FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON COTE D'IVOIRE: TIME FOR A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000200 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W NSC FOR MGAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030 TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR PINR IV MR FR SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON COTE D'IVOIRE: TIME FOR A POWER-SHARING DEAL REF: PARIS 109 PARIS 00000200 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following his recent visit to Cote d'Ivoire, Laurent Bigot, MFA DAS for West Africa, believes that a new approach for resolving the country's political crisis is needed and he is developing a policy proposal involving a negotiated agreement among the parties in advance of contested elections. Bigot admits this scenario would be a major concession to Gbagbo, who would gain a recognized mandate as president. It would, however, also give the opposition factions a significant role in a restructured government prior to elections. Given that the main opposition parties appear powerless to stop Gbagbo from interminably delaying elections, they should be willing to consider this solution, Bigot believes. ECOWAS mediator Compaore would need to play a key role in obtaining the Ivoirians' agreement. Bigot also believes that the GOF needs to take a much less visible role in Cote d'Ivoire, both to facilitate a transition and to reduce the likelihood of anti-French violence. Bigot was struck by how comfortably Cote d'Ivoire appears to have settled into two separate geographic entities. END SUMMARY. RESOLVE IMPASSE WITH NEGOTIATED GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) French MFA DAS for West Africa, Laurent Bigot, who visited Cote d'Ivoire in early February, shared on February 18 his views with Africa-watcher on the need for France to significantly modify its approach to Cote d'Ivoire. Following President Gbagbo's February 12 dissolution of the cabinet and dismissal of the country's independent electoral commission, Bigot is convinced that Gbagbo will never implement fully the Ouagadougou Agreement and permit presidential elections, as long as there remains any chance that he could lose. Bigot believes that Gbagbo will continue to create excuses for postponing the elections "for years." ¶3. (C) Therefore, Bigot believes a new, "pragmatic" approach is needed to overcome the present impasse and create genuine momentum for elections. Central to Bigot's thinking is to encourage the major parties to negotiate a new, consensus government that would allow Gbagbo to remain as president for some formal mandate in advance of elections. The other parties would be represented at high levels in the government, with, in Bigot's assessment, RDR Leader Alassane Ouattera as Prime Minister (or some other party representative since Ouattara might not want to return to the PM's office),current PM and FN leader Guillaume Soro could be President of the National Assembly, and Bedie's PDCI Party could have some other high position. Other ministerial slots would also be negotiated. ¶4. (C) In Bigot's opinion, obtaining the parties' agreement may be possible. He thinks that Gbagbo would accept a mixed government under his continued presidency. Bigot reiterated (Reftel) that Ouattera, while remaining hugely popular in northern Cote d'Ivoire, likely does not actually want to be president since he knows his election could lead to national violence and likely attempts on his life. Therefore, it might be possible to get the RDR on board. Bigot mentioned that Ouattera had met in Paris with the Africa advisors at the French Presidency on February 12, but the GOF was not yet ready to propose the negotiated government Bigot described to us. ¶5. (C) A model for this type of political resolution can be found in Mauritania whereby, Bigot asserted, a power-sharing government was instituted that legitimized the electoral process. Bigot believes that SRSG Choi could accept Bigot's scenario, but that the key player is ECOWAS Mediator Campaore, who, in Bigot's view, should be supportive and whose ability to obtain the Ivoirians' agreement would be essential. Overall, according to Bigot, it is time for all the actors to be "realistic" about Gbagbo's position and pursue a new solution. FRANCE NEEDS TO GET OUT OF THE SPOTLIGHT -------------- ¶6. (C) Bigot's second major proposal for France-Cote d'Ivoire is that the GOF must visibly recede into the background. France should stop "naming and shaming" Ivoirian political actors, including Gbagbo, should be very circumspect in its public pronouncements, and should avoid PARIS 00000200 002.2 OF 002 any suggestion of favoritism among the factions. (Note: The MFA's public statement following Gbagbo's February 12 actions was markedly restrained. End note.) Bigot admitted that France is viewed, with some reason, as being anti-Gbagbo, but this must change. In addition, Bigot will recommend that Ouattera, and others, no longer be granted secret audiences at the Elysee or MFA. With Gbabgo again proving his entrenched position, the GOF must establish a more "low-key" attitude, both to help move the political discussion forward and also to "protect" the 14,000 French citizens in the country who remain at risk should new violence break out. Bigot suggested that as long as France plays a visible role, its interests are vulnerable to militants who will try to blame France for Cote d'Ivoire's problems. IMPRESSIONS OF "TWO COUNTRIES" -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During his week-long mission to Cote d'Ivoire in early February, Bigot met with senior officials from the major political parties and came away with the impression that they are ready for a new approach. Bigot traveled as far north a Bouake and was struck by how completely and comfortably divided into "two countries" Cote d'Ivoire had become. While admitting there are many indications of increasing poverty in both the north and south, the country's two halves appeared to be operating parallel economies. Those making money, including legitimate and black market businesses as well as "fee" collectors along the main roads, are very content with the status quo. He fears that without a near-term political solution this division could become permanent. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) It is not at all certain that Bigot will succeed in significantly altering France's approach to Cote d'Ivoire. His boss, AF A/S Gompertz, as well as FM Kouchner, are probably not ready to give up the democratic ideal, but an increasingly "realist" Elysee could well agree. Bigot's position, perhaps a product of his own frustration with the continuously postponed elections, would represent a major concession to Gbagbo, but French officials are obviously losing patience with the current impasse. France is hamstrung as well on removing expensive Operation Licorne forces until an "acceptable" transition is in place, and seem increasingly willing to trade-off questionable democratic credentials for stability and security. ¶9. (U) Conakry minimize considered. RIVKIN