COMKFOR BRIEFS AMBASSADORS ON MOVEMENT TO GATE TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000094 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2020 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MARR KV SUBJECT: COMKFOR BRIEFS AMBASSADORS ON MOVEMENT TO GATE TWO AND DETERRENT PRESENCE REF: PRISTINA 044 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). ¶1. (C) On February 16, COMKFOR, General Markus Bentler (Germany),briefed Chiefs of Mission in Kosovo on KFOR's path towards Gate 2 and KFOR's eventual full transition to Deterrent Presence (DP). Bentler said that KFOR's drawdown will lead to a security gap, and he discussed measures that KFOR will take to minimize that gap: increased exercises, more mobile forces, improved intelligence assets, as well as better communications and cooperation with EULEX and the Kosovo Police. Bentler argued that KFOR had sufficient forces in place to handle any threats to a safe and secure environment. Bentler also said that he does not want to link the drawdown to any political actions. (Note: We interpret this as a desire on his part to avoid synchronizing the drawdown with the Northern Strategy (see reftel),a choice laden with negative consequences. End Note.) ¶2. (C) Bentler gave an update on the process of unfixing from the nine cultural and religious heritage sites in Kosovo. In addition to unfixing at Gazimestan (approved at the NAC on February 17),Bentler identified the next four sites where KFOR intends to unfix: Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, and Gorioc Monastery. He did not discuss a timeline for unfixing from these sites. According to Bentler the process of handing over responsibility for the protection of cultural and religious sites to the Kosovo Police is proceeding well. The Kosovo Security Force, he noted, would have no role in protecting these sites. (Note: it remains unclear if KFOR intends to unfix from the latter four sites one at a time, or in some combination. End Note.) ¶3. (C) COMMENT: We appreciate KFOR's efforts to keep the international community informed on its drawdown plans, but we are troubled by COMKFOR's insistence on divorcing KFOR's drawdown from political actions -- for example, the Northern Strategy. Kosovo's safe and secure environment cannot be separated from political events, and we should all recognize that KFOR is a resource for strengthening Kosovo's future stability. In short, KFOR has a role to play in ensuring a durable safe and secure environment in Kosovo and its capacity to play this role is greatest while significant forces remain on the ground. As we have argued (reftel),the best means to operationalize security and stability -- the key condition in a conditions-based drawdown -- is to tie it to successful efforts to reintegrate northern Kosovo under Pristina's legitimate authority. We urge caution in KFOR's next steps, in particular on its plans to unfix from other religious and cultural sites. Unfixing from two or more sites simultaneously is a step fraught with peril. In this case, a slower, more patient approach will achieve our goals with less risk. END COMMENT DELL