POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

S E C R E T RIYADH 000061



NOFORN

SIPDIS



TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN

STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020

TAGS: ECON, PREL, EFIN, KTFN, SA

SUBJECT: POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF

INTERIOR



Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and

Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials

to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in

Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO

officials shared with Mabahith detailed information on the

financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist

groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mabahith pointed

to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP),Saudi Arabia's

overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban

matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith

pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in

the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban

leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith

asked GRPO and Treasury to provide additional detailed and

actionable information to assist in its investigations.



2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence

exchange session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through

the previously shared intelligence, which suggested that

Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi Arabia

in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the

information provided, to work through intelligence channels

to share information and results, and submit additional

requests for information. END SUMMARY.



(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network



3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the

Saudi government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and

highlighted the importance the USG places on combating

Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives

significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion,

but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives

significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in

Saudi Arabia and the UAE.



4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious <br />
threat and stated that Saudi authorities can more easily

target al-Qaida financing since the group's members are

frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses and

phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however,

usually enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and

may use fabricated travel documents, according to Mabahith.

Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj represents an

opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same officials

further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between

Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering

sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.



5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials

travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but

said they also conduct fundraising activities while in the

Kingdom. Mabahith initially responded that Taliban

reconciliation issues were handled by the GIP and stated that

the Mabahith has very little insight or coordination with the

GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa said that

even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the

auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest

anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.



6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on Tayyeb

Agha, Mullah Jalil, and Khalil Haqqani, three senior Taliban

officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to Saudi

Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence. (NOTE: Information

available to the USG and shared for this exchange included

telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information

for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.)

Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to

follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and

Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and

phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates

known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.



7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names

of suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith

recognized Shaykh Abdullah bin Ubayd, a prominent Saudi who



reportedly gave Mullah Jalil $30,000 in September 2008.

Mabahith had no information regarding Ubayd's financial

contributions to the Taliban, but speculated that the money

could have come from a trust or a charity that was associated

with Ubayd, rather than from Ubayd himself. Mabahith pledged

to investigate Ubayd and stated that it would not hesitate to

"press him" regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn

emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize

Taliban fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked

hard to delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving

money to the group.



8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG's new fingerprinting

system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be

more effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel

through official points of entry, than it will be against

al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters, who enter the country

illegally. Mabahith also stated that this system should

reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents used at

official points of entry. They pointed out the country's

large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they

expect to encounter.



(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna



9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about

Pakistan-based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa

al-Sunna (JDQ) and its involvement in attacks against

coalition forces in Afghanistan. GRPO and Treasury passed

names and other identifying information of suspected Saudi

Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith pledged to

investigate the names and follow up through intelligence

channels.



(U) Al-Haramain Foundation



10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful

operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support

activities of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation

(AHF),and pledged USG support for their investigation.

Mabahith confirmed that more than 40 AHF-affiliated

individuals had been arrested as a result and that Mabahith

had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil.

Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were

embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil,

since they had previously arrested and released him based on

an earlier lack of evidence.

SMITH