Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10PRISTINA91
2010-02-22 13:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE

Tags:  PINR PREL MARR KV 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000091 

SIPDIS

DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, NSC FOR HOVENIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PINR PREL MARR KV
SUBJECT: THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE
FOR KOSOVO

REF: A. KOSOVO DEFENSE POLICY MEMO (20-JUN-08)

B. 09 PRISTINA 225

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000091 SIPDIS DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, NSC FOR HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PINR PREL MARR KV SUBJECT: THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE RIGHT CHOICE FOR KOSOVO REF: A. KOSOVO DEFENSE POLICY MEMO (20-JUN-08) ¶B. 09 PRISTINA 225 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Current OSD policy (Ref A) preventing the implementation of the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) until the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) reaches Full Operating Capability (FOC) is not in the best interests of U.S. foreign policy goals nor the KSF. We propose re-examining this policy, and if the KSF continues its positive progress, we recommend initiating the process to establish a formal state partnership in January 2011. U.S. policy recognizes Kosovo as an independent state on an equal footing with its neighbors, which all currently participate in the program. Kosovo's participation in the SPP would provide a unique opportunity to socialize KSF members via regular, long-term interaction and engagement with experienced military and civilian personnel. The current policy forges a connection between FOC and the SPP based on an FOC date that is not firmly established and remains malleable. Implementing the SPP in 2011 allows us to evaluate progress in the KSF. The bilateral nature of the program sends a strong message of support and long-term investment in the KSF, an investment that supports our broader goals for Kosovo. END SUMMARY TREATING KOSOVO LIKE A STATE, AND LIKE ITS NEIGHBORS: -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) OSD's June 2008 Kosovo Policy memo (Ref A) prevents the USG from offering the State Partnership Program (SPP) to the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) until it has achieved Full Operating Capability (FOC). This policy runs counter to the USG policy of engaging Kosovo as an independent state on an equal footing with its neighbors. Since the U.S. recognized Kosovo's independence, our foreign policy goal has been to ensure Kosovo's independence and its long-term viability and stability. Establishing an SPP for Kosovo would allow the U.S. to interact with the KSF directly, side-stepping KFOR's status neutrality and the concerns of NATO's non-recognizers. Moreover, it would reaffirm our commitment to Kosovo, and by treating Kosovo as full-fledged state, we encourage others to do the same. Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia all participate in the SPP. Denying Kosovo i
ts opportunity to participate unnecessarily separates Kosovo from its neighbors and signals doubt when our policy is to emphasize confidence. Accordingly, we believe that the inter-agency process should re-examine the current OSD policy with an eye towards initiating the process to establish a formal state partnership in January 2011. SOCIALIZING THE KSF: -------------- ¶3. (C) The citizen-soldier nature of the National Guard/SPP uniquely fits the current missions of the KSF, and it is in the KSF's best interest to enter the SPP sooner rather than later. The KSF declared Initial Operating Capability on September 15, 2009, and is developing towards FOC. Long-term, day-to-day cooperation with U.S. military personnel through the SPP will socialize KSF officers and NCOs. This interaction will both accelerate the KSF's progress towards FOC and improve the quality of the KSF's performance once it reaches FOC. The unscripted interaction between the two will be critical in shaping KSF members into a modern, professional security force, with a modern outlook and ultimately the ability to inter-operate with NATO militarily. If we delay introducing the SPP in Kosovo until after FOC, we risk that Kosovo's new state partner will spend as much time undoing poor habits as it does in sharing best practices. It is in everyone's best interests to start working with the KSF soon, while it is at a formative stage. PRISTINA 00000091 002 OF 002 DE-LINK FOC AND THE SPP: -------------- ¶4. (C) Current OSD policy lashes FOC and the SPP together, and the latter cannot begin until the former is complete. This is problematic in that FOC is a vaguely defined concept, and we have no firm date for when the KSF may achieve this status. According to KFOR's initial planning, FOC should come about two to five years after IOC. Waiting for the political stars to align such that everyone is ready to declare the KSF as fully operational puts a state partnership in a holding pattern for little substantive reason. We should de-link the two concepts and focus on the criteria that potential state partners tell us they need for a successful program. We believe that the KSF will meet these criteria in the coming months. NOT A DISTRACTION, BUT A WAY TO DEVELOP TOWARD FOC -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Some contend that establishing an SPP prior to the KSF's achievement of FOC would pose a distraction. In fact, the opposite is true. National Guard representatives from several states have expressed interest and enthusiasm in organizing a robust SPP for Kosovo. Such an active state partner in Kosovo would support KFOR's goal of securing additional training for the KSF. The Ministry for the KSF echoes this sentiment and made a specific request to enter the SPP on May 13, 2009 (Ref B.). The presence of a National Guard state partner will enhance NATO's own program for developing the KSF. The NATO Advisory Team's director agrees that FOC will be too late if we want to ensure development of a quality security force that meets NATO standards. He views the SPP as a useful tool for ensuring the KSF's development, a tool that is relevant now. Additionally, senior leadership of the U.S. military in Europe has indicated support for this project. Far from a distraction, the SPP dovetails with KFOR's developmental goals for the KSF as it moves towards FOC. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: We strongly support the KSF in its interest to enter the State Partnership Program. We urge a re-examination of OSD's policy prohibiting implementation until after FOC. The bilateral nature of the program sends a strong message of USG support and long-term investment in the KSF and Kosovo institutions, an investment that will support our broader goals in Kosovo and throughout the region. The SPP offers many advantages, and the benefits accrue over time. Starting the SPP process in January 2011 will allow us to assess the situation, lay the proper groundwork, and enjoy the benefits until FOC and beyond. DELL

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