Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10RABAT7
2010-01-05 15:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDING SHIP

Tags:  MARR MASS PREL MO 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0007/01 0051539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051539Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:DSCA-MEAN// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE//SPP// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1024
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 5000
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 6097
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3860
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0041
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000007 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MO
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDING SHIP
- TANK (LST) AMPHIBEOUS EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE (EDA) SALE

REF: LETTER OF REQUEST FROM MOROCCAN NAVY DTD 10
SEPTEMBER 08 REQUESTING ONE LST NAVAL VESSEL

Classified By: CHIEF OSC-MO, LTC J. T. WYATT, SR, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A
ND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000007 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015 TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MO SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF LANDING SHIP - TANK (LST) AMPHIBEOUS EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE (EDA) SALE REF: LETTER OF REQUEST FROM MOROCCAN NAVY DTD 10 SEPTEMBER 08 REQUESTING ONE LST NAVAL VESSEL Classified By: CHIEF OSC-MO, LTC J. T. WYATT, SR, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A ND (D). ¶1. (C/NF) Purpose: The Embassy supports the sale of one Landing Ship - Tank (LST) Amphibious Ship to the Government of Morocco. ¶2. (C/NF) Reason Desired: Due to a catastrophic fire, the Royal Moroccan Navy (RMN) is seeking a replacement for their current LST. The engine room fire rendered the current LST beyond economical repair. The offered LST is a refurbished LST obtained from U.S. Navy inventories and is configured for international sale. Replacement of the current Moroccan LST allows the RMN to deliver critical material and personnel in support of humanitarian assistance, counter drug trafficking, natural disaster relief, peacekeeping, and illegal immigration operations. The LST acquisition will enhance interoperability with U.S. systems and further U.S. access to the RMN. ¶3. (C/NF) Effect on Force Structure: The new LST would replace the currently inoperable RMN LST. The RMN has support and training needed to operate this vessel. ¶4. (C/NF) Contribution to both U.S. and Moroccan Defense/Security Goals: U.S. Government interests would be served by building RMN,s sealift capability and increasing RMN,S interoperability with U.S. forces. Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) is an OSD core competency and increasing Morocco,s sealift capability fulfills this objective. At the same time, replacing the inoperable RMN LST would contribute to the RMN,s objectives of increasing its ability to participate in peacekeeping operations, to deliver critical material and personnel, and to respond to natural disasters. ¶5. (C/NF) Justification of type and quantity: The RMN needs to replace the current USN provided LST. The acquisition of one LST would meet RMN requirements and is not considered excessive as it is merely replacing the current U.S. provided EDA asset. ¶6. (C/NF) Reaction of Neighbors: Reaction from the Government of Algeria may be expected. However, the quantity is not excessive, and no new capability is being introduced, although this mission defers to Embassy Algiers to assess the GOA re
action. With the aging of the RMN,s military equipment, Morocco is seeking to modernize all of its naval fleet with the objective of maintaining a credible force. The acquisition of the LST is consistent with its maritime plan. The Governments of Mauritania and Spain would possibly take note of the sale, but both countries enjoy good relations with Morocco. ¶7. (C/NF) Ability to Account, Safeguard, Operate, Maintain, and Support: Excellent. Morocco currently has a wide variety of classified and sensitive U.S. origin equipment and has demonstrated considerable expertise in its security, maintenance and operations. Additionally, in December 2009, the Government of Morocco (GoM) signed a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) with DoD, stipulating that Morocco will safeguard all U.S. origin sensitive military communication security items and equipment. ¶8. (C/NF) Training Requirements: None. ¶9. (C/NF) Impact of In-Country U.S. Forces: We anticipate no need for additional in country staff support. ¶10. (C/NF) Source of Financing: For the initial acquisition of the LST, including total support package, Morocco indicates it would use national funds. For the continued life cycle management of the LST, Morocco would either use national funds or its FMF budget allocation to the RMN. ¶11. (U/NF) Human Rights Impact: As recently noted in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Morocco,s human rights situation has improved considerably, although significant problems remain. During the reign of King Mohammed VI, in particular, increased freedoms and rights have been given to women. While violations continue, we do not perceive the RMN to be a human rights violator. Post sees little risk that this vessel would be used for human rights violations. ¶12. (C/NF) End-Use Monitoring Plan: OSC Rabat has an End-Use Monitoring Plan in effect and would ensure all sensitive items are accounted for and disposed of in accordance with U.S. regulations. ¶13. (C/NF) Approval Recommendation: Embassy Rabat recommends approval of the sale of one Landing Ship ) Tank Amphibious. Modernizing the RMN is consistent with USG objectives and the LST foreign military sale continues our support of the Government of Morocco's security and regional stability. ¶14. (U) OSC POC is LCDR Bramblett, Rabat comm. 212 661-074-866. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** KAPLAN

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