China cautiously seeks to expand commercial interests in

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000037 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/26 TAGS: ECON EFIN SENV ENRG EC CH SUBJECT: China cautiously seeks to expand commercial interests in Ecuador REF: 09 QUITO 1059; QUITO 5; 09 QUITO 934 ... id: 245644 date: 1/26/2010 22:21 refid: 10QUITO37 origin: Embassy Quito classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 09QUITO1059|09QUITO934|10QUITO5 header: VZCZCXYZ0100 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHQT #0037/01 0262221 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 262221Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0689 INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0008 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0005 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000037 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/26 TAGS: ECON EFIN SENV ENRG EC CH SUBJECT: China cautiously seeks to expand commercial interests in Ecuador REF: 09 QUITO 1059; QUITO 5; 09 QUITO 934 CLASSIFIED BY: Heather M Hodges, Ambassador, Department of State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) China's Ambassador to Ecuador, Cai Runguo, told Ambassador January 15 that the PRC is moving forward with negotiations with the GoE on financing various commercial projects, but that Ecuadorian President Correa's criticisms of China's tough negotiating position had caused some concern in Beijing. It appears the GPRC-GoE negotiations over the $1.7 billion Coca Codo hydro project are progressing, although it is still unclear whether Correa will accept China's standard commercial loan conditions (particularly access to international arbitration). Cai noted he was confused by the GoE's efforts to strengthen ties with Iran, asked whether Correa's frequent criticism of the U.S. was ideological, and mentioned that China is maintaining good and economically beneficial relations with Venezuela. Clear from Cai's remarks and those of other Chinese officials, China believes it has significant economic interests in Ecuador, but is moving cautiously in talks with a GoE government that it does not seem to fully trust. End Summary. Correa's Comments Disconcerting �00A; -------------- ¶2. (C) Chinese Ambassador Cai Runguo called on the Ambassador in her office on January 15, at Ambassador Cai's request. Ambassador Cai was accompanied by his political officer, Tiefei Xu. Embassy DCM also sat in. Ambassador Cai expressed interest in a range of U.S.-Ecuadorian bilateral issues, as well as Obama administration policy towards Latin America, but was open to discussing Chinese issues in Ecuador and Venezuela. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Cai indicated that China was disconcerted by Correa's verbal attack in December 2009 over China's negotiating position for loans to Ecuador, in which Correa alleged that even the IMF had not treated Ecuador as poorly as did China (Ref A). According to local press reports, Ecuadorian Finance Minister Viteri traveled to China in mid-January 2010 to negotiate various credits with the PRC government. Cai confirmed that Chinese-Ecuadorian loan/investment agreements were proceeding, but argued that China was "substantially" maintaining insistence on the guarantees that Correa found objectionable and had complained about publicly during his December remarks. Later in the conversation Cai also expressed China's unhappiness with Ecuador's continued maintenance of safeguard tariffs, and concern over when they would be lowered. ¶4. (C) The focus at the moment is a 1.7 billion dollar loan from China's export-import bank to construct the Coca-Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project. If terms can be agreed on that loan, Cai said there is another one billion dollar loan from China's development bank, for projects yet to be defined. As part of the arrangement, the GoE has designated the Chinese firm Sinohydro as the chief contractor on the Coca-Codo project. China's agreements stipulate bilateral negotiations first in the event of disputes, but then provide recourse to international arbitration. China is "still negotiating" this clause with Ecuador. (Ecuador's new constitution bars the GoE from entering into contracts that include international arbitration, and the GoE has publicly announced its intention to terminate most of its Bilateral Investment Treaties, including with the U.S., mainly because they allow dispute settlement via international arbitration mechanisms.) ¶5. (C) Ambassador Cai said that Correa does not seem to understand that China is negotiating "commercial deals" with Ecuador, similar to deals with other countries, and that China would not want to set a concessionary precedent for other countries. In general, Cai said Correa wants Chinese investment in Ecuador, in petroleum, mining, telecommunications and infrastructure. China is "studying the investment situation." Ecuadorian Press quoted Finance Minister Viteri on January 13, from China, stating that the GoE had signed a memorandum of understanding on a loan from China's Export-Import Bank to finance Coca-Codo. Although she acknowledged that talks were still ongoing, GoE sources commented that the MOU represented the end of the difficult phase of the talks. Interest in Exploiting Yasuni ITT oil reserves -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Prompted by the Ambassador's query, Cai stated that "all" petroleum companies were interested in developing