THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000091

SIPDIS

DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, NSC FOR HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PINR PREL MARR KV
SUBJECT: THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE
FOR KOSOVO

REF: A. KOSOVO DEFENSE POLICY MEMO (20-JUN-08)

B. 09 PRISTINA 225

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Current OSD policy (Ref A) preventing the
implementation of the National Guard State Partnership
Program (SPP) until the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) reaches
Full Operating Capability (FOC) is not in the best interests
of U.S. foreign policy goals nor the KSF. We propose
re-examining this policy, and if the KSF continues its
positive progress, we recommend initiating the process to
establish a formal state partnership in January 2011. U.S.
policy recognizes Kosovo as an independent state on an equal
footing with its neighbors, which all currently participate
in the program. Kosovo's participation in the SPP would
provide a unique opportunity to socialize KSF members via
regular, long-term interaction and engagement with
experienced military and civilian personnel. The current
policy forges a connection between FOC and the SPP based on
an FOC date that is not firmly established and remains
malleable. Implementing the SPP in 2011 allows us to
evaluate progress in the KSF. The bilateral nature of the
program sends a strong message of support and long-term
investment in the KSF, an investment that supports our
broader goals for Kosovo. END SUMMARY

TREATING KOSOVO LIKE A STATE, AND LIKE ITS NEIGHBORS:
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2. (C) OSD's June 2008 Kosovo Policy memo (Ref A) prevents
the USG from offering the State Partnership Program (SPP) to
the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) until it has achieved Full
Operating Capability (FOC). This policy runs counter to the
USG policy of engaging Kosovo as an independent state on an
equal footing with its neighbors. Since the U.S. recognized
Kosovo's independence, our foreign policy goal has been to
ensure Kosovo's independence and its long-term viability and
stability. Establishing an SPP for Kosovo would allow the
U.S. to interact with the KSF directly, side-stepping KFOR's
status neutrality and the concerns of NATO's non-recognizers.
Moreover, it would reaffirm our commitment to Kosovo, and by
treating Kosovo as full-fledged state, we encourage others to
do the same. Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Serbia all participate in the SPP. Denying Kosovo its
opportunity to participate unnecessarily separates Kosovo
from its neighbors and signals doubt when our policy is to
emphasize confidence. Accordingly, we believe that the
inter-agency process should re-examine the current OSD policy
with an eye towards initiating the process to establish a
formal state partnership in January 2011.

SOCIALIZING THE KSF:
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3. (C) The citizen-soldier nature of the National Guard/SPP
uniquely fits the current missions of the KSF, and it is in
the KSF's best interest to enter the SPP sooner rather than
later. The KSF declared Initial Operating Capability on
September 15, 2009, and is developing towards FOC.
Long-term, day-to-day cooperation with U.S. military
personnel through the SPP will socialize KSF officers and
NCOs. This interaction will both accelerate the KSF's
progress towards FOC and improve the quality of the KSF's
performance once it reaches FOC. The unscripted interaction
between the two will be critical in shaping KSF members into
a modern, professional security force, with a modern outlook
and ultimately the ability to inter-operate with NATO
militarily. If we delay introducing the SPP in Kosovo until
after FOC, we risk that Kosovo's new state partner will spend
as much time undoing poor habits as it does in sharing best
practices. It is in everyone's best interests to start
working with the KSF soon, while it is at a formative stage.


PRISTINA 00000091 002 OF 002


DE-LINK FOC AND THE SPP:
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4. (C) Current OSD policy lashes FOC and the SPP together,
and the latter cannot begin until the former is complete.
This is problematic in that FOC is a vaguely defined concept,
and we have no firm date for when the KSF may achieve this
status. According to KFOR's initial planning, FOC should
come about two to five years after IOC. Waiting for the
political stars to align such that everyone is ready to
declare the KSF as fully operational puts a state partnership
in a holding pattern for little substantive reason. We
should de-link the two concepts and focus on the criteria
that potential state partners tell us they need for a
successful program. We believe that the KSF will meet these
criteria in the coming months.

NOT A DISTRACTION, BUT A WAY TO DEVELOP TOWARD FOC
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5. (C) Some contend that establishing an SPP prior to the
KSF's achievement of FOC would pose a distraction. In fact,
the opposite is true. National Guard representatives from
several states have expressed interest and enthusiasm in
organizing a robust SPP for Kosovo. Such an active state
partner in Kosovo would support KFOR's goal of securing
additional training for the KSF. The Ministry for the KSF
echoes this sentiment and made a specific request to enter
the SPP on May 13, 2009 (Ref B.). The presence of a National
Guard state partner will enhance NATO's own program for
developing the KSF. The NATO Advisory Team's director agrees
that FOC will be too late if we want to ensure development of
a quality security force that meets NATO standards. He views
the SPP as a useful tool for ensuring the KSF's development,
a tool that is relevant now. Additionally, senior leadership
of the U.S. military in Europe has indicated support for this
project. Far from a distraction, the SPP dovetails with
KFOR's developmental goals for the KSF as it moves towards
FOC.


6. (C) COMMENT: We strongly support the KSF in its interest
to enter the State Partnership Program. We urge a
re-examination of OSD's policy prohibiting implementation
until after FOC. The bilateral nature of the program sends a
strong message of USG support and long-term investment in the
KSF and Kosovo institutions, an investment that will support
our broader goals in Kosovo and throughout the region. The
SPP offers many advantages, and the benefits accrue over
time. Starting the SPP process in January 2011 will allow us
to assess the situation, lay the proper groundwork, and enjoy
the benefits until FOC and beyond.
DELL