Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ROME97
2010-01-27 11:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
AFGHANISTAN: ITALY AGREES ON THE NEED TO AVOID
how-toVZCZCXRO9173 PP RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0097 0271123 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271123Z JAN 10 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3186 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0577 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0443 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3998 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4227 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3074 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000097
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR/RPM FOR AARON COPE
S/SRAP FOR JARRETT BLANC
SCA FOR TOM GRAMAGLIA AND CAROLYN COBERLY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY AGREES ON THE NEED TO AVOID
TALK OF EXIT STRATEGY
REF: A. STATE 4108
B. ROME 83
C. STATE 6355
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor J. Liam Wasley for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000097
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR/RPM FOR AARON COPE
S/SRAP FOR JARRETT BLANC
SCA FOR TOM GRAMAGLIA AND CAROLYN COBERLY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY AGREES ON THE NEED TO AVOID
TALK OF EXIT STRATEGY
REF: A. STATE 4108
B. ROME 83
C. STATE 6355
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor J. Liam Wasley for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) The Ambassador raised Ref A points with Italian MOD
La Russa at a lunch on January 19, asking him to help
underscore in public that NATO's planning process for ISAF
transition to Afghan lead at the provincial level is not an
exit strategy. La Russa agreed and said that Italian
commanders in the field were working closely with ANSF units
and would help to evaluate their state of readiness as the
planning process moved forward. He noted that, in the
Italian-led RC-West, at least, the ANSF were not ready to
take the lead.
2. (C/NF) POLOFF delivered Ref A and C points to Sergio
Mercuri, Italian MFA Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and Carlo
Batori, MFA ISAF Desk Officer, on January 19 and 22. Both
concurred with the need to avoid giving the public impression
that the conditions-based provincial transition to ANSF
security lead was an exit strategy, and expressed concerns
that the British were pushing for clear transition dates for
domestic political reasons. They stressed the need to ensure
that both the security transition process and the
reintegration process were Afghan-led and responded to
political conditions on the ground, not just security factors.
THORNE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR/RPM FOR AARON COPE
S/SRAP FOR JARRETT BLANC
SCA FOR TOM GRAMAGLIA AND CAROLYN COBERLY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY AGREES ON THE NEED TO AVOID
TALK OF EXIT STRATEGY
REF: A. STATE 4108
B. ROME 83
C. STATE 6355
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor J. Liam Wasley for Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) The Ambassador raised Ref A points with Italian MOD
La Russa at a lunch on January 19, asking him to help
underscore in public that NATO's planning process for ISAF
transition to Afghan lead at the provincial level is not an
exit strategy. La Russa agreed and said that Italian
commanders in the field were working closely with ANSF units
and would help to evaluate their state of readiness as the
planning process moved forward. He noted that, in the
Italian-led RC-West, at least, the ANSF were not ready to
take the lead.
2. (C/NF) POLOFF delivered Ref A and C points to Sergio
Mercuri, Italian MFA Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and Carlo
Batori, MFA ISAF Desk Officer, on January 19 and 22. Both
concurred with the need to avoid giving the public impression
that the conditions-based provincial transition to ANSF
security lead was an exit strategy, and expressed concerns
that the British were pushing for clear transition dates for
domestic political reasons. They stressed the need to ensure
that both the security transition process and the
reintegration process were Afghan-led and responded to
political conditions on the ground, not just security factors.
THORNE