C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000033

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10
TAGS: PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: 22 BAHMAN - TAKING IT TO THE STREETS

CLASSIFIED BY: Kathleen McGowan, Political Officer, DOS, IRPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Iranian government and the 'Green Path
Opposition' (GPO) February 11 will once again face-off on the
streets of Tehran and other cities as the country commemorates the
anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. On this holiday, the
Iranian equivalent of our own Fourth of July, each side will
attempt to outnumber the other on the streets of Tehran, with much
focus on the main east-west 'Azadi/Enqelab-e Eslami' street that
bisects central Tehran and leads to the vast Azadi ('Freedom')
Square in West Central Tehran, where President Ahmadinejad is
scheduled to deliver the day's keynote address. Since the violent
December 27 'Ashura' clashes the government has worked doggedly to
deter potential future protests through both intimidation and
sweeping preemptive arrests. Regime officials are already
implementing the now-familiar steps of disrupting Internet, SMS and
telephone services, cordoning off key arteries used to access Azadi
Square, and are reportedly installing security cameras and
loudspeakers throughout the vicinity.




2. (SBU) SUMMARY (CONT): For its part, the GPO's February 11 goals
are to flood the streets with identifiable supporters as a show of
strength, demonstrating that the Iranian people do not support the
status quo and seek change, however ill-defined. Tactically, the
GPO will seek to both document their large numbers by pictures and
video for transmission abroad, and to force the government "off
script" by co-opting if not disrupting the carefully orchestrated
ceremonies. Though the GPO organization remains decentralized, the
titular leadership - Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami - have sought to
reinsert themselves into the popular movement with strong
statements exhorting supporters to come out in defense of their
rights and the 'original goals' of the Revolution. Expectations for
tomorrow on each side are high, with some regime extremists seeing
the day as "the final nail in the seditionists' coffin" and at
least some oppositionists seeing it as the start of regime
collapse. However, no one knows or can know what will happen.
Despite predictions of drastic change and definitive victories, it
is more likely that the day's events will not be decisive for
either side.

END SUMMMARY.



22nd of Bahman: "Victory Day"




3. (SBU) The Islamic Republic's anniversary celebration typically
pairs revolutionary bombast with obligatory 'massive' public
gatherings. Demonstrations occur throughout Iran, culminating in
Tehran with the day's showcase, a presidential address in Tehran's
vast Azadi (Freedom) Square. Ahmadinejad's past speeches have hit
predictable themes: in 2006 he praised the Revolution for "saving
Iran from the Shah's tyranny"; in 2007 he championed Iran's nuclear
rights; in 2008 he proclaimed Iran had "broken the back of Global
Arrogance"; and in 2009 he announced Iran had become a "true and
genuine superpower." Footage of past national day ceremonies in
Azadi Square show significant attendance, albeit questionable
fervor. (NOTE: Azadi Square was the site of the massive
demonstration three days after the election; photos of the white
marble "Freedom Tower" in the center of the Square surrounded by
well over one million peaceful protestors have become iconic images
of the Green Movement.) For this year's public Tehran '22 Bahman'
ceremonies the 'Islamic Propaganda Coordinating Council,'
responsible for the day's events, has announced that there will be
seven main marching routes, each procession starting at 9:30 AM at
a prominent mosque and heading towards Azadi Square in West-Central
Tehran, with the main marching route being along the east-west
Azadi Street that bisects Central Tehran.




4. (C) Before each national holiday targeted by the GPO for public
demonstrations, the government has intensified its efforts to
neutralize and intimidate would-be protesters. Though the regime
has consistently used detention to silence critics of the June 12
Presidential election, credible reports from IRPO contacts suggest
the ongoing wave of arrests since the December 27 Ashura day
violence is the most sweeping since the days immediately following
the disputed poll. Since Ashura (December 27), word of dozens of
new arrests has filtered out of Iran daily. In addition to
targeting the 'usual suspects' - journalists, student leaders,
artists, civil society and human rights activists - the government

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has widened its net, detaining many ordinary citizens suspected
only of participating in past protests. According to a
knowledgeable Tehran-based journalist, hundreds of arrests over
recent weeks have gone unreported. At the same time, the regime
has stepped up the pace of judicial trials, levied capital offense
charges against purported protestors, and - most ominously -
executed two dissidents with threats of more hangings to follow.




5. (SBU) As February 11 draws closer, regime officials are already
implementing the now-familiar steps of disrupting Internet, SMS and
telephone services, and cordoning off key arteries used to access
Azadi Square. Communications Minister Reza Taghipour announced
February 7 that 'damage' to the fiber optic network will impair
Iran's Internet connectivity for several days, but should be
repaired "early next week." According to wire service reports, he
also acknowledged that text messaging in Iran had been disrupted
this week due to "software updates."




