FATA SECURITY UPDATE; PAKISTANI/RC-EAST COORDINATION ON

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000010 E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/25/2020 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS PK AF SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE; PAKISTANI/RC-EAST COORDINATION ON BAJAUR CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Consul General, Peshawar, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During a January 23 briefing for RC-East MG Scapparotti, 11th Corps Chief of Staff BG Aamer provided an overview of the security situation in FATA and Malakand Division, Northwest Frontier Province. It would take at least a year, predicted Aamer, to finish military operations and create the conditions for civilian development that is required to stabilize the area. The imminent operation in Bajaur (for which MG Scaparrotti met the same day with Frontier Corps MG Tariq Khan to plan coordinated operations) was designed to: (a) prevent militants who had re-infiltrated into Bajaur from again threatening the neighboring settled areas of Malakand Division; and (b) finish operations in northern FATA so that they could redeploy and increase forces in the south (i.e., North Waziristan) by May-June. 11th Corps Commander LTG Masood made it clear that the Army had decided to change tactics and would no longer displace local populations ahead of combat because the post-conflict consequences of this in Bajaur and Malakand had been too disruptive. The Army and the Frontier Corps again complained about militant support from the Governor of Kunar Province and noted the importance of reconstruction and restoring civilian governance to their ability to reverse militancy. This is a joint CG Peshawar SOC-FWD Pakistan message. End Summary. South/North Waziristan (SWA/NWA) ¶2. (C) According to Aamer, the Army is continuing "synchronized, calibrated" operations around Ladha in central SWA where militants are trying to regroup because they increasingly are being denied support in NWA. The Wazir tribe is "completely on board," and discussions with the dominant Mehsud tribe (reftel) continue. Many within the Mehsud tribe are now openly advocating support to the Government of Pakistan which is considered to be against their cultural norms. The Army is expanding its "social space" of areas in which the local population supports anti-militant operations with both intelligence and the denial of sanctuary. ¶3. (C) IEDs remain the weapon of choice within SWA and all indications are the TTP leadership has fled the Agency to NWA and left behind mid-level leadership and foot soldiers behind to continue harassment operations. Gul Bhadar continues to support these resistance activities. Both Aamer and Masood highlighted the $55 million USAID has provided for SWA. ¶4. (C) In North Waziristan (NWA),"the environment is being shaped (through roadblocks and snap operations) to deal effectively with the situation by the middle of the year." The Army will be rotating forces in May/June, with the "quiet" result of an added infantry battalion and additional Special Service Group (Special Forces) troops. The relief in place of these infantry formations is designed to bring fresh troops into the environment as the current formations have been engaged in combat operations for nearly two continuous years. ¶5. (C) The January 21-22 operations in NWA included an attack that killed ten militants along the border near Machi Khel and an airstrike on a militant compound outside Miram Shah where known Arab, Uzbek, and Afghan fighters were living. Aamer said that the areas around Mir Ali, Miram Shah, Datta Khel and the Tochi Valley remained problematic. Extremists were being supported by Gul Bahadar, foreign fighters and Punjabi militants (Note: no mention of the Haqqani network but an interesting admission on the presence of Punjabi militants). The problem was that these areas were heavily populated (Aamer claimed the population of NWA was now about 800,000); LTG Masood said several times that the Army had abandoned its previous strategy of depopulating areas before military operations. "There will be no new displacements," as this punishes the tribes and creates too many post-conflict challenges. Aamer and Masood voiced the hope that the NWA population has taken a lesson from what happened in SWA and will cooperate with the government to preclude a similar fate for themselves. Orakzai/Mohmand/Kurram/Khyber ¶6. (C) Most of the access points to Orakzai Agency have been blocked but further action is planned after the Bajaur operation is completed. The plan is to encircle Mangal Bagh's militants in the Tirah Valley (a central point in the Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies). This is the area that al-Qaida wants to keep in reserve as a sanctuary if they lose the Waziristans, according to Aamer. The Thall-Parachinar road in Kurram, which was blocked by militants for over a year, is now open; the major concern in Kurram now is habitual Sunni-Shi'a conflict. Pockets of resistance along the border remain in Mohmand Agency, which serves as a conduit between Bajaur and Khyber/Orakzai. The Frontier Corps will continue sporadic operations in Khyber Agency, which controls Af-Pak trade and Coalition Forces' supply routes and protects Peshawar. Bajaur ¶7. (C) Aamer noted that militants from Swat and Dir (Malakand Division, NWFP) as well as from the Khyber and Orakzai Agencies in FATA and Afghanistan had been steadily moving into the Bajaur area in recent months. These