either side. END SUMMMARY. 22nd of Bahman: "Victory Day" �00A;¶3. (SBU) The Islamic Republic's anniversary celebration typically pairs revolutionary bombast with obligatory 'massive' public gatherings. Demonstrations occur throughout Iran, culminating in Tehran with the day's showcase, a presidential address in Tehran's vast Azadi (Freedom) Square. Ahmadinejad's past speeches have hit predictable themes: in 2006 he praised the Revolution for "saving Iran from the Shah's tyranny"; in 2007 he championed Iran's nuclear rights; in 2008 he proclaimed Iran had "broken the back of Global Arrogance"; and in 2009 he announced Iran had become a "true and genuine superpower." Footage of past national day ceremonies in Azadi Square show significant attendance, albeit questionable fervor. (NOTE: Azadi Square was the site of the massive demonstration three days after the election; photos of the white marble "Freedom Tower" in the center of the Square surrounded by well over one million peaceful protestors have become iconic images of the Green Movement.) For this year's public Tehran '22 Bahman' ceremonies the 'Islamic Propaganda Coordinating Council,' responsible for the day's events, has announced that there will be seven main marching routes, each procession starting at 9:30 AM at a prominent mosque and heading towards Azadi Square in West-Central Tehran, with the main marching route being along the east-west Azadi Street that bisects Central Tehran. ¶4. (C) Before each national holiday targeted by the GPO for public demonstrations, the government has intensified its efforts to neutralize and intimidate would-be protesters. Though the regime has consistently used detention to silence critics of the June 12 Presidential election, credible reports from IRPO contacts suggest the ongoing wave of arrests since the December 27 Ashura day violence is the most sweeping since the days immediately following the disputed poll. Since Ashura (December 27),word of dozens of new arrests has filtered out of Iran daily. In addition to targeting the 'usual suspects' - journalists, student leaders, artists, civil society and human rights activists - the government DUBAI 00000033 002 OF 003 has widened its net, detaining many ordinary citizens suspected only of participating in past protests. According to a knowledgeable Tehran-based journalist, hundreds of arrests over recent weeks have gone unreported. At the same time, the regime has stepped up the pace of judicial trials, levied capital offense charges against purported protestors, and - most ominously - executed two dissidents with threats of more hangings to follow. ¶5. (SBU) As February 11 draws closer, regime officials are already implementing the now-familiar steps of disrupting Internet, SMS and telephone services, and cordoning off key arteries used to access Azadi Square. Communications Minister Reza Taghipour announced February 7 that 'damage' to the fiber optic network will impair Iran's Internet connectivity for several days, but should be repaired "early next week." According to wire service reports, he also acknowledged that text messaging in Iran had been disrupted this week due to "software updates." ¶6. (SBU) Reportedly the Tehran Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) has divided the ten kilometer main parade route from Imam Hossein to Azadi Square into operational sections, with Basij forces from major Iranian cities deployed to Tehran each responsible for one section. Additionally the Tehran traffic department has announced traffic curfews in areas around West Central Tehran. And, for the first time, the regime has placed loudspeakers all along the ten-kilometer long main parade route, from Azadi Square to Imam Hossein Square, reportedly to 'drown out' any oppositionist chants with amplified pro-government chants. ¶7. (SBU) The government is also employing gentler tactics to defuse protests. This year, the government has taken advantage of 22 Bahman falling on a Thursday (the last day of the workweek) and a religious holiday on the other side of the weekend to declare a long holiday, in hopes that many potential protestors will leave town. Indeed, travel agents say flights out of Iran this weekend are fully booked. ¶8. (SBU) With such extensive efforts to diminish the opposition turnout, the government is clearly trying to deliver a 'knockout blow' to the GPO. LEF Deputy Commander Radan recently said as much: on 18 Bahman he said that the 'Iranian people on 22 Bahman will hammer the last nail in the insurrectionists' coffin.' Similarly, the opposition website Rah-e Sabz on February 10 reported that the Intelligence Ministry is sending text messages claiming that '22 Bahman will be the day of the insurrectionists' destruction.' The Opposition Targets Azadi Square ¶9. (C) The January 28 executions appear to have energized Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karrubi, and former President Khatami, who had made some tactical conciliatory gestures to the regime after the Ashura protests erupted in violence. All three men sharply condemned the executions and have since issued increasingly strident criticisms of the regime, culminating in direct appeals for participation in 22 Bahman events. This, following Supreme Leader Khamenei's mid-January directive to Iran's political figures to "choose sides," suggests any much-bruited 'elite compromise' remains a long way off. ¶10. (C) For its part, the GPO's February 11 goals are to flood the streets with identifiable supporters as a show of strength, demonstrating that the Iranian people do not support the status quo and seek change, however ill-defined. Tactically, the GPO will seek to both document their large numbers by pictures and video for transmission abroad, and to force the government "off script" by co-opting if not disrupting the carefully orchestrated ceremonies. As in the past before other protest occasions, grass-roots DUBAI 00000033 003 OF 003 oppositionists have distributed planned protest routes, suggested slogans via the Internet, and are reportedly trying to rally the movement's latent support to join the cause. (COMMENT: IRPO contacts have discounted the importance of such routes, saying that many protesters choose their own routes based on circumstances they encounter. END COMMENT) A best-case scenario for the GPO is one where its supporters are able to converge on Azadi Square during Ahmadinejad's planned speech and significantly outnumber those regime supporters on hand. ¶11. (C) Indications of the potential opposition turnout are mixed. When asked what he expected of the 22 Bahman protests, a Tehran-based professor said he thinks the protests will be quite large and explained, "The people are fed up. That's it." A couple from Esfahan said they had previously avoided attending protests due to the danger said that they now intend to demonstrate against the government on 22 Bahman, 'unless it becomes too dangerous.' At the same time, several visa applicants in Dubai from Tehran said that they would not participate in the protests because of the risks involved; one woman explained that she was unable to do so because she needed to take care of her parents. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Each of the past protest days has been a test of the opposition's staying power and in this regard, 22 Bahman is no different: the GPO maintains its relevance by turning out supporters in sufficiently large numbers to keep the government off-balance. Some contend however that events since late December portend a particularly violent confrontation on 22 Bahman. Some Ashura-day protesters responded to government violence in kind, setting off street clashes, in what observers said indicated demonstrators now longer feared security forces. Since Ashura, the regime has said repeatedly it would no longer tolerate street demonstrations. It executed two "dissidents" and signaled its intention to put even "ordinary" protesters to death or in jail for many years to intimidate would-be protestors. The competition between the government and the opposition to draw out supporters and pack Azadi Square does heighten the potential for violence between pro-government attendees and protesters in addition to clashes between security forces and the opposition. ¶13. (C) COMMENT (CONT): The media and some Iranians, responding to the potential for a dramatic showdown, have cast 22 Bahman as a 'do or die' moment for the GPO, while regime hardliners have vowed the crush the 'insurrection' at every level. But despite the heightened rhetoric from both sides, 22 Bahman is unlikely to significantly alter the dynamic between the regime and the GPO. If 22 Bahman unfolds in a manner similar to past protest days such as Qods Day or Ashura - thousands to tens of thousands oppositionists on the streets and sporadic clashes leaving a few dead - the stalemate between the opposition and the government will continue, the dynamic largely unchanged. Only if either the GPO cannot put significant numbers on the streets on the one hand, or on the other manages to mobilize millions, or if there is a significant increase in violence, will tomorrow's events significantly alter the current balance of power. END COMMENT. EYRE