JANUARY 13 U.S.-CZECH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000030 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 TAGS: PREL MARR ENRG AF RS EZ SUBJECT: JANUARY 13 U.S.-CZECH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE Classified By: EUR A/S Phil Gordon, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A/S Phil Gordon led the U.S. side in the second U.S.-Czech Strategic Dialogue ON January 13. DFM Tomas Pojar, who led the Czech side, was friendly, open and constructive. Before the Dialogue, A/S Gordon met with FM Jan Kohout. Kohout, Pojar, other leaders and even Czech media with whom Gordon met uniformly asked first about when the U.S. would name an ambassador to the Czech Republic. The Czechs asked about U.S. Russia policy in several contexts, but did not contest A/S Gordon's assertion that the U.S had not sacrificed either principles or allies to its Russia policy. ¶2. (C) The two sides had a full discussion of the agreed agenda: Afghanistan, energy security, Eastern Partnership, relations with Russia, Western Balkans and the Middle East. FM Kohout and DFM Pojar expressed concern about a supposed lack of U.S. attention to Central Europe; Gordon cited strong administration commitment to and expertise in the region. ON Afghanistan, Pojar predicted that the Czechs would keep present troop levels but would not increase them. Kohout suggested a possible modest increase after the elections, which A/S Gordon encouraged. Pojar urged continued U.S. involvement in energy security. Pojar was critical of the adequacy Westinghouse's lobbying efforts to win a $27 billion contract to build additional nuclear power plants at Temelin. Pojar was glad to hear the U.S. would not negotiate a START agreement at all costs. At the conclusion, The Czechs asked that the Strategic Dialogue process continue. End Summary. Kohout-Gordon Meeting -------------- ¶3. (C) Foreign Minister Jan Kohout opened the meeting by saying that he had told former Secretary Albright that naming a new ambassador as soon as possible was important. (Note: Albright attended a seminar ON the NATO Strategic Concept in Prague January 12. End Note.) ¶4. (C) FM Kohout called the Dialogue an important opportunity. Kohout thought the two sides had managed well the results of the missile defense policy review and noted that Russia was not happy with the new phased adaptive approach (PAA). Kohout highlighted the importance of energy diversity, including at the Temelin nuclear plant (a reference to the Westinghouse bid) and concern about cyber threats. He asked about what to expect on Iran and Yemen. ¶5. (C) Kohout told Gordon some Czechs are worried about being "totally forgotten" (again, caveating that this was not his personal feeling) and urged Gordon not to underestimate this concern. But, he added, the Czech Republic does not expect the U.S. to "be its mother" and it was important for the Czech Republic to work out problems ON its own. He noted that he was associated with a political party "closer to Obama" (a reference to the Social Democrats - CSSD),but that some Czech "experts" were concerned about what they perceived as the President's weakness and lack of leadership. He urged the U.S. to "show its teeth somehow." ¶6. (C) A/S Gordon said the lack of a U.S. ambassador was no reflection ON bilateral relations and thanked Kohout for Czech patience ON the issue. However, anyone who thought President Obama had no "teeth" seriously misunderstood him: he had sent additional troops to Afghanistan and had not compromised principles or allies for better relations with Russia. Gordon identified Iran as an important challenge over the next six months and emphasized the importance of U.S.-EU cooperation ON sanctions. ON Yemen, Gordon advised that the less said publicly about counter-terrorism cooperation, the better: the U.S. was getting good cooperation from the Yemeni government but did not want to advertise it. ¶7. (C) Kohout noted the A/S's upcoming meeting with Deputy Speaker of Parliament and CSSD shadow Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaoralek and said A/S could send an important message on an increase of troops. He said unlike the Defense Minister, who wants an increase of 100-plus, Kohout's ambition is somewhere in the middle, 20-30 people as trainers would be more politically feasible. ¶8. (SBU) He ended by noting that he would like the opportunity to meet SecState and would gladly rearrange his schedule should that be possible. Strategic Dialogue - Afghanistan -------------- PRAGUE 00000030 002 OF 004 ¶9. (SBU) At the beginning of the formal Strategic Dialogue, A/S Gordon thanked Pojar for the Czech contributions in Afghanistan and said the U.S. was pleased with the international response to the President's December speech. Gordon explained the way forward, noting that the U.S. would review the situation late this year with the aim that the U.S. begin transferring more responsibility for security to the Afghans in summer 2011. ¶10. (C) Pojar expressed appreciation for U.S. troop cooperation in Logar, where the Czechs maintain a PRT. Pojar indicated that the Czechs plan to maintain their current level of involvement, and noted it was unlikely the Czech government would increase troop strength in Afghanistan, as the Czechs have "no ambition to play a more significant role." Czech