NO REAL THREAT TO CORREA ON THE HORIZON

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000011 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/15 TAGS: PGOV ELAB MARR EC SUBJECT: NO REAL THREAT TO CORREA ON THE HORIZON REF: 09 QUITO 1055; 09 QUITO 849; 09 QUITO 877; 09 QUITO 951 09 QUITO 1043; 0... id: 243921 date: 1/15/2010 18:08 refid: 10QUITO11 origin: Embassy Quito classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 09QUITO1043|09QUITO1055|09QUITO841|09QUITO849|09QUITO877|09QUITO951|10QUITO5 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHQT #0011/01 0151808 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 151808Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY QUITO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0649 INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000011 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/15 TAGS: PGOV ELAB MARR EC SUBJECT: NO REAL THREAT TO CORREA ON THE HORIZON REF: 09 QUITO 1055; 09 QUITO 849; 09 QUITO 877; 09 QUITO 951 09 QUITO 1043; 09 QUITO 841; 10 QUITO 5 CLASSIFIED BY: Hodges, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Workers, students, teachers, and indigenous groups have announced protests against the government during January 2010, as is often the case for this time of year. At the same time, President Rafael Correa has alleged a military-led attempt to destabilize the government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs resigned, and Correa's popularity dropped again in the polls. However, these events are unlikely to threaten the stability of the Ecuadorian government, or the tenure of President Rafael Correa, in the near future. End Summary. UNCOORDINATED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Indigenous leaders are calling for assemblies of their communities on January 20, in part due to regularly-scheduled internal congresses, but also to decide on whether to mobilize political protests and what kind of strikes they will hold to protest the closure of a Shuar radio station (Ref A) and the government's "lack of respect." The indigenous are by and large the most intimidating group when it comes to threats of mobilization, having already organized demonstrations (alone or with others) that resulted in the ouster of three presidents since ¶1997. However, the political organizations representing the indigenous nations have lost influence, internal unity, and the sympathy of the general population in recent years. The Correa administration claims to have the support of the indigenous people except for a few of its leaders, although his adherents in those communities are likely fewer in number than when he was first elected. Indigenous mobilizations have been so far unsuccessful in changing the more controversial laws during the Correa administration; demonstrations in January 2009 failed to persuade the GOE to redraft the mining law, and in September 2009 the GOE refused to make significant changes to the draft water law. The demonstrations in September resulted in the death of one protester and many injuries among the police, but only a few hundred indigenous people participated in each location, in contrast to the tens of thousands who took to the streets in 2000 and 2005 (Ref B and C). ¶3. (SBU) Other groups also plan to mobilize this month. University students called for protests in all provincial capitals on January 6, but less than two hundred marched in Ecuador's largest city, Guayaquil, and the protestors in Quito were so few that the event did not even make the local papers. The Montubio ethnic minority cancelled the protest it had planned for January 11 after conversations with the government. Workers have scheduled a protest for January 15, but they usually organize demonstrations in January to protest the minimum salary wage increase that is announced around that time each year (see septel on labor organizations). Teachers protested throughout 2009 with few results, and have not yet set a date for their January strike. The public is used to these protests and no serious disruption of public order is expected. THE ALLEGED POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY -------------- ¶4. (C) Correa himself is the most vocal source of claims of alleged attempts by the military to destabilize the government. In his two most recent radio addresses, Correa discussed emails circulating in the barracks allegedly sent by supporters of former President and retired Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, who leads the Patriotic Society Party. The emails supposedly report that Correa intends to eliminate certain benefits for the military. Correa has provided no substantiation for his allegations, and none has been made available by other members of his government. Military leaders immediately declared their loyalty to the Government of Ecuador (GOE),while the Gutierrez supporters claimed ongoing political persecution by Correa. The publicity may be interpreted as a government strategy to gather public support for the committees to defend the citizen revolution, announced during the August 10 inauguration (Ref F),and a way to undermine the prestige of the Patriotic Society Party. In fact, the Correa administration has made significant efforts to keep the troops happy, for example by increasing their salaries and making a show of modernizing military equipment. RESIGNATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) The resignation of Minister Fander Falconi on January 12 over Correa's accusations of loss of sovereignty during international negotiations on an Amazon rain forest conservation effort does not jeopardize the stability of the government (Ref G). The President had announced that he would make more changes in his cabinet in the beginning of 2010. A change in the cabinet is, in any case, quite common in