included Maulana Fazlullah, Qari Hussain, Jan Wali, Qazi Zia ur Rehman, and Salih Mohammad. The focus of militant activity remains the Mahmond tehsil along the border with Kunar Province in Afghanistan, but Aamer admitted they do not yet have full control of the restive Charmang Valley. The Frontier Corps has established concentric rings, an inner one around Mahmond tehsil and another around Khar to block militant exits. Since the militants are aware of planned operations, however, Aamer said the leaders already were slipping away to Afghanistan. The focus on the upcoming operation will be against mid-level forces; the plan is to regain control of Mohmand and station troops there for at least six months to stabilize the agency. ¶8. (S/REL PAK) Aamer and Masood were adamant the Governor of Kunar was providing logistical and refuge support to TNSM Commander Faqir Mohmand and remained concerned the upcoming Bajaur operation would merely displace him and his key leaders to Afghanistan. ¶9. (S/REL PAK) Masood noted the importance of securing Bajaur that he identified as key to securing the northern portion of Pakistan. Preventing movement through Bajaur into Lower Dir, combined with efforts in Afghanistan in preventing movement through Nuristan, would secure the Malakand Division. Security within the settled areas will allow the Pakistan military to shift some of the nearly three divisions' worth of troops currently acting as a hold force there to support the efforts in SWA and NWA. Aamer inserted into this discussion the importance of developmental and reconstructive aid into this region, and specifically asked for donor representation in Khar, Bajaur. U.S. Operations in Afghanistan ¶10. (C) Noting that RC-East covered the major population centers important to improving governance and controlling Kabul, LTG Masood asked why the U.S. was concentrating the troop surge in RC-South. Scaparrotti replied that we needed to control a Taliban resurgence but noted that his major focus was governance and the number of civilian experts in RC-East had increased from 30-174 during his command. Bio Note ¶11. (C) LTG Masood's only son was killed in the December 4 attack on a mosque in Rawalpindi. Since then, he has been reporting to the 11th Corps headquarters in Peshawar only infrequently. Before his son's death, he was due to retire but was extended for the SWA operation. Mission sources report that COAS General Kayani has agreed that Masood will be given the option of remaining in Peshawar but for how long remains unclear. In the meetings today, he was particularly unfocused and BG Aamer, who has effectively been running 11th Corps, interrupted and corrected his commander on several occasions. Operational Planning With the Frontier Corps ¶12. (C) In a follow-on meeting, FC MG Tariq provided a detailed historical overview of the FATA/NWFP covering the last several years. He particularly explained how the GoP agreed to a series of deals with various militant factors and tribes because of political necessity. As the deals were broken by the various factions, the GoP used this as justification to conduct operations against them. ¶13. (C) Bajaur was the first major operation conducted but was unable to conclude due to unrest within Malakand and eventually SWA. Currently the militants were attempting to reconsolidate their position in the northern portions of Bajaur believing the difficult terrain and Faqir Muhammad's grip on the region prevented effective FC interdiction. Tariq claimed the local tribes want them removed from the area. ¶14. (S/REL PAK) The current plan is to conduct a three phased operation against the remaining contested regions with Bajaur. The first two are directed at pushing the militants up through Mohmand tehsil towards Afghanistan with an expectation RC-E would conduct disrupting operations as a blocking force. The third phase is directed towards Hashim Valley, along the southern portion of Bajaur. Shaping operations were due to begin January 24 with the initiation of air strikes against pre-planned targets followed by a ground assault beginning on January 26. The actual start will be dependent on the weather. An Agency-wide curfew will be issued 24hrs prior to the ground assault in order to isolate the militant and safeguard the population. Tariq did not expect any major population disruptions. ¶15. (S/REL PAK) The Frontier Corps operations will target the following militant groups: - Faqir Muhammad (Strength: 180-200) - Ibn-e-Amin/Fateh (Strength: 150-200) - Jan Wali Alisa Sheena Gp (Strength: 70-80) - Maulv I Umar Group (Strength: 25-30) - Qari Zia Ur Rheman Group (Strength: 40-50) Each of the elements are known supporters of Faqir Muhammad, who is the dominant threat personality in Bajaur. Faqir Muhammad is currently broadcasting through FM thaQe is ready to support the GoP, but Tariq believes he is using these statements to buy time prior to the launch of the offensive. This is not the first time Faqir Muhammad has used this tactic. ¶16. (S/REL PAK) Like 11th Corps, the Frontier Corps iterated to RC-East their belief, based on intelligence analysis, that the Governor of Kunar is providing logistical and refuge support to the militants. The preferred tactic was to cross into Afghanistan for about a kilometer, cache their equipment, and blend into the local population to evade capture. ¶16. (S/REL PAK) RC-East, Frontier Corps, 11th Corps, and SOC(FWD)-PAK will use the Intel Fusion Cells as the deconfliction point and the conduit to pass intelligence back and forth. PUTNAM