WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000022 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA AND NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020 TAGS: PREL PINS GV MO UV SUBJECT: WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO BURKINA FASO? RABAT 00000022 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Following the Secretary,s conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri, the Embassy was surprised to learn January 12 of the Government of Morocco,s (GOM,s) abrupt decision to discharge Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara from the Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat and send him by medical plane to Ouagadougou. A January 11 telephone conversation between King Mohammed VI and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore, Security Council consideration of the report on the September 28 massacre in Conakry, and pressure from Dadis, supporters to repatriate him appear to have motivated the GOM,s action. Believing that President Campaore may have torpedoed French, Moroccan and U.S. efforts to find an African country that would accept Dadis for resettlement, King Mohammed VI intended to place responsibility for continued mediation of the Guinea conflict squarely in Campaore,s court. The GOM supported U.S. requests to keep Dadis Camara from using contracted civilian air arranged by his supporters for return to Conakry, and transported him via Moroccan &medical8 airlift to Burkina Faso without telling him that he would not be returning to Conakry. Finally, the GOM pledged continued support for U.S. and French requests to establish a new residence for Dadis Camara to keep him out of Guinea and for Guinea,s transition. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Embassy Rabat learned the afternoon of January 12 that the GOM intended to facilitate the departure of Dadis Camara for Burkina Faso by the end of the day. According to Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Chief of Staff of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dadis Camara was aware of events in Guinea, had been well enough to travel for at least three weeks, and his return had been formally requested by the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Moroccan Ambassador to Guinea. Bourita stated that King Mohammed VI, who reportedly spoke with Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore on January 11, wanted Compaore to assume responsibility as mediator of the Guinean conflict vice remaining angry that he had not been party to the Rabat Declaration of January 5. It was the king,s further desire that Dadis Camara not be in Morocco when the UN Security Council considered the contents of the United Nations report on the September massacres in Guinea. Bourita asked for U.S. support to keep the travel secret from the Government of Burkina Faso, which he stated was not advised until shortly before Dadis' arrival of the GOM,s intent to deliver Dadis Camara to Ouagadougou that day. ¶3. (C) Embassy Rabat demarched the Ministry of Foreign Affairs late January 12, requesting the GOM not permit Dadis Camara to utilize a rented airplane arranged by his supporters in Guinea for return to Guinea. The GOM honored that request and Dadis Camara departed Rabat for Ouagadougou between 1845 and 1900 GMT aboard a Moroccan &medical plane8 in the company of two Moroccan doctors (one an anesthesiologist),a Moroccan nurse, a Lebanese doctor, and a Guinean cardiologist. Dadis reportedly thought he was going to Conakry and was &calm8 although the previous day, he had reportedly told Fassi Fihri that he wanted to return to Conakry to &cut off hands and heads.8 Camara landed in Ouagadougou before 21:45 GMT on January 12. ¶4. (C) The GOM expressed its intent to reach out to the Government of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. and French demarches urging Saudi Arabia to accept Dadis Camara for residency, just as King Mohammed VI had reached out to Gabonese President Ali Bongo, who declined to host Dadis. The GOM also reached out to General Sekouba Konate on both January 12 and 13 to reassure him that Morocco remained RABAT 00000022 002.2 OF 002 supportive of his efforts to lead a transition. The GOM reportedly also urged President Campaore to host Dadis Camara for more than five days -- as Campaore had reportedly stated the night Dadis arrived. ¶5. (C) Comment: The timing of the king,s decision was surprising, if not entirely unexpected. While not in accord with the spirit of the January 5 declaration, the GOM had always said that it needed a legal basis to keep Dadis and did not want him in Morocco when the Security Council considered the report on the massacre. The GOM remains hopeful that Dadis Camara will not return to Guinea. Morocco,s willingness to work with the U.S. and France to prevent Dadis from taking contracted air back to Guinea, bought some time. Moreover, Morocco remains interested in participating in the international contact group meeting in Addis Ababa in late January. End Comment. ¶6. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. ***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco ***************************************** KAPLAN