the Yasuni-ITT petroleum field if conservation initiatives fell through. (See Refs B and C for background on Yasuni ITT and the recent political crisis it caused in Ecuador, including the resignation of Foreign Minister Falconi.) Cai mentioned that Russia was interested in Block 31 in Ecuador, which is in the Yasuni National Park and next to the ITT block. (PetroBras previously held the Block 31 concession but returned it to the GoE.) According to local press reports, PetroEcuador consulted with foreign oil companies, including Chinese oil company SINOPEC, on the possible exploitation of Yasuni ITT as recently as 2008. ¶7. (C) The Ecuadorian government had also solicited Chinese involvement in building the Refinery of the Pacific, a joint initiative of Venezuelan President Chavez and Correa. However, Ambassador Cai pointed out that if Chavez goes from power, would a subsequent government continue with crude deliveries? If Yasuni-ITT were developed, Cai seemed to believe that could change the calculus for the Pacific Refinery. (Ecuadorian press report that the South Korean company SK Group is slated to build the $12.5 billion refinery, and that Deutsche Bank and China's Export-Import Bank are considering providing up to $5 billion in financing between them.) Skepticism over GoE Interest in Developing Manta as Aviation Hub -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador Cai said that Correa had twice asked China to look at investing in Manta (site of the former-U.S. Forward Operating Location) as a transportation node, but Cai said that Chinese companies were neither interested nor experienced in such an overseas project. Cai evinced skepticism over Correa's concept of a Manta-to-Manaus transportation link. When Cai suggested Russia might be interested in Manta after Correa's Russia trip, the Ambassador noted that Russian ambassador Yan Burliay had told her that Russia's interest in Manta at this point was merely as an aviation stop for airplanes picking up flowers at Latacunga in the mountains, then proceeding to Manta on the coast to load shrimp and bananas. Ecuador's Relationship with Iran and the U.S.; China's Growing Relationship with Venezuela -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Cai asked what the U.S. thought of Ecuadorian relations with Iran; what was the benefit to Ecuador? He said he had asked this of the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, which replied that "various economic projects" were the benefit. The Ambassador noted our principal concern was Ecuador's budding relationship with an Iranian Bank that had been designated by the USG for facilitating proliferation of WMD. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Cai said that China's relations with Venezuela were good, citing a joint development fund with two-thirds Chinese capital. The fund originally was for $8 billion, but after Chavez requested a doubling, was raised to $12 billion. Credits from the fund are guaranteed by petroleum. ¶11. (C) Cai asked whether Correa's frequent criticism of the U.S. stemmed from ideology, and the Ambassador answered, yes. Ambassador Cai nodded and said, "but he is different from Chavez." He opined that Correa has substantial support in Ecuador but appears to be losing the middle class. China's Rapidly Increasing Commercial and Investment Ties with Ecuador -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) China has already shown itself willing to make large deals in Ecuador (as it also appears to be doing in other oil-producing states in the region, particularly Venezuela). In July 2009, the two countries announced a four-year oil sales deal, under which China providing a $1 billion advance payment. The terms of the deal reportedly favored China. Ecuadorian press reported that during the November 2009 visit of Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative conference (CPPCC) national Committee, the two countries announced the signing of three cooperation agreements, including an arrangement to buy Chinese military planes for Ecuador's Air Force. This was on top of the January 2009 $60 million deal to purchase an air defense radar system from the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation. During his visit, Jia reportedly emphasized the benefits that China sees in enhancing economic cooperation between the two countries. He encouraged Chinese companies to increase commercial and investment ties with Ecuador, noting that Chinese investment in Ecuador had reached $2.2 billion and also that two-way trade in 2008 was almost $2.5 billion, 50% above 2007 levels. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Faced with a $3-4 billion (or higher) fiscal deficit in 2010, and with no ability to print money or issue debt, and no intention of returning to the IMF or World Bank, the GoE is desperate to find large-scale financing from non-traditional sources. Its efforts to date with Russia and Iran have been a bust, but China has proven a more willing, if demanding, source of both financing and investment. Successful conclusion of the Coca Codo talks would further increase the importance of China to Ecuador. However, faced with the often counterproductive public comments of President Correa and a complex investment climate resulting from the new constitution and apparent GoE ambivalence about attracting foreign investment, the GPRC is moving cautiously and making sure to negotiate terms favorable to China. HODGES =======================CABLE ENDS============================