YEMENI-HOUTHI CEASEFIRE: WILL IT LAST?

S E C R E T RIYADH 000193 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2019 TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA YM SUBJECT: YEMENI-HOUTHI CEASEFIRE: WILL IT LAST? REF: A. 09 SANAA 2117 ¶B. 09 SANAA 2279 ¶C. RIYADH 1621 ¶D. RIYADH 1633 ¶E. SANAA 275 Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (A),(B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: On Thursday, February 11, the Yemeni Government announced a ceasefire in its conflict with the Houthis to take effect as of midnight on February 12th. While violations and political setbacks are likely in the days and weeks ahead, the ceasefire ought to hold for the near term. The Houthis fighters have been weakened by significant losses and appear to be choosing to put down their guns while they are still standing rather than risk being further ground down by Saudi and Yemeni forces. Importantly, Saudi Arabia has acheived its military objectives of driving the Houthis away from the border area. The ceasefire also reflects that the Yemeni government, with Saudi encouragement, understands the urgency to redirect the focus of its security forces to the fight against Al-Qaida. One key unresolved matter is the promised return of five Saudi soldiers held by the Houthis. If these captives are not returned to Saudi Arabia in the days immediately ahead, the Saudi military will likely seek to compel their release with a resumption of attacks on Houthi targets. End Summary. ¶2. (U) As reported in reftel (e),the ceasefire went into effect at midnight on Friday, February 12, 2010 after the Houthis agreed to six ceasefire terms laid out by the Yemeni Government. The local press has carried various descriptions of the six conditions of the ceasefire, which are summarized below, The Houthis must: -- end attacks against Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia forces; -- release civilian and military prisoners taken during the conflict, including the five Saudi captives; -- withdraw from government buildings and military posts occupied during the fighting; -- remove checkpoints so that roads can be reopened; -- return looted items, including arms taken from the Yemeni and Saudi military; and -- withdraw from the Saudi/Yemen border area; and ¶3. (C) Prince Khalid bin Sultan informed Ambassador Smith on February 7 that a ceasefire was in the works, and his prediction that something would happen "within a week" has proven accurate. Prince Khalid also informed the Ambassador that, as requested by Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Government troops would be deployed along the Yemeni side of the Saudi/Yemeni border once the Houthi fighters have fully withdrawn from the area. Additionally, Prince Khalid said that he would advocate not permitting the many evacuated villages on the Saudi side of the border to be re-populated. He prefers that a 10-kilometer strip on the Saudi side of the border be retained as an unoccupied military zone. ¶4. (C) On February 13, Prince Khalid appeared on Saudi television to declare Saudi support for the Yemeni-Houthi ceasefire. Prince Khalid noted that the Saudi military would remain in place along the Saudi border to reinforce the Saudi Border Guard. He also noted that one important condition of the ceasefire had not yet been met, which is the return of the five Saudi soldiers captured by the Houthis. Prince Khalid said that he expects the return of these captives "within 48 hours." If the Houthis do not return the Saudi soldiers in the days immediately ahead, this Saudi military would likely resume air and artillery operations against Houthi targets in an effort to compel their release. This eventuality could put the ceasefire in jeopardy. ¶5. (S) Embassy Comment: The ceasefire, which brings to a close nearly five years of on-again, off-again battles with the Houthis, has the potential to last for some time. Both sides appear tired of fighting each other. The Houthis have been beaten, but not vanquished, leaving them able to quit the fight while drawing pride and accomplishment from their defiance of the central government. With a ceasefire in place, the Saudi government can return to its practice of buying tribal loyalties, and is prepared to do so by funding substantial development projects in northern Yemen to help induce Houthi cooperation with the Yemeni government, and in the words of the Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior Mohammed bin Nayef "to give the people something to lose." ¶6. (S) After three months of military operations, the Saudi military has achieved its primary goal of driving the Houthis from the border area, teaching them a lesson, and emerging from the campaign with substantially stronger border controls in place. The primary Saudi concern at this point is gaining the release of the soldiers held by the Houthis; our assumption is that the transfer will happen very soon. The Yemeni Government has been feeling pressure from both the U.S. and the Saudis to turn its attention to Al-Qaida, and now will be better positioned to do so. While ceasefire violations and protests of bad faith from both sides are likely over the coming weeks, particularly as the Yemeni government seeks to reassert its control over Saada, nonetheless the conditions outlined above suggest that the agreement to end hostilities should prove durable. End comment. SMITH