BURMA: WA ARMY STILL OPPOSES BORDER GUARD FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000057 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM SUBJECT: BURMA: WA ARMY STILL OPPOSES BORDER GUARD FORCE REF: RANGOON 704 RANGOON 00000057 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Officer Marc Shaw for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) United Wa State Army (UWSA) Deputy Liaison Officer Soe Than reiterated January 14 the UWSA does not plan to accept the Burma government's Border Guard Force (BGF) proposal. The UWSA has opted to "not answer" the GOB rather than reply with a "no" in order to avoid the appearance of a provocation. Soe Than said Wa forces are lying low; but if attacked, the UWSA will rely on "conventional warfare." He talked up the UWSA's financial and moral support from China. End Summary. BGF: "Thanks, but No Thanks" -------------- ¶2. (C) Soe Than told us January 14 that UWSA leaders have determined it is "impossible" for the UWSA to join the BGF under the terms laid out by the GOB. In addition to not wanting to cede sovereignty to the GOB, the Wa dislike the provision of the BGF that calls for the mandatory retirement of those over 50 years of age. UWSA leaders have opted not to relay to the GOB that they will not join the BGF because they fear the GOB would interpret a negative response as a direct challenge to SPDC authority, possibly triggering Burma Army military action. ¶3. (C) The UWSA does not believe the GOB's motives with respect to the BGF are genuine. Although the GOB openly declares the BGF will be an integrated force of both Wa and Burma Army commanders, Wa commanders expect that, despite some initial concessions, government soldiers eventually would control the force. For example, the original proposal between the government and National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) -- one of three CFGs that already have been integrated into the BGF -- called for a battalion commander from the SPDC. The NDA-K demanded that an NDA-K soldier be in charge of the battalion. The SPDC permitted that but removed all power from the battalion commander position and placed it with the deputy commander, an SPDC soldier. The NDA-K commander is a figurehead "just for show," Soe Than said, and added: "You can never trust the SPDC. They always negotiate while holding a sword behind their back." Lying Low, but Prepared to Fight if Necessary -------------- - ¶4. (C) Soe Than indicated that, although the UWSA does not seek a resumption of armed conflict, it has arranged "protective measures" should it need to defend itself. If the Burma Army attacks, the UWSA will rely on "conventional warfare." Soe Than told us the UWSA is concerned by the January 8 replacement of colonels in the Light Infantry Divisions in Minesat, Lashio, and Namsang, eastern Shan State. The newly appointed colonels have no personal connections to Wa in the area and they are under the direct control of Defense Services Chief of Staff General Thura Shwe Mann. Soe Than expressed complete confidence that the UWSA would have the "upper hand" in any battle with the Burma Army, claiming the Wa have more than 30 U.S.-manufactured surface-to-air missiles. He predicted the Burma Army would face serious logistical challenges and numerous potential casualties if it were to attack. ¶5. (C) Soe Than said that, in a November 2009 meeting at Wa headquarters in Pangsan (Shan State),UWSA leaders instructed personnel outside Shan State to keep a low profile. Thus, UWSA businessmen and representatives throughout Burma reportedly are changing phone numbers and the names on vehicle and company ownership documents to avoid possible government seizure of assets. Wa officials have been instructed not to acknowledge their Wa affiliation. Soe Than said he has reduced the frequency of his regular communications with headquarters (which previously took place RANGOON 00000057 002.2 OF 002 about once a month.) Kokang Incident an "Internal Conflict" -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked, Soe Than said the Wa did not intervene in August when the Burma Army attacked the Kokang, despite an informal mutual defense agreement, because the UWSA viewed the Kokang incident as an "internal power struggle." Chinese Support Key -------------- ¶7. (C) Chinese support offers some degree of comfort for the UWSA, remarked Soe Than, though it was unclear if he was referring to official government, provincial government, or private support. He said the UWSA believes the Chinese perceive that the SPDC is angling for new allies -- the U.S., North Korea, and Russia, so China is beefing up its financial and military support for the UWSA. Soe Than claimed Chinese government representatives attend all UWSA ceremonies, and he said that in December 2009 five representatives from the Chinese embassy in Rangoon attended a Wa anniversary celebration. Biographic Details -------------- ¶8. (C) Soe Than, who attended Mandalay University, describes himself as a diplomat who often acts as the interlocutor between the UWSA mid-level leadership and the SPDC. He claims he does not have regular direct access to top Wa leaders but says they sometimes solicit his input since he knows the situation on the ground in Rangoon. Soe Than said he often softens the tone of the SPDC's remarks to make them palatable to his bosses. Otherwise, he said, the harsh scoldings he receives by some of the SPDC leadership might provoke a negative reaction by UWSA leadership. Soe Than told us he often entertains requests for financial assistance from local GOB officials. Most recently, for example, he provided money for a wedding (including for dresses),but in the past he has even given motor vehicles. When asked what the return is, Soe Than said: "The ability to stay comfortable and operate our businesses in peace." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) This was our second conversation with Soe Than, who is engaging, frank, and appears to be well-versed in the inner workings of the UWSA. We are unsure why he, as a member of the normally reclusive and secretive organization, seems so candid with us. Although he has told us he doesn't seek permission from top UWSA officials beforehand, we find that hard to believe. Our Australian and UK colleagues indicate UWSA representatives will not meet with them. We assess that UWSA leadership is curious about U.S. engagement efforts and keen for the U.S. to know it will continue to resist GOB demands that it accede to a Border Guard Force agreement. DINGER