MADAGASCAR/FRANCE: THE U.S. AND FRANCE "SHARE THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000066 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PINS KDEM MA FR SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR/FRANCE: THE U.S. AND FRANCE "SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES" REF: A. 09 PARIS 1754 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 12 Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Political Minister-Counselor, 1.4 (b /d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz on January 20 minimized apparent differences between U.S. and French policy towards Madagascar by saying that "we share the same objectives" with respect to a consensus-based approach leading towards inclusive and free and fair elections, possibly by mid-2010. Gompertz believed that the earlier process based on the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords was dead and that instead of reviving them, we should be trying to convince the parties to agree on a roadmap towards elections. The discussion with Gompertz followed recent discussions at the Presidency (Remi Marechaux) and at the MFA working level (desk officer Beatrice Lederle) which demonstrated the difficulty of finding a clear and convincing solution to Madagascar's complex political crisis. Lederle also indicated that the Presidency was making key GOF decisions about Madagascar, despite the MFA's reportedly more "prudent" approach. END SUMMARY. Meeting with Gompertz (January 20) -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz met with POL/MC and Africa Assistant on January 20 to discuss a range of African issues, including Madagascar (Gompertz's views on other issues are reported septel). Gompertz said that the situation in Madagascar remained difficult, with no ready solution. He regretted very much the failure of the consensus-based process that included the earlier Maputo and Addis Ababa accords. He placed most of the blame on SADC mediator Chissano for his ill-advised decision to hold the final meeting in Maputo (Maputo III) when he knew that three faction leaders Ravalomanana Ratsiraka, and Zafy) would attend but that Rajoelina would not. That alone ended the consensus. Gompertz thought that Rajoelina was equally to blame for the breakdown in the earlier process, with several questionable decisions, including non-attendance at Maputo III and his subsequent refusal to allow the other faction leaders to return to Madagascar. Rajoelina has since pursued his unilateral call for elections. Although singling out Chissano and Rajoelina, Gompertz indicated that the other principal actors could have shown more flexibility at various points as well. ¶3. (C) In Gompertz's view, the Maputo and Addis Ababa chain of negotiations was no longer viable, and France believed that it was best to find a way to gain broad-based agreement to support elections, although Rajoelina's March date was much too early, with a mid-2010 date more realistic. Gompertz said that it would be pointless to try to return to the earlier process. ¶4. (C) We noted that the U.S. hoped that the parties could return to a consensus-based approach to address a number of issues. Gompertz acknowledged what appeared to be a difference in U.S. and French views, but he insisted that "we share the same goal" in terms of bringing stability to Madagascar via eventual free and fair elections. He repeated, however, that the way to do that was to move forward on the elections issue and not try to revive the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords, which, he reiterated, no longer offered a workable path to a solution. ¶5. (C) Gompertz was more vague in describing how best, tactically, to move forward with an election scheme. He said at one point "whatever works is OK for us." In the interim, he said that France has lobbied Rajoelina to do his best to operate an inclusive government. The objective was to avoid unilateral, Rajoelina-controlled elections that excluded the others. Some measures that could also be taken included an amnesty provision and some assurance to Ravalomanana that his private business interests would be left alone. He hoped that the AU mission led by Jean Ping, scheduled to begin meetings in Madagascar on January 21 would produce results and create momentum but he was not sure it would. (MFA DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau said on January 21 that Paris was not sending anyone to the Ping meeting but he thought an International Contact Group (ICG) meeting could take place "before the end of January.") Meeting with Presidential Advisor Marechaux -------------- ¶6. (C) The meeting with Gompertz followed two recent meetings with Presidency and MFA officials. On January 8, PARIS 00000066 002 OF 003 Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux provided Africa Watcher with his assessment of the January 6 ICG meeting on Madagascar. Marechaux did not offer "talking points" per se, but rather tried to explain France's reasoning for abandoning the Maputo and Addis processes. He asserted that France was not simply echoing Rajoelina's call for elections, but rather sought assurance that the elections would be inclusive, credible, and fair, in the belief that this was the most effective way to resolve Madagascar's continuing political instability. Meeting with MFA Desk Officer Lederle -------------- ¶7. (C) On January 14, MFA Desk Officer Beatrice Lederle confided to Africa Watcher that French support for Rajoelina's call for elections was adopted only after a robust internal debate. The MFA wanted to be "prudent," but the Presidency determined it best to support the call for elections. Lederle readily acknowledged that it would be very difficult to get the opposition to agree, and said that Rajoelina seemed not to realize he needed to make concessions to the opposition. He seemed, in fact, to think France's statements were all the backing he needed, which Lederle said was a mistake. ¶8. (C) Lederle shared a draft