Queries ON Afghanistan -------------- ¶11. (C) Pojar posed several questions to Gordon -whether the U.S. had seen a change in President Karzai over the past six months, the U.S. view of Pakistan, and about Russian cooperation ON Afghanistan. Gordon noted Karzai had said some of the right things, and committed to addressing governance and corruption, but that the U.S. needed to see action. Gordon also stated that we had told Karzai that support for his government would wilt if corruption continued and that we would not be able to support him if he did not demonstrate a commitment to these issues. ¶12. (C) ON Pakistan, Gordon noted that some in the Pakistani military continued to perceive India as the main threat and to sympathize with the Taliban, and thus Pakistan has not been able to put its full attention and assets to address the situation in Afghanistan. Responding to Pojar,s query ON whether Russia has been helpful ON Afghanistan, A/S Gordon noted that the Russians had granted lethal transit, and that Russia seemed to want the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. Pojar noted in response that it was his view that "Russia is not interested in seeing the U.S. succeed in Afghanistan." Energy Security -------------- ¶13. (C) A/S Gordon emphasized that the U.S. was very committed to Eurasian energy security and Special Envoy Morningstar was very active in the region. Experience has shown that countries that are largely dependent ON energy from one country are also dependent politically ON that country. At the end of the day, however, the U.S. cannot be more concerned about Europe's security than the Europeans. It is the Europeans that must lead and the U.S. can help. Pojar agreed that Europe needs to do more. While the Czech gas industry is fully privatized, the GOCR is trying to encourage greater interconnectivity with neighbors. A gas interconnector is being built between the Czech Republic and Poland. There are inchoate plans to build an interconnector with Austria. Nevertheless there are still significant holes in the EU energy grids. More liberalization of the energy market is also needed, although the semi-state Czech electricity company CEZ does not always support this. ¶14. (C) Pojar added, however, that U.S. involvement is often crucial to making progress. The Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline would not have been built without U.S. leadership, and he urged the U.S. to continue to push Turkey and Azerbaijan to reach a gas transit agreement that would allow Nabucco to go forward. A/S Gordon emphasized that the U.S. strongly supports development of a gas pipeline through the southern corridor and was very active in the region. He noted that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement protocol was being blocked by the Turkish parliament which wants progress ON Nagarno-Karabakh, without which it will be difficult to get the gas flowing and U.S.-Turkish relations could suffer. Pojar said he believed Russia felt it had an interest in maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, which "lets them pull the strings." As he had with U/S Tauscher in November, Pojar raised the subject of intelligence sharing ON energy issues. ¶15. (SBU) Pojar also raised concerns that Westinghouse was not being nearly as active as its competitors (the Russian AtomStroyExport and French Areva) in support of its bid to supply the Czech Republic with new nuclear reactors and urged Westinghouse to do more ON the ground to demonstrate its interest. A/S Gordon and Charge Thompson-Jones stressed that Westinghouse was very serious about its bid, and PRAGUE 00000030 003 OF 004 Thompson-Jones promised to share Pojar's concerns with the U.S. company. START -------------- ¶16. (C) Pojar asked about the status of START. A/S Gordon said there were many unresolved issues, including numbers and telemetry. The Russians had miscalculated, believing the U.S. wanted an agreement at all costs, and were surprised when the U.S. did not agree (Pojar said he was glad to hear this). Pojar asked about Russian attempts to link defensive weapons to START. Gordon replied that the Russians knew that there was no chance the U.S. would agree to this. When Pojar asked about timing, Gordon said the U.S. has no deadline and would not be forced into an unacceptable deal. Russia and Central Europe -------------- ¶17. (C) Pojar kicked off the discussion of &Relations with Russia8 by stating it is not clear what the U.S. is trying to achieve via U.S. policy toward Russia. Pojar also inquired about U.S. policy toward Central Europe. He said he understood President Obama did not have experience in this part of the world and recognized that Central Europe was not a top priority, but pressed to know "how much you will be involved." He claimed the U.S. had not shown leadership ON some issues, acknowledging that neither had the EU. He also stated that he sees diminished U.S. interest and growing Russian interest in the region. Rounding out his comments, Pojar highlighted that the Czechs were carefully watching the NATO Strategic Concept debate and that the "real questions" were the meaning of NATO and Article 5. ¶18. (C) Gordon granted that Afghanistan and Iran were top priorities, but challenged the idea that the U.S. was not paying attention to the region. He pointed to the depth of