6. (SBU) Reportedly the Tehran Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) has
divided the ten kilometer main parade route from Imam Hossein to
Azadi Square into operational sections, with Basij forces from
major Iranian cities deployed to Tehran each responsible for one
section. Additionally the Tehran traffic department has announced
traffic curfews in areas around West Central Tehran. And, for the
first time, the regime has placed loudspeakers all along the
ten-kilometer long main parade route, from Azadi Square to Imam
Hossein Square, reportedly to 'drown out' any oppositionist chants
with amplified pro-government chants.




7. (SBU) The government is also employing gentler tactics to defuse
protests. This year, the government has taken advantage of 22
Bahman falling on a Thursday (the last day of the workweek) and a
religious holiday on the other side of the weekend to declare a
long holiday, in hopes that many potential protestors will leave
town. Indeed, travel agents say flights out of Iran this weekend
are fully booked.




8. (SBU) With such extensive efforts to diminish the opposition
turnout, the government is clearly trying to deliver a 'knockout
blow' to the GPO. LEF Deputy Commander Radan recently said as
much: on 18 Bahman he said that the 'Iranian people on 22 Bahman
will hammer the last nail in the insurrectionists' coffin.'
Similarly, the opposition website Rah-e Sabz on February 10
reported that the Intelligence Ministry is sending text messages
claiming that '22 Bahman will be the day of the insurrectionists'
destruction.'



The Opposition Targets Azadi Square




9. (C) The January 28 executions appear to have energized Mir
Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karrubi, and former President Khatami, who
had made some tactical conciliatory gestures to the regime after
the Ashura protests erupted in violence. All three men sharply
condemned the executions and have since issued increasingly
strident criticisms of the regime, culminating in direct appeals
for participation in 22 Bahman events. This, following Supreme
Leader Khamenei's mid-January directive to Iran's political figures
to "choose sides," suggests any much-bruited 'elite compromise'
remains a long way off.




10. (C) For its part, the GPO's February 11 goals are to flood the
streets with identifiable supporters as a show of strength,
demonstrating that the Iranian people do not support the status quo
and seek change, however ill-defined. Tactically, the GPO will
seek to both document their large numbers by pictures and video for
transmission abroad, and to force the government "off script" by
co-opting if not disrupting the carefully orchestrated ceremonies.
As in the past before other protest occasions, grass-roots

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oppositionists have distributed planned protest routes, suggested
slogans via the Internet, and are reportedly trying to rally the
movement's latent support to join the cause. (COMMENT: IRPO
contacts have discounted the importance of such routes, saying that
many protesters choose their own routes based on circumstances they
encounter. END COMMENT) A best-case scenario for the GPO is one
where its supporters are able to converge on Azadi Square during
Ahmadinejad's planned speech and significantly outnumber those
regime supporters on hand.




11. (C) Indications of the potential opposition turnout are mixed.
When asked what he expected of the 22 Bahman protests, a
Tehran-based professor said he thinks the protests will be quite
large and explained, "The people are fed up. That's it." A couple
from Esfahan said they had previously avoided attending protests
due to the danger said that they now intend to demonstrate against
the government on 22 Bahman, 'unless it becomes too dangerous.' At
the same time, several visa applicants in Dubai from Tehran said
that they would not participate in the protests because of the
risks involved; one woman explained that she was unable to do so
because she needed to take care of her parents.




12. (C) COMMENT: Each of the past protest days has been a test of
the opposition's staying power and in this regard, 22 Bahman is no
different: the GPO maintains its relevance by turning out
supporters in sufficiently large numbers to keep the government
off-balance. Some contend however that events since late December
portend a particularly violent confrontation on 22 Bahman. Some
Ashura-day protesters responded to government violence in kind,
setting off street clashes, in what observers said indicated
demonstrators now longer feared security forces. Since Ashura, the
regime has said repeatedly it would no longer tolerate street
demonstrations. It executed two "dissidents" and signaled its
intention to put even "ordinary" protesters to death or in jail for
many years to intimidate would-be protestors. The competition
between the government and the opposition to draw out supporters
and pack Azadi Square does heighten the potential for violence
between pro-government attendees and protesters in addition to
clashes between security forces and the opposition.




13. (C) COMMENT (CONT): The media and some Iranians, responding to
the potential for a dramatic showdown, have cast 22 Bahman as a 'do
or die' moment for the GPO, while regime hardliners have vowed the
crush the 'insurrection' at every level. But despite the
heightened rhetoric from both sides, 22 Bahman is unlikely to
significantly alter the dynamic between the regime and the GPO. If
22 Bahman unfolds in a manner similar to past protest days such as
Qods Day or Ashura - thousands to tens of thousands oppositionists
on the streets and sporadic clashes leaving a few dead - the
stalemate between the opposition and the government will continue,
the dynamic largely unchanged. Only if either the GPO cannot put
significant numbers on the streets on the one hand, or on the other
manages to mobilize millions, or if there is a significant increase
in violence, will tomorrow's events significantly alter the current
balance of power. END COMMENT.
EYRE