non-paper on France's ideas for moving forward. The GOF would very likely present something close to this at the next ICG meeting, though Lederle asserted that the paper was designed to promote discussion and should be considered "food for thought" rather than firm policy. (We have forwarded the non-paper to Ambassador Carter and AF/S). ¶9. (C) France was willing to give Jean Ping's efforts to find a path towards a new consensus government a chance and would then react to his report, but there was little optimism in Paris that Ping would succeed, she admitted. At the same time, Lederle said that if the parties reached partial agreement as a result of Ping's efforts, this would represent progress. How to Reach Agreement? -------------- ¶10. (C) Neither Gompertz, Marechaux, nor Lederle offered a strategy for reaching an agreement among the political parties to move forward towards elections -- "whatever works is OK," as Gompertz put it. Marechaux opined that Ravalomanana and Zafy might be convinced to support elections because they both believed they would do very well. Lederle, on the other hand, thought Ravalomanana was the only one who could really rally a turnout. She said that Rajoelina did not have much of a party structure in place, just a loose coalition of small parties. ¶11. (C) Lederle said that France was considering what carrots and sticks were available, but admitted that options were limited. She said France could talk to the opposition about "amnesty" (but could not explain why the opposition would be interested in giving up their goal to again lead the country),and that the current government should be interested in "election assistance" and the blessings of international credibility. According to both Marechaux and Lederle, France did not have a very robust assistance program in place (and no budget support) and had already diminished its military assistance, due to budget cuts. Further on France's Policy Shift -------------- ¶12. (C) France invested a tremendous amount of time, energy, and money (mainly in the form of covering operating expenses, providing air travel support to some of the parties, etc.) in trying to establish a consensus government, according to Marechaux. He added that France put tremendous pressure on all the parties to abide by the previous agreements. But that did not work, and it was now time for a new approach (which accurately summarizes Gompertz's view as expressed on January 20). ¶13. (C) Marechaux said that Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka appeared satisfied to let Madagascar's economic and security situations deteriorate. Lederle said that Ravalomanana was getting ready to organize demonstrations (but he might wait until after Ping's consultations). ¶14. (C) Previewing Gompertz, Marechaux stated that errors were made on all sides. He was particularly frustrated with the Maputo III document and wondered how SADC mediator Chissano could have signed it "when it contradicts Addis on a PARIS 00000066 003 OF 003 number of points" (e.g., concerning Presidential structure, Presidential authority, composition of the government). ¶15. (C) Both Marechaux and Lederle conceded that the January 6 ICG meeting demonstrated that the U.S. and France remained divided on how to move forward, but both hoped that some common approach could be forged. Marechaux was bothered by what he termed the inflexible position by some African nations. He said that while France and the U.S. "know Madagascar well" and have been following its issues for years, Uganda, for example, had no understanding of the dynamics in play. Rajoelina May Be on Thin Ice -------------- ¶16. (C) Though often considered "France's choice," neither Marechaux nor Lederle expressed confidence in Rajoelina's leadership. According to Lederle, he had had no national constituency. Rather, he viewed himself in almost messianic terms as the one "called to save his country," though he exhibited few administrative skills. Marechaux viewed Rajoelina as young, inexperienced, and without any understanding of what it takes to lead a country. As examples of his "immaturity," Marechaux said that as Maputo III was unfolding, Rajoelina refused to call Chissano. Also, sometimes Rajoelina would decide he "just wants a quiet evening at home with his family" and would not answer his phone for anyone. ¶17. (C) In terms of an eventual way forward, Marechaux believed Rajoelina could accept a strong Prime Minister imposed by a new National Assembly, adding that he had agreed to a greatly diminished role with the Addis Ababa agreement. If there were a concerted movement towards elections, Rajoelina would have no choice but to get on board, even if the electoral process did not conform to his original intentions and even if it clearly indicated the beginning of the end of his time as head of state. Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) Clearly part of the problem for France is that the French do not want Madagascar's political crisis to drag on indefinitely, with social upheaval and risks to the over 20,000 French citizens in Madagascar, and with demands for major new GOF investments of time and expense. They seem to view the process centered on arriving at a political consensus that would have created a broad-based framework for going forward as having exhausted itself, with little chance for resuscitation. ¶19. (C) Now, the prospect of elections, in the French view, holds more promise, even if this puts France in the position of supporting Rajoelina's latest scheme and even if the French do not offer a coherent strategy for having all parties agree to elections. In some respects, French policy has returned to what it was before the process involving Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy took form -- with elections as a goal -- although the involvement of the earlier presidents has changed the dynamics dramatically from what they were earlier. END COMMENT. ¶20. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. RIVKIN