high-level administration foreign-policy decisionmakers with experience in the region and cited a number of examples of NATO and U.S. involvement in the region. Moreover, in no instance had the U.S. sacrificed principles or allies to its Russia policy. The results so far had been modest, Gordon said, but not bad. ¶19. (C) Pojar said the U.S. needed to do more things like NATO contingency planning in the Baltics (an example Gordon had cited). He also said he was satisfied with the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, but expressed concern about its planning, development and funding. He did not think the U.S. approach was wrong, "but we need to see results." He agreed the START process thus far showed the U.S. did not simply want to please Russia. Eastern Partnership -------------- ¶20. (C) Pojar said the EU's more open policy toward Belarus via the Eastern Partnership had perhaps surprised Russia. Gordon said there was a "real opportunity" ON Belarus and thanked the Czechs for helping to initiate the Eastern Partnership within the EU. Gordon noted there were signs Minsk wanted a different relationship with the U.S., and he had recently traveled to the region and that there would be follow-on meetings at his level next month. He did not want to overstate progress, but said the U.S. has taken note of some small steps (such as non-recognition of South Ossetia and release of a U.S. citizen from detention). In addition, he believed Belarus was perhaps starting to chafe under Russian influence. ¶21. (C) Pojar agreed that Belarus was nationalistic and that "it's good to battle Russia in their neighborhood" and not nearer to the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic welcomed U.S. cooperation ON Belarus and the Eastern Partnership in general with the U.S. ON this. ¶22. (C) Pojar noted that several EU countries had pushed for Russian attendance at Eastern Partnership meetings. The Czechs had no objection to Russian participation as long as other third countries, including the U.S. and Turkey, were included as well, a stumbling block for some EU colleagues.. ¶23. (C) ON Ukraine, A/S Gordon and Pojar agreed there was no easy formula for the way forward. Gordon noted that it was important that the upcoming elections be legitimate; the U.S. was sending election monitors to try to make sure it was free and fair. Pojar urged the U.S. to make sure no IMF funds to Ukraine were diverted to pay Ukraine's gas debts to Russia. PRAGUE 00000030 004 OF 004 Middle East -------------- ¶24. (C) Pojar asked "what can I expect" in the Middle East (Note: Pojar will become the next Czech ambassador to Israel later this month. End Note). A/S Gordon gave a realistic assessment of the peace process; Pojar had nothing to add. He expressed hope EU Middle East policy would become more realistic and less reflexively pro-Palestinian. ¶25. (C) Pojar asked about U.S. timing ON Iran. Gordon predicted that Iran's internal political turmoil would probably not soon produce changes in its government, or its nuclear policy. Gordon said the U.S. was now examining sanctions. He stated that while the first recourse is to work through the UN Security Council, Gordon indicated he did not expect it to produce strong sanctions, and therefore the U.S. and EU would need to work together ON sanctions. ¶26. (C) Pojar asked about the status of Russian SA-300 missile sales to Iran. Gordon said Russia knew the U.S. would view any move here as an aggressive step. He also indicated the U.S. would not "compensate" Russia for not selling the missiles to Iran. Western Balkans -------------- ¶27. (C) The Czechs focused the Balkan discussion ON Bosnia, particularly the Butmir process and the closure of the Office of the High Representative in (OHR). A/S Gordon highlighted that Deputy Secretary Steinberg had gone three times to advance the Butmir process, and noted that the impetus for advancing the process and implementing reforms must come from the parties themselves. ¶28. (C) Commenting ON the OHR, Gordon noted that the 5 2 "conditions" required for OHR closure have yet to be met and that we should not simply drop these requirements. DFM Pojar pressed ON this issue, and noted the European view that the EUSR may be more effective. Gordon pointed out that Republica Srpska PM Dodik has repeatedly challenged OHR and there is no indication that he will treat the EUSR any differently. ¶29. (C) The Czechs also posed the question of whether the USG believes we will need to wait for a change of leaders in order to see progress advancing reforms. Gordon noted that for now we should stick to the OHR and press for the conditions to be met. Czechs Wish to Continue Dialogue -------------- ¶30. (C) Pojar urged continuation of the Strategic Dialogue including lower-level meetings ON specific topics, and between officials of different agencies. He believed the MFA would want to continue the Strategic Dialogue even after a change of government following upcoming May elections. ¶31. (U) A/S Gordon and DFM Pojar conducted a media availability in which both sides praised the useful Dialogue, and A/S Gordon took questions ON the content of the Dialogue, missile defense, and the status of a new U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic. ¶32. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this message. Thompson-Jones