FRANCE/GABON (SENEGAL)/RWANDA: PREVIEW OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000216 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2030 TAGS: PREL EAID SENV MOPS SG GB RW FR SUBJECT: FRANCE/GABON (SENEGAL)/RWANDA: PREVIEW OF PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S FEBRUARY 24-25 VISITS PARIS 00000216 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French President Nicolas Sarkozy visits Gabon (February 24) and Rwanda (February 25),spending about 24 hours in the former and about three in the latter. His Africa advisors told us on February 23 that in Gabon, he will sign a renegotiated defense agreement that will include a continuing military basing arrangement in Gabon. France and Senegal have agreed to end the basing agreement in Senegal, with the French retaining a residual presence in Senegal. The decision -- which our contact described as "as good an outcome as we could have asked for" with respect to Senegal -- about the bases will allow the rapid conclusion of a new defense agreement with Senegal. France views relations with Gabon entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar Bongo, the elections of Ali Bongo, the need for Gabon to restructure its economy because of its dwindling oil resources, and France's interest in developing more efficient commercial and banking arrangements, in part to respond to China's way of doing business in Africa. Following shortly after the renewal of France-Rwanda diplomatic relations in November, Sarkozy will make a three hour visit to Kigali on February 25, in a visit best described as a confidence-building exercise. Sarkozy will likely acknowledge that France, as part of the international community, bears some responsibility for the 1994 genocide, but cannot be singled out for blame. He will press the idea that France and Rwanda must remember the past, but now look to the future. END SUMMARY. Overview -------------- ¶2. (U) According to an official Presidential announcement, Sarkozy will arrive in Mvengue-Franceville, Gabon, at 0800 on February 24, where he will be greeted by President Bongo. They will pay their respects to the late President Bongo at his mausoleum, hold discussions, and then visit the Centre International de Recherches Medicales de Franceville. The parties will then proceed to Libreville, where they will visit the Rougier plywood factory. Sarkozy will then deliver a speech at the Cite de la Democratie, followed by a reception for the French community in Gabon, followed by a dinner hosted by Bongo. Sarkozy will leave the next morning (February 25),arriving in Kigali at 1315, where President Kagame will greet him. They will hold discussions, after which there will be a press conference, a lunch hosted by Kagame, a visit to a memorial to genocide victims, and finally Sarkozy's departure at 1620 on February 25. Gabon (and Senegal) -------------- ¶3. (C) Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux on February 23 briefed Africa Watcher and Africa Assistant on the Gabon portion of the visit. He began by discussing the military bases issue and how, in 2008, an intra-GOF defense review concluded that France needed only one military base on the Atlantic side of Africa. This suggestion coincided with Sarkozy's policies on Africa and the need for France to rationalize its presence there and to seek greater efficiencies and cost effectiveness. There were once three French military bases, in Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon. The base in Cote d'Ivoire effectively closed during the recent political turmoil there, leaving the bases in Senegal and Gabon. Marechaux said there was much back-and-forth within the GOF on which base to close. France, he noted, has had a military presence in Senegal, of one sort or another, since 1659. ¶4. (C) Defense Minister Morin did not make things easier by suggesting not long ago that France would keep both bases. Marechaux said that Morin (whom Marechaux described as a bit gaffe-prone) was mis-interpreted in that the 2010 French budget included provisions for both bases as the decision to close one had not been made by the time the budget was made. In the meantime, Senegal's President Wade had made several statements about wanting the bases returned to Senegal, in part because they occupy very desirable land in Senegal that could be put to other lucrative uses. ¶5. (C) Marechaux said the decision almost "made itself" because the Senegalese told the French that if France wanted to maintain a base in Senegal, it could do so but would have PARIS 00000216 002.2 OF 003 to construct a new base in a new location, with the old bases reverting to Senegalese control. Marechaux said the French told the Senegalese that that would be a factor in French decision-making. In the end, France chose Gabon. Morin went to Senegal to assuage the Senegalese, telling Wade that "we've done what you asked for, we are returning this valuable land." Marechaux expressed relief, saying that Wade took the same line, saying that France had given Senegal back her lands. Marechaux said that the outcome was about as good as France could have expected. Marechaux said that France would retain a couple of hundred troops in Senegal, to man two small bases (more like offices) near the port and airport in Dakar. These would not be operational bases but rather communications and logistics coordination hubs that could facilitate French deployments in West Africa if necessary. The details had not yet been worked out. ¶6. (C) The decision on the bases will allow France and Gabon, during Sarkozy's visit, to sign a new defense agreement, the first revision since the immediate post-independence period. Marechaux explained that the existing defense agreement was simply obsolete, as it provided, among other things, for France to provide internal security in Gabon during political unrest. The resolution of the base issue will allow France to sign a new defense agreement with Senegal, "within weeks," Marechaux predicted. ¶7. (C) Aside from these pol/mil issues, Marechaux said that Gabon was entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar Bongo, the election of his son, and the prospect of dwindling oil reserves forcing Gabon to seek avenues for diversifying its economy. Marechaux said that France wants to play a close, cooperative, and helpful role as Gabon transitions. Marechaux mentioned China as an impetus for change, both for Gabon and France. He said that France, through the French Development Agency (AFD) would establish new mechanisms for project financing to make implementation more efficient. French projects "sometimes take years to conclude," whereas the Chinese projects can happen very quickly. Marechaux said that France would still try to maintain a strong sense of transparency, "good governance," and "virtue" (as he put it) even if China only cared about winning project and speed. "We will try to show them that our method will provide ancillary benefits to Gabon," he said. ¶8. (C) Marechaux also explained that AFD is also going to pilot a new project of guaranteeing bank bonds as a way to generate investment funds for local enterprise. He mentioned efforts to develop Gabon's mining sector, in which the French government, via its involvement with an AREVA subsidiary, is working with Gabon on manganese extraction. France hopes that Gabon will exploit other mineral wealth, in an environmentally friendly way, as its oil supply is exhausted. ¶9. (C) Sarkozy will try to advance France's dialogue with Gabon on global issues, such as the Copenhagen process on the environment, the MICOPAX arrangement in C.A.R, and Gabon's role on the UN Security Council (noting in particular that Gabon will hold the Chair in March, which will likely be a critical time for decisions on Iran sanctions). Sarkozy will also visit the Rougier plywood operation, which, Marechaux said, uses wood from a French-supported sustainable forestry project. Rougier is also a model company in terms of its labor policies. Marechaux said that Sarkozy wants to use Rougier as a model of a modern company with true "green" credentials that could be emulated in Gabon and elsewhere. ¶10. (C) Marechaux said that Sarkozy was willing to meet with Gabon's political opposition group. He said that the opposition was being very sly, expressing an interest in meeting with Sarkozy but wanting Sarkozy to ask for the meeting. He said that after much to-an-fro, the meeting had been arranged but that the opposition was still trying to make it appear that it would take place at Sarkozy's request. ¶11. (C) FM Kouchner, Secstate for Cooperation and Francophonie Joyandet, the Presidency's Africa cell, and a host of business leaders and members of the press will accompany Sarkozy to both Gabon and Rwanda. Marechaux, expressing a bit of disdain, noted that businessman and lawyer Robert Bourgi, was in the official party. Marechaux PARIS 00000216 003.2 OF 003 (PROTECT) described Bourgi as a "mercenary" interested only in his own well-being. But he will nonetheless be on Sarkozy's plane, to Marechaux's apparent displeasure. RWANDA -------------- ¶12. (C) Sarkozy's short visit to Rwanda is both simpler and more complex, as described by the Elysee's junior AF Advisor, Clement LeClerc. The underlying goal is to reinforce the recently renewed (November 29, 2009) diplomatic relations between France and Rwanda, and, more importantly, turn the page away from the 1994 genocide and towards a new era of cooperation. LeClerc stated that Sarkozy will again acknowledge that France, along with the entire international community, must recognize some responsibility for mistakes made before and during the genocide, but that France was neither the cause nor the enabler. During his January visit to Kigali, FM Kouchner did not face any significant criticism from the local press or politicians asserting France's culpability, and therefore LeClerc did not expect Sarkozy would have to address these old accusations. Interestingly, LeClerc digressed to assert that most of the French NGOs and other voices that continue to claim French culpability in the genocide are aligned politically with parties on the left, and therefore they are trying to keep this a pertinent issue to be addressed by Sarkozy's center-right government. Sarkozy's core message is "don't forget the past, but likewise, don't be paralyzed by it -- don't let the past become a barrier to progress on our relations." ¶13. (C) A French President has not visited Rwanda in 25 years, but Sarkozy has pursued this trip as a foreign policy goal since 2007. Sarkozy's 3-hour visit to Kigali is expected to be almost exclusively an engagement with President Kagame, including a short meeting, a joint press conference, and a lunch. Finally, and most symbolically, Sarkozy will lay a wreath at the genocide memorial. The trip will be short on "deliverables," in part because France's foreign assistance budget for the coming year was calculated before the restoration of relations took place and therefore did not assign additional funds for Rwanda-related projects. LeClerc expects that France will be able to offer significantly more assistance in the future. One goal of the visit is to speed the resumption of cultural ties, including setting in motion the reestablishment of a French Cultural Center and a French school, and allowing Radio France International to recreate its Rwandan bureau. ¶14. (C) According to LeClerc, Sarkozy is unlikely to raise delicate national or regional political issues on order to focus the visit towards enhancing the bilateral relationship. At the same time, France continues to search for a role in helping bring peace to the broader Great Lakes region, mostly via the efforts of Special Envoy Christian Connan, by creating cross-boarder economic projects with some financial and technical support from the French Development Agency. ¶15. (C) We asked LeClerc about press reports stating that France was going to try to organize a two-part Great Lakes donor's conference in May/June 2010. While LeClerc said that that remained an objective, he acknowledged that there were many unresolved obstacles that had to be overcome. The conference would not be a certainty until such issues as venue, participants, format, agenda, and other such matters were resolved. LeClerc noted that Kabila, Kagame, and the other leaders of the broader Great Lakes community all had their preferences, and they all were suspicious of each other and were wary about ending up with the short end of the stick. Leclerc repeated that organizing such a conference could be difficult and he could not state with certainty that it would come about. (COMMENT: Our own take, after speaking with LeClerc, is that the article in Le Parisen, which we circulated to the Department and to posts in the region, may have been excessively optimistic and presumptive. However, the French clearly would like to see the conference take place, and we will continue to monitor their thinking. END COMMENT.) PEKALA