the Correa administration: since Correa took office in January 2007, one or more members of the cabinet have been changed 54 times with no significant impact on the administration's direction. CONTINUING DECLINE IN POPULARITY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to local polling, approval for Correa's performance in December 2009 was between 42 and 54 percent. While this indicates a fall of 20 or 30 percent points (depending on the pollster) in comparison with December 2008 figures, the Ecuadorian president was still the most popular public figure of 2009 according to end-of-year surveys. As President Correa likes to point out, his government has won six consecutive elections in three years, an uncommon political event in Ecuadorian history. He holds the current record for popularity among all presidents in Ecuador since 1979, with over 70 percent approval rating in 2007. In the Ecuadorian context, an approval rating of over 40 percent is still remarkably high. ¶7. (C) As reported earlier, the social and political movements are not unified and there does not appear to be an opposition figure to rally around at this time. These groups have even scheduled their demonstrations on different dates, allowing them to air their particular grievances, but losing an opportunity for the show of unity that made them so effective in 2000 and 2005. Hence, the government can deal with discontent by negotiating with, or ignoring, each group separately. Embassy contacts - including some among the protesting organizations - note that Ecuadorians have no real interest in tossing out the current president; they may not like him much, but there is no stomach for instability. Polling results bear this out, as two-thirds of Ecuadorian citizens say they would not approve of revoking the President's mandate (refs D and E). ¶8. (C) Another factor that should not be discounted is that Correa's political support among lower and lower-middle classes is solid, due in large part to his dramatic increase in social spending since taking office. In addition to doubling cash transfers to poor families and the elderly, his government has greatly increased spending on health and education, particularly in rural areas, where approximately 5 million of Ecuador's 14 million citizens reside. The beneficiaries of this fiscal largesse, traditionally ignored by past governments, form a large and stable political base for Correa, and are likely to oppose any political change that would potentially disrupt these pro-poor programs. CORREA STILL HOLDS THE REINS, DESPITE HIS PUBLIC FEARS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The political opposition is still weak and disorganized, and it lacks a credible political leader. Within his political movement, Alianza PAIS (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance), Correa still runs the show. At the National Assembly, some PAIS assembly members have shown nascent signs of independence from the Executive, but this has not yet translated into legislative action. Over the past few years, President Correa managed to alienate several of the key founders of the PAIS movement, including Alberto Acosta (former President of the Constituent Assembly, Gustavo Larrea (former Coordinating Minister of External and Internal Security),and more recently Fander Falconi, without significantly damaging his own political support. Of the original group, only the current Coordinating Minister of Politics, Ricardo Patino, is still in the government. Hence, Correa is so far walking away as the winner of the political contest. 10.(SBU) While Correa does not appear to have any significant competitors for power in the wings, it has not stopped him from announcing imminent threats to his regime and the "citizen revolution," usually during his Saturday TV and radio addresses. His most recent allegations of conspiracies to destabilize the government came on January 2, when he first raised the rumors of discontent in the military and, in the same address, alleged that "right wing foundations based in the United States" were working with indigenous groups to destabilize the regime. In January 2009 he used his radio address to allege that retired military officers were attempting to destabilize his government at the behest of a "certain political party." In May 2009 it was the "oligarchy's puppets" working against him, and in September 2009 it was once against the teachers and indigenous threatening to create instability. (These are just few illustrative examples.) COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) While Correa is politically weaker than even six months ago, and continues to alienate groups, the latest political events in Ecuador are probably no more than business as usual. Indigenous groups, teachers, students, and workers have thus far been unable to coordinate their actions, which prevents them from having a serious impact on government stability. Rumors of significant disaffection in the military do not look likely to translate into anti-government moves at this point. The political opposition is weak and unable to coordinate. Even Correa's traditional (and favorite) opponents, the business leaders and wealthiest Ecuadorians, have done little more than talk about creating an opposition force, without achieving any significant public presence. While disparate opposition groups were able to coalesce and topple former President Bucaram in little more than five weeks in 1997, it appears the current movements are weaker and less organized than ever, barring some unforeseen event that brings them suddenly together. The divide in ideological orientation of opposition groups - some on the far right and others on the far left - also augurs poorly for the prospect of any joint action. HODGES =======================CABLE ENDS============================