SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SRAP WITH SAUDI INTEL: WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE TALIBAN?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000101



NOFORN

SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PK, AF, SA

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SRAP WITH SAUDI INTEL: WHAT TO

DO ABOUT THE TALIBAN?



REF: A. 09 RIYADH 1639

B. RIYADH 8



RIYADH 00000101 001.2 OF 002





Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for

reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)



SUMMARY:

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1. (C) During a meeting with General Masudi, General Director

of Internal Affairs for the General Intelligence Presidency

(GIP),Barnett R. Rubin, the Special Advisor to the Special

Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, sought Masudi,s

views regarding the Taliban, Saudi plans to deal with them

politically, and the objectives of Pakistan. Masudi

discussed the GIP view of the Taliban and mentioned concerns

about keeping Pakistan a part of the process. He also

discussed the growing Iranian role in Pakistan's instability,

Taliban financing in Saudi Arabia and a possible positive

outcome for Afghans being held in Saudi Arabia. End Summary.



2. (S//NF) Barnett R. Rubin, the Special Advisor to the

Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Chief

GRPO met with General Masudi, the General Director of

Internal Affairs for the GIP, on January 11 to discuss policy

regarding the Taliban and the potential for cooperation with

the SAG in Afghanistan and Pakistan.



THE SAG VIEW OF THE MATTER

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3. (C) Masudi gave an overview of SAG thinking about the

Afghan Taliban. The SAG viewed the Afghan Taliban as largely

under the control of Pakistan, Masudi said. Many members of

the Taliban were born in Pakistan as refugees, had lived

there and had family there. However, there were some members

of the Afghan Taliban who were opposed to such a strong

Pakistani influence. They wished to pursue their own

objectives without outside influence. Unfortunately, this

group was weak. These members of the Afghan Taliban needed

support to be able to become more independent of Pakistan.





AFGHAN FIGHTERS EXPLOITED BY IRAN AND PAKISTAN

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4. (C) Most of the Afghan Taliban were Afghan citizens,

Masudi continued, but they did not have a clear vision of

what they wanted for Afghanistan. The vast majority of the

Afghan fighters were being exploited by outside powers and

simply used as "fuel for the battle." Outside powers, like

Iran and Pakistan, had influenced the uneducated Afghans to

believe that the U.S. and the SAG were working against the

Afghan people. We have to convey the truth to this group,

Masudi urged, because they were ignorant and simply didn't

know.





DON'T FORGET PAKISTAN

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5. (C) In order for any of this to work, Masudi cautioned,

it was vital to consider Pakistan's concerns regarding

Afghanistan. Pakistan was very concerned about losing

influence in Afghanistan to India and Iran. It was important

that the SAG and the U.S. reassure Pakistan that any

activities conducted wouldn't harm its interests, otherwise

there might be a backlash. Furthermore, the Pakistani

government insisted that it played a big part in the defeat

of the Soviets. Islamabad lost much in the war, and had to

take in millions of Afghan refugees. The Pakistanis felt

that they deserved to have a big part in Afghanistan, Masudi

said. They wanted to be "the closest friend" and were

offended when they thought Iran or India were taking this

role.



6. (C) The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was also a

major concern to Pakistan, Masudi said, even if the

Pakistanis didn't say it. This single issue was a very

important factor in the 1980's when Pakistan was deciding

which mujahidin groups to support. (Note: At that time

Masudi worked on Afghanistan for GIP chief Prince Turki

al-Faisal. End note.) Pakistan would support only those

leaders who promised to recognize the Durand Line as an



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international border. This was why Pakistan did not support

Ahmad Shah Massoud.





THE TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN; A WHOLE DIFFERENT MATTER

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7. (C) Masudi made a big distinction between the Taliban in

Afghanistan and in Pakistan. In Pakistan, he said, Al Qaeda

had much more of an influence over the Taliban. Negotiating

with the Taliban in Pakistan wouldn't work because they

didn't have a political cause to negotiate.





IRAN AND AL QAEDA

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8. (C) Masudi said that the GIP had information that

demonstrated new links between Iran and Al Qaeda. Some Al

Qaeda prisoners that were held in Iran had been released and

gone to fight in Waziristan. Masudi gave the example of

Yasin Bargush, a Syrian member of Al Qaeda's leadership who

was arrested and detained in Iran. Masudi said that Bargush

was released by Iran to strengthen the link between Al Qaeda

and Iran.





TALIBAN FINANCING

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9. (C) Rubin outlined the USG's concern about members of the

Taliban fundraising in the KSA. Even if Taliban leaders

traveled to the KSA for talks, he explained, it was key that

they were not allowed to raise funds while they were in the

Kingdom. Masudi agreed and assured Rubin that guests of the

GIP in Saudi Arabia were not raising money. Masudi suggested

that his office meet with the MOI and give them an overview

of these discussions so that they could coordinate some of

their efforts. "We need to be clear with all of the

government that raising money is not permitted."





AFGHANS ARRESTED IN KSA COULD BE HELPFUL

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10. (C) Masudi also mentioned that the SAG held a number of

Afghans in prison on charges of fundraising for the Taliban.

Perhaps these prisoners could be used as bargaining chips in

political talks, Masudi speculated. This could strengthen

the hand of those engaged in political discussions and

demonstrate to members of the Taliban that such efforts could

produce positive results. Masudi suggested that this was

another area where the GIP could coordinate with the MOI.





ALL THE REST

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11. (C) Summarizing his views on the Haqqani Network and

Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Masudi said they all wanted power

but they would join the political process eventually. "When

they are convinced that a military solution won't work, they

will join to have a piece of the cake."



12. (U) Special Advisor to the Special Representative for

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Barnett R. Rubin, has cleared this

